


Kings Bench. Montreal.

Civil Pleas.

1811

13 Decr. 1820.



A.

Armour. . . .	Yarker. . . .	9
Archambault . . .	Fultum & al' . . .	8284 92144
Armour	Peddie. . . .	127162
Armour. . . .	Thurien	129
Armour. . . .	Hunter & al. . . .	226

B.

Bowman. . . .	Galloway. . . .	23
Bourré	Grandprie	30
Blackwood. . . .	Terrier & al'	47
Bleigny & Iarry	Marmier & al'	60
Brennet. . . .	Legauet	78
Blackwood	Guy. . . .	96 103 122
Bouthillier & Preston		125
Bouchard	Belanger	150
Beaujeu	Trusdell	154
Barsalou	Orkney & al'	172

C

Cormier	- + Henry & al	29
Carmel	- + Chisholm	42
Chartier	- + Descelles & al	153
Campbell	- + Leprohon	170

D

Donegany	- + Pickle	6
Dubord, M ^{me} Eno	- + Dery	15
Daries	- + Snow	24
Durocher	- + Beaubien	49 220
Dorions & al	- + Dorions	163
Dumont & al	- + Forgeron & al	205
Duplessis	- + Cardinal	210

E

F. G.

Foretier. - - -	Morrison. - -	3
Fournier. - - -	Monpellier -	26
Fisher. - - -	Lacasse & opp ^t -	111

Gallipeau. - - -	Gosselin. - - -	18
Genard & C° - - -	Nicholls & de dons -	41
Galeusha - - -	Tecmen - - -	64
Gibbsal! - - -	Mc pherson -	80

H.

I.J.

Hondlow	u	+	Christie	u	—	14	
Homes	u	u	Gagnes	Hale	u	71	
Hart	u	u	+	Raymond	u	81	
Henderson	u	u	+	Babuty	u	87	
Hunter	u	u	+	Brown	u	—	126

K.L.

M.

King. u - -	e Solomons. u	24
King. u - -	e Fraser Stuart	73
Knowl & al. u -	e Gregory. u -	90
King. u - -	e Magoon -	107
Kidd. u - -	e Raymond -	166
King. u - -	e McCordal -	218

Laberge. u - -	e Doucet. u -	25
Longueuil - -	e Charron. u -	38 43
Leroux - -	e Birch. u -	85
Letourneau -	e St Denis. u	116
Lebrun. u - -	e Charles -	120
Sacré -	e Turgeon. -	193

McKenzie, Tut. & Hallowell. - -	1
Mount. u - - e Healey & opp't	65
Mitchel. u - - e Russel & May	65
McKenzie. u - e Pitchie & Eno	128
Maitland - e Forbes & Gowan	133
Montigny - e Choquet -	169

N. O.

P. Q.

Pearson. - - -	Vandersluis -	33
Prime & al. u - -	Raddington	35
Potts. u - - -	Burton u	69
Peddie. u - - -	Wnider Val.	100 117
Pothier. u - - -	Toucheval	105
Pichetoux. - - -	Maninger val	118
Perrault. u - -	Melleur -	156

Ournet aux - + Tetro u - - 55

R.

S.

Rouleau	-	St. Juliens	-	9
Russel & Co	-	Teasdale & Sons	83	
Rouville	-	Gauthier	142	178
Robertson	-	Davies	-	165

Seminary, Montebello	Fleming	-	10
Shuter	-	Thayer	20
Shuter	-	Thayer on Intern	76
Smith	-	Beers	85
Scott & Val.	-	Phoenix Ins: Co	93
Stacey	-	Ermatinger	130
St. Marie	-	Dent	138
Stewart	-	McLean & Sons	204

T.

V. U.

Ternier. - - - eck' nieder sal. 36 37 117

Thayer. u u u Pierce sal'. u 97

Tavernier. u u Cuvillier & opp. 161

Vandersluy & Bleury

110

W.

X.Y.

Wragg. & - + Hunter. in 36
Warwick & al' & Yule & al' 146
Woods. in - e Vandersluys 159

on 304. Drift + low ground
at approximately 1000 feet

No 834.

McKenzie, Tutor &
Hallowell + }

Action of Debt on Dues of Fidei ~~coms~~

The de^r. states, that on 8th June 1811, by a certain act or deed in writing, made and executed before I. A. Gray & his colleague Notaries, the said Alex. McKenzie the Plff did give & grant to the Defnd^t his heirs, assigns and legal representatives, the sum of £1000 for the uses and purposes therein mentioned, that is to say, on condition that the said Defnd^t would pay to Ann. McKenzie, wife of the said Plff, during her natural life, the yearly interest of the said sum of £1000, on the 8th day of April of every year, the first pay^t. of such interest to be made on 8th day of April 1812 - and that on the death of the said Ann McKenzie, or the said Defnd^t his heirs & assign, should pay to the Children, or child living after marriage of the said Ann McKenzie w^t the s^r. Plff the said principal sum of £1000, and the interest which might then be in arrear and unpaid, all which the said Defnd^t in & by the said act or deed bound and obliged himself to do & perform.

That afterwards in the year 1818, at Charlottenburg in Upper Canada, the said Ann McKenzie, died, leaving two minor children of her marriage w^t the s^r. Plff, vna^t. Alex. McLeod McKenzie, and Mary McKenzie to q^t. minor Children the said Plff was duly appointed Tutor on 21 Jan^y. 1819 - whereby the s^r. Defnd^t hath become liable to pay to the said Plff in his s^r. capacity, the said principal sum of £1000, and interest thereon from the 8th day of June 1818 then & there in arrear on the said principal sum - Wherefore -

Plea - Preemptory exception to the sufficiency of the declaration - And further, that in and by the act or deed of trust - (fidei-commisso) it was stipulated covenanted and agreed, that in case of the death of the said Ann McKenzie, leaving alive any child or children lawfully begotten, the property after the said principal sum of £1000, should belong to such child or children and be payable to him or them only, and should belong and become payable to the said Plaintiff only in case no such child or children should then remain alive - And that the said Plaintiff hath, and would have no right to claim and demand, in the capacity of Tutor, or any other manner whatever the part of the said principal sum of £1000, during the life time of the said child or children and further that Defendant is not indebted in manner & form her

N^o. 619.Foretier. —
Morrison. }

On question, whether renunciation to the succession
of a living person, & with his consent, is valid

The principal authority for the affirmative of this question
is to be found in *Ferr. Dec. Droit. v^e "Stipulation"*

See opinion of Lubrum
cited by Poth. *Duc.*
p. 32. in 2nd. 1^{re}
and p. 35. —

Le pacte qui seroit fait touchant la Succession d'un
hom. vivant, est pareillement nul, etant contre les bonnes
mœurs, s'il n'est fait de Son Consentement — cites the
Roman Law —

Mais la Convention seroit valable si elle étoit faite
du consentement de celui de la Succession duquel il seroit
question —

The *Repr^e du Jurisp^{de} v^e "Droits Successifs."* would
seem to adopt this principle, but in reading the whole sentence
and comparing it with what he says under other heads, the
contrary must be admitted —

see p. 550. — Quand une Succession est échue, il est certain
que celui à qui elle est acquise peut en disposer en tout ou en
partie avec la même liberté qu'il peut disposer de ses autres biens. —
Nous disons, "quand elle est échue", parce qu'on regarde comme contrarie
aux bonnes mœurs, de disposer par anticipation, de l'héritage d'une
personne vivante sans son consentement. On ne tolère cette liberté
qu'au sujet des Contrats de mariage dans certaines Coutumes, où
une fille peut, moyennant une dot, renoncer aux Successions
futures de son pere & de sa mere, & quelques fois même de ses collatéraux
sans leur participation ni leur consentement —

Same author. v^e Renonciation aux Successions à échoir. p. 136.
says — Quoique la Renonciation à une Succession future soit contraire
au principe qui rejette les Conventions relatives à la succ^e d'une personne
vivante, notre Jurisprudence a néanmoins admis les Renonciations
de cette espèce dans les Contrats de Mariage — but nothing is said
in regard of any other Renonciation with the Consent of the person
whose succession is in question —

Pothier. obl. N^o 132. — Cette règle que les choses futures peuvent être l'objet
d'une obligation, reçoit une exception par les Loix Romaines à l'égard
des successions futures. — Ces Loix proscrivent comme inacceptables et
contraires à l'honneur public que toutes les Conventions par rapport
aux Successions futures, soit celle par laquelle une personne trahit
ou disposerait de sa propre Succession future envers une autre personne

a qui il promettoit de la lui laisser, quand même cette convention se feroit par un Contrat de mariage. L. 15. Cod. de Pact. Soit celles par lesquelles des parties traiteroient de la Succession future d'un Tiers, que les dites parties, ou l'une d'elles s'attendent de receuillir. I. fin. Cod. de Pact. à moins que ce tiers n'intervint, & ne donnat son consentement à la convention.

So far the Roman law — upon this Pothier says. Dans notre droit François, la faveur des Contrats de mariage y a fait admettre les conventions sur les Successions futures — Cuid at the close of this paragraph he adds — Hors les Contrats de mariage, les Conventions, les Conventions sur les successions futures sont rejetées par notre Droit François, de même qu'elles l'étoient par le Droit Romain —

Poth. Suc. p. 31. §. 3. Les Renonciations aux Succ. futures sont contraires au principe, qu'on ne peut reproduire un droit qui n'est pas encore ouvert et à cet autre principe qui rejette les Conventions touchant la Succ. d'un hom. vivant; néanmoins notre Sérice prudence a admis ces Renonciations dans les Contrats de mariage, qui selon nos usages, sont susceptibles de toutes sortes de conventions —

⁼ See also. p. 162. —

⁼ Poth. Vente. N° 526. —

Suivant les Lois Romaines ces conventions étoient interdites, même dans les Contrats de mariage. I. 15. Cod. de Pact. — Dans notre droit, la faveur de ces Contrats les y a fait admettre — mais nous ne les admettons pas ailleurs — upon the Trab. D'ob. N° 132. —

⁼ Poth. Introduction au Titre — Des droits de Successions. Cout. d'Orléans p. 594. N° 66 — and 579. N° 3. —

⁼ 1. Despreisses p. 18. N° 5. La vente de l'hérité d'un vivant, est nulle, quand même elle seroit faite de son consentement — cités. Louet & Brodeau. Lettre. H. Som. 6.

⁼ Louet & Brodeau. Let. H. Som. 6.

En la cause entre Antoine de la Couture. Demdr et Louis de Blanchefour, Defor il a été jugé que la vente d'une hérité, bien qu'elle fut faite du consentement de celui. de cuius hereditate agibatur, étoit nulle — et les lettres obtenuies pour faire casser le Contrat furent entérinées, encore que le Veudeur et celui auquel on succedoit, eussent reçus longtems fra —

⁼ Lamorignon. arrêts, 2 Vol. p. 414 — La renonciations faites par les enfans mâles, ainés & puînés aux successions non encore échues des pere & mere et autres directes & collatérales, ne sont valables —

Dict. d'arrets par Brillou. v^e Renonciation - Aîné. p. 813. -

Renonciation faite par le fils aîné à son droit d'aïnesse, en faveur de l'un de ses frères, du vivant, et en la présence du père, est nulle - Arrêt du 21 Mars 1581 - Charondas. liv. 5. Rep. 7. -

Id. p. 816. Renonciation à Succession future cassée, par arrêt du Parlement de Bretagne du 21 Avril 1582. - Dufaul. liv. 2. ch. 155. -

=
I. Bourjon. p. 909. sec. 3. §. 35. - Les Renonciations à Successions futures, ont leurs règles particulières - Dans la thèse générale, toute renonciation à Succession non ouverte est nulle - ce qui recourt l'exception qui forme la proposition qui suit - exception que l'usage et une juste convenance ont fait adopter. -

§. 36. Cependant cette Renonciation est valable, lorsqu'elle est faite par un Contrat de mariage dans les Circonstances & sous les conditions suivantes - voilà l'exception annoncée, mais nul autre acte qu'un Contrat de mariage ne pourroit la faire valider.

Donegany
Pickle & Sab }

In action by Indorsee of Note ag^t Indorsees -
Duo. Can the maker be admitted as a witness
to prove that note was given on usurious consideration -

The objection taken was on account of the interest of
the witness. —

The principle upon which witnesses are now
admitted goes to the extent, that every man may be heard
as such, provided the verdict to be given in the cause
cannot benefit the witness — see cases —

Peates Ca. 6.

Charrington
vs.
Mclner — }

In an action ag^t the maker of a prom^t note
the Indorser is a good witness to prove it
paid

Id. p. 52.

Humphrey
vs.
Marson — }

The Drawer of a bill of exchange, may
be a witness for the acceptor to prove it
paid. —

1 Camp. 55.

Pool. vs.
Boursfield — }

To in an action by the payee ag^t, the
acceptor, the drawer is admissible to
prove, that he received a valuable
consideration the bill has been discharged
by an executed agreement —

7 Term Rep. 605.

Jordaine
vs.
Lashbrooke — }

In an action by the Indorsees of a
bill of exchange against the acceptor,
the latter may call the payee as a
witness to prove, that the bill was
void in its creation. —

Peates Ca. 55.

Phelemon
vs.
Whitmore — }

In action by Payee ag^t the acceptor, the
drawer admitted as a witness, to prove that
the acceptance was conditional, & that the
defendt. was not to pay the bill unless he
should receive a sum of money due to drawer

Leake Ca. 293
Rich.
Toppings }

The drawer of a bill of Exchange given for an usurious consideration is a good witness to prove the usury in an action agt. the acceptor, upon being released by him —
L^o Bryan —

5 Esp. Rep. 110 Board
Ackerman }

In an action by the Indorser of a bill payable to the Drawee's own order, the drawer may be a witness to prove usury in discounting the bill — L^o Elkins —

4 Jaunt. 464 Jones
Brooke }

In an action against the acceptor of a bill, accepted for the accommodation of the Drawer — The Drawer is not a competent w^t to prove that the holder came by the bill on usurious consideration — because he does not stand indifferently liable to the holder & acceptor — For the holder can recover agt. him only the contents of the bill; the acceptor is entitled to recover agt. him both the amount of the bill, and also all damages he may have sustained, including the costs of the action agt. himself — See case —

1 Holt. Rep. 390 Harman
Lasbrey — }

A. who is indebted to B. gives him a bill of C. to get it discounted. — B. instead of discounting it holds the bill, as a security for the debt of A., contending that A. gave it to him by way of payment of his debt. — In an action upon this bill brou^t by B. agt. C. — A. is not a competent w^t to prove on the part of the Defend^t that he deliv^r. the bill to B. merely to get it discounted, & not as payment without a release — because in the event of a plif^s recovering he would be liable to the costs of the action brou^t agt. C. as special damage, in an action agt. himself for the violation of his duty

1 Camp. 207, 8. Shuttleworth
Stevens — }

In an action by the Indorsee agt the drawer
of a bill of exchange, drawn without
consideration, the Payee who indorsed it to the
Deft in payt of goods, is a competent Wit^s
to prove the want of consideration for the
Indorsement.—

Peates Ca. 159 Adams
Lingard }

On Ques - whether the Indorse of a Bill
of Exchange is an admissible witness to
invalidate it —

N^o 178Brouleau.
St Julien }

La question de prescription -

2. Gr. Cout. p. 536. N^o 6. - on art. 227. n.

Puisque la fin de non recevoir est fondée sur la presumption du paiement, il s'ensuit, que si le Juge reconnoissoit que le Défendeur n'eut pas en effet payé la somme qui lui seroit demandée, il ne devroit pas le recevoir à son serment, mais le condamner à la payor

N^o 1727Armour
Yarker - }

Action by Indorsee of Promy Note of Drawer

The Note was drawn^{on date} on 1 May 1820 for £30 payable to I B. Voro, or order, and payable in 3 months. — On 7th Augt. the note was protested at the instance of the Plff the holder — at that time the Indorsement on the note was in blank — when the action was instituted, the following words app'd to have been written over the name of I B. Voro the Indorsee — "Montreal 1 May 1820. Pay the within sum to Mr Robert Armour value recd." — The Defendant pleaded non-assumpst. — Objection taken at hearing, that as none of parties were merchants or Traders and the note had been indorsed in blank whether Plff could maintain his action —

Seminary of
Montreal }
Wm vs Fleming }

Action of Complaint for having disturbed
Pliffs in enjoyment of their right of banalite
as Seigniors of the Seigniory of Montreal -
by erecting a certain Windmill within same.

The action is brought in the name of Messire Jean
Henry Auguste Roux, Superior of the Gentlemen Ecclesiastis
of the Seminary of Montreal, Seignior in possession of the
Seigniory of Montreal in the district of Montreal in the
Province of Lower Canada, and the said Gentlemen Ecclesiastis
of the said Seminary of Montreal, Seignior in possession as
aforesaid of the said Seigniory by Messire Jos. Borneuf
their agent and attorney, Plaintiff, complain for

Plea of Exception - That the Plaintiffs cannot have
or maintain their action in the manner & form by them
brought because ~~is said~~

That at the time of suing out the writ of Summons
in this Cause, there was not, nor hath there been at
any time since, any Corporation, Body politic or Corporate
or distinguished by the name of "The Gentlemen Ecclesiastis
of the Seminary of Montreal; or by the name of the
Superior and Gentlemen Ecclesiastis of the said Seminary
of Montreal; or any Corporation, body politic or Corporate
whereof the said Jean Henry Auguste Roux, was or is
Superior; Or whereof the said Joseph Borneuf
in the said declaration named, was or is Agent or Attorney

And because the said Jean Henry Auguste Roux
and the said Gentlemen Ecclesiastis of the Seminary of
Montreal, and the persons meant to be designated
by such appellation, cannot in such their alleged
incorporate or Collective name and capacity, legally
have

have or maintain any action or demand whatsoever in
the Court now here — and this the said William Fleming
is ready to verify — Wherefore he prays Judgment be

And for further peremptory exception, saith,
That the said Jean Henry Auguste Roux and the
Gentlemen Ecclesiastics of the Seminary of Montreal
ought not to have or maintain their said action or
because he saith — That the names of the persons
by and for whom the said action hath been brought
are not mentioned, nor are the said persons named
in the writ of Summons in the said action issued
or in the said declaration, and because the said
declaration doth not set forth or shew, by or for whom
the said action hath been brought — And this the said
Wm Fleming is ready to verify — Wherefore hee

And for further peremptory Exception, saith, In
That the said Gentlemen Ecclesiastics of the Seminary
of Montreal, have brought and prosecuted their said
action by and in the name of Jos. Borneuf as their
agent and attorney; And because the said
Gentlemen Ecclesiastics of the Seminary of
Montreal cannot by the Law of the Land prosecute
have, or maintain their said action by or through
the said Joseph Borneuf as their Agent & Attorney.

And for further peremptory Exception, saith hee
Because the said Declaration, and the matters therein
are not sufficient in law to entitle the said Jean
Henry Auguste Roux, & the Gentlemen Ecc. of the Sem. of
Montreal to have or maintain their said action as hee
in manner and form by them brought, to which
Declar

declaration the said Wm Fleming hath not any need
nor is he bound by the law of the land to answer - and
this he is ready to verify - Wherefore &c

And for causes of exception - says -

- 1^o That the causes matters and things in the s^d declr
cont^d, do not, nor can by the law of the land, constitute the
subject of an action of Complainte.
- 2^o That it is not shewn, nor doth it appear in & by the
said declaration, that the said Jean Henry August Roux
and the Gentlemen Ecclesiastis of the Seminary of Montreal
ever acquired or became vested with any right of banalite
which might or could be infringed by the s^d Wm Fleming -
- 3^o That it is not shewn, nor doth it appear in and by
the said declaration, that the said Jean H. Aug. Roux &
the Gentl^r Ecc: of the Sem^y of Montreal, ever had any
banal mill within their pretended Seigniory in the
said declaration mentioned, at which the Censitaires or
Tenants of the said Seigniory, might or could cause their
grain to be ground. -
- 4^o That the premises in the said declaration contained
do not justify or warrant the conclusions or prayer of the
said declaration. -
- 5^o That the said declaration doth not set forth or
shew a legal cause of action ag^t the s^d Wm Fleming -
- 6^o That the said declaration is altogether irregular,
incongruous and insufficient

Plea to merits - Not Guilty & matters & things
alleged in the Declaration are false & untrue &
unfounded both in fact and in law.

Houldow
Christie }
v^e

Quo. - Whether, cohabitation after a Judgment of separation de corps & de biens between husband & wife, has the effect of annulling & setting aside that Judgment in regard of Creditors? —

See. Rep^r v^e Separation de biens p. 220 —

— Dans le cas de la séparation de Corps, la Seule Cohabitation le constate d'une manière legale & publique — il seroit inutile alors d'exiger d'autre preuve. — speaking of the intention of the parties, husband & wife to set aside the effect of such Judgment

Poth. Tr. Com^t N^o 524.

Dans le cas de la séparation d'habitation, nous avons vu dans notre traité du Contrat de mariage N^o 524. que le retour de la femme en la maison de son mari, suffit seul pour détruire la sentence de Séparation d'habitation, sans qu'il soit besoin qu'il soit passé pour cet effet aucun acte devant Notaires ou au Greffe parce que ce retour de la femme en la maison de son mari est un fait notoire qui ne peut être ignoré du public. — Ce retour de la femme en la maison de son mari en détruisant la séparation d'habitation, détruit aussi la séparation de biens, qui est comme un accessoire à moins que la femme ne proteste par un acte devant notaires, qu'en retournant avec son mari elle n'entend se départir que de la séparation d'habitation, et non de la séparation de biens. —

Poth. Contr. Mar. ch^h 524.

Tous les effets de la séparation cessent, lorsque la femme séparée d'habitation, est volontairement rentrée avec son mari. — Le mari rentre dans tous ses droits sur la personne et les biens de la femme,
la

la Communauté de biens, qui étoit entre les Conjoints est rétablie de plein droit — Tout ce qui a été acquis de part et d'autre pendant que la Séparation a duré y entre comme si elle n'avoit jamais été dissoute, et la séparation d'habitation, quelque exécution qu'elle ait eu, et quelque longtems qu'elle ait durée, est regardée comme non avvenue: ~~de~~

N° 184.

Th: Dubord
N^e Envo
Jos: ^m Derry

Touching right of Common, as between
Seignior & Tenant. —

The grant to the Defendants ancestors here
in his deed of Concession, was, a droit de
Commune, without other explanation — Quo—
now far this gives a right to cut down wood
for use of Tenant? —

Hennion de Pansey. Dissertations Feodales. 1 Vol. p. 139—
re Communaux §. 1. —

The property in Commons he describes as of two kinds
ces propriétés sont de deux sortes — les unes foncières,
comme des bois, des prés, des pâtis; les autres consistent
en droits Incorporés, tels que des servitudes sur le fond
d'autrui —

On donne aux premières, la dénomination de Communes
ou Communaux, les autres sont plus généralement
connus sous le nom d'Usages. —

Id. p. 140. §. 2.

L'origine des droits d'usage se présente très naturellement.
Les Seigneurs avoient de grands Domaines — des bois considérables,
peu d'habitans — et le désir d'en augmenter le nombre. Pour
y parvenir, le moyen le plus efficace, étoit, d'améliorer la
condition

condition de leurs sujets, en favorisant l'agriculture. —

Pour cultiver, il faut des bestiaux — il faut un bâtiment au cultivateur — Mais les bestiaux exigent des pâtures : et comment bâtr, comment subvenir à mille autres besoins, sans la faculté de couper du bois dans les Forêts ? — Les Seigneurs se trouvoient donc dans une espèce de nécessité de permettre à leurs habitans le pâturage sur les terres de leurs domaines, et même l'usage de leurs bois : C'est aussi ce que la plus part ont fait. —

Les droits d'usage dans les Forêts, ont encore une autre origine le peu de valeur que les bois avoient autre fois. Dans l'impuissance de les exploiter utilement, les propriétaires les laisoient dans une espèce d'abandon — chacun y courroit impunément — et le temps a donné à cette tolérance le caractère d'une servitude. —

Ainsi dans le nombre des Communautés d'Habitans, qui ont des Communes, et des droits d'usage, les uns en jouissent en vertu de Titres — les autres en vertu de la possession Seule. —

Denizart. V^e Usage. M. A. Quand les Habitans ont droit d'usage dans un Forêt, ou sur d'autres héritages, ils ne peuvent en user, que pour eux, et pour leur nécessités personnelles — Ils ne peuvent par exemple, vendre bois, herbes, ou autres choses quelconques croissant en l'héritage, dont ils sont usagers — cite Coutume de Nevers — Néanmoins ledit usage peut être amplié, ou limité, par titre ou prescription suffisante au contraire — Cela est conforme au Droit Commun, qui veut, que le droit d'usage soit réglé par les Concessions, les titres, et la possession des usagers. —

Fremiville Traité de Gouvernement de biens & affaires des Communautés
d'Habitans. p. 30. 31 -

Ques. 2^e Si l'y a plusieurs Seigneurs dans une paroisse
un seul pourra-t-il demander le triage ? -

S'il y a plusieurs Co-Seigneurs de la Seigneurie, un d'eux
seul ne peut pas demander le triage des Communautés, il
faut qu'ils le demandent tous conjointement - arrêt
du 23 Nov. 1660 - rapporté dans le Journal des audiences -
sans quoi il seroit débouté de sa demande -

N^o. Densart R^e Commune § 6. N^o 6 -

S'il y a plusieurs Seigneurs qui aient des droits à
reclamer sur les Communes, il faut que tous ces Seigneurs
demandent conjointement le triage, pour qu'il leur soit
accordé - arrêt du 23 Nov. 1660 - rapporté au Journal des
audiences. Tom. I. p. 917. - rendu conformément aux conclusions
de M. Talon. -

Rules for interpretation of Contracts -

Part. 2^e.

N^o 94. Ce qui peut paraître ambigu dans un Contrat
s'interprète parce qui est d'usage dans le Pays. -

N^o 95. L'usage est d'une si grande autorité pour l'interprétation
des Conventions, qu'on sous-entend dans un Contrat les
clauses qui y sont d'usage, quoiqu'elles ne soient pas exprimées.

N^o 1642Galipeau -
Gosselin. u }

On deed of sale - in q^b: a sum of 2000^t was reserved
in hands of D^r D^r the purchaser, & to be paid to the
daughter of Peff when she should come of age, or should
be provided for by marriage or otherwise -

"jusqu'à son age de majorité, ou qu'elle soit pourvue par mariage
ou autrement"

The Minor dying under age, is the Peff as her heir entitled to
the pay^t. of the money -

There seems to be distinction taken as to the interpretation
of a Term or condition of pay^t. of an obligation by contract, or acts
inter vivi - and of a legacy or gift made by will or donation - In
former case, the doubt is to be interpreted in favor of the party bound or
Debt, but in the latter a more favorable interpretation is taken by
looking at the intention of the Donor - Poth. Obl. N^o 213. -

The stipulation here is to pay, at different periods, that is, the
majority after minor - q^b: is a certain known period - and also at
her marriage. q^b: was an uncertain event - as to the words "autrement"
it must mean to refer to something, where either the interest or necessity
of the minor might require the pay^t. to be made - such as subsistence
education or the like - The intention of the stipulation being to
secure to the minor all the beneficial right in this money which
the Law could give -

What rights are vested in the minor, by her death? Can he
demand more than the minor could have done? Does not the
heir take the succession as it stood at the time of the decease of the
Minor? What entitles him to demand more? - Had the minor
been married, or had she been in any situation to entitle her to
call for this money - That right would have gone to the heir - but
her death, seems to be a circumstance not provided for nor
contemplated by the Contract -

The majority of the minor, is ^a fixed & certain term of pay^t. the
other limitations of pay^t are mere conditions, which have never happened

Warwick
Ernestine

G. Com. art. 160. Gloss. 1^e. N° 23. p. 1010

Si le Gardien présente par le Saisie n'est pas solvable
peut passer pour solvable, quoique véritablement il ne le soit
pas, l'huissier n'est pas responsable si les meubles ont été
débournés par le Saisie, et si le recours contre le Gardien
se trouve inutile et sans effet au Saisissant à cause de
son insolabilité — see also. Serpellon. p. 624 —

=

Impays Sheriff. Tit. Trespass. p. 283 —

The High Sheriff is answerable in damages
for the trespasses committed by his officers in the execution
of warrants, the law looking upon the Sheriff and all
his officers as one person: he is to look to his officers,
and they to do their duty: for if they transgress, he is —
answerable to the party injured by such transgression, and
his officers are answerable over to him —

see 2. Black. Rps. 317. Saunderson v. Baker.

Jel. p. 285 —

If the Sheriff or his officers break the house of any
person to execute process of sc. fa. against the goods
or Capias agt. the person, at the Suit of the Subject, he
is a trespasser and liable to this action. — 5. Co. 91.
Seymain's Case. —

Nov 1817

(20)

Shutes
m
Thayer —
Town. Poubeau on

En matière de Commerce les homologations
des sentences arbitrales doivent se faire
devant les juges Consuls —

Rep^r. à l'arbitrage. p. 549. 1st Col. —

Prake, Ev. 81 If the parties think proper to submit their differences
to an arbitrator his Judgment is as conclusive upon
them as that of a Court established by the Law
// And though in questions respecting land he cannot
absolutely convey property from one to another, but
can only order it to be done; yet if he determine the
right to be in one, this is conclusive evidence of the
title, and cannot be disputed in an action of Ejectment
Evidence, refers to case of Doc on Demise of Morris & al. v. Rosser. 3 Ed.
15 — when evidence to impeach the award was refused —

1. Bos. & Pult. 91. The Court will not set aside an award on the ground
Ridout v. P. of the witnesses not having been examined on oath, if no
such objection was made at the time of their examination —

18 East R. 344 Partiality and improper conduct in an arbitrator in
making his award without hearing the Plaintiff and his
witnesses, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action on the Bond
conditioned for the performance of the award, but is only
matter for application to the equitable jurisdiction of the
Court to set aside the award — neither can a parol
agreement between the parties to waive and abandon the
award be pleaded to such action —

2. Nelson 148.

Wells v. MacCormick Partiality in arbitrators not allowed to be given in evidence —
strong case of Law

1. Henr. 438. Partie entente du Frans. 2 du mois d'Avril 1560 et de Louis
13 du mois de Janvier 1629, encore que dans les compromis
il n'y ait aucune peine, les sentences arbitrales sont
juridiques, et doivent être exécutées, comme si elles
avaient été rendues par des juges ordinaires.

Bairn. Ab. Tit. Arbitrament extrinsie circumstance, nor any matter effect debony & award - When an award is put in Suit at law, no extrinsic circumstance, nor any matter effect debony & award - can be given in evidence to impeach it; If it be open therefore to any objection of this kind, the D^r must apply for relief either to a Court of Equity by bill, or if the submission has been made a rule of any Court of Law to the summary and equitable jurisdiction of that Court of which such submission has been made a rule - cit. 2. Wib. 148 #

1 Salk. 71
on note (a)

In neither case
whether the submission
be originally by rule
of Court or by bond
and afterwards made such,
will the Court enter
into the merits of the
award, and examine
into the reasonableness
and justice of it //
unless it appears
manifestly from the
merits that the arbitrators
have acted dishonestly
and corruptly //

In the Case Lucas. ex dem. Marcham. vs. Wilson, 2 B. in. 705.
D^r. Mansfield said - The Court will not at all enter into the
merits of the matter referred to Arbitrators, but only take
into consideration such legal objections as appear upon the
face of the award, and such objections as go to the
behaviour of the Arbitrators. - The same was likewise
ruled in Waller. vs. King. 2 P. Ca. Law & Eq. 63. Greenhill v. Church
3. Ch. Rep. 49. Brown v. Brown. Ca. Ch. 140. - 1 Verm. 157. -

Where a submission is by Bond &c and not by rule
of the Court, the only remedy agt. an improper award
is by bill in Equity, and it seems the grounds for
relief are the same as on submissions by rule in Courts
of Com. Law -

Hyd on award
12. 226

See the side -
8 East. 344.

When the submission is by the act of the parties, then in
order to be relieved against the award against any extrinsic
circumstances, the defendant cannot make these a defence to
the action on the award, or on the submission bond: he
cannot give in evidence any thing to impeach the conduct
of the Arbitrators - the award is a determination
of

of Judges chosen by the act of the party himself, and nothing extrinsic to that Judgment can be offered in evidence to over-turn it — see

sup^r. 227. With us in such a case, (enmity of the Arbitrator) the only relief is in equity, which often sets aside awards and gives that kind of relief, which seems naturally to arise out of the circumstances — as by directing account or granting injunctions to stay all legal proceedings, which had been pursued on the foundation of the award being good — though bills of this sort are received with some prejudice, because Arbitrators are Judges of the parties own nomination, yet, if on partiality, a Court of Equity should not relieve — Arbitrators would have too great a power, and might abuse it from corrupt motives. —

{ But except for corruption or improper conduct in the Arbitrators, a Court of Equity will never set aside an award, where the submission is voluntary —

3 C.R. Rep. 529
Tittensor. v. Peat. An award being made by Judges of the parties own choosing is final unless there is collusion or gross misbehaviour in the Arbitrators — [see case].

error in taking the account, or partiality & improper behaviour in the Arbitrator —

Id. " p. 644
ca. 252, Anonym. Unless there is corruption or partiality in an Arbitrator the party cannot set aside his award —

Bowman
Galaway }

On motion for a new trial for excessive damages
see Cases - contn -

- Grant's Sum^r L^d. Townsend vs D^r Hughes - 2 Mod. Rep. 150.
216.
- d^r 218. Leeman - vs Allen - 2 Wilson. 160. -
- d^r 220. Huckle - vs Money - 2 Wils. 206. -
- d^r 225 Beardmore vs Rivington. 2 Wils. 248.
- = d^r 231 Gray - vs Sir Alex^r Grant - Ibid. 252.
- d^r 234 Gilbert vs Bentenshaw. 1 Cours. Rep. 231. - *
- d^r 236 Leith - vs Pope - 2 Su W. Black. Rep. 1327. -
- = d^r 239 Duberly vs Gunning. A. J. Rep. 651. -

The King.
Solomons }

On question whether Ordres en Council
of 29th May. 1815, - can be construed to abrogate
the St. 41 Geo. 3. ch. 14 - in regard of duties
imposed on Snuff & tobacco imported into
Canada from the United States. —

Ques. depends upon the interpretation of Statute
see. 19. Vetus ab. Tit. Statute (E. 6) construction
of Statutes —
N° 85 - 86 - also N° 132. Law Note p. 525 —

Davis
&
Snow }

Dec. des arrêts. v^e arbitres, Sentences —

Quand il y a trois arbitres, et que l'un ne veut
signer la sentence, elle ne laisse pas d'être valable —

Si de trois arbitres deux signent la sentence, l'autre
refusant, la sentence est bonne — Jusq' le 11 Juin 1585 —
Dout. lib. C. Son. 3. —

Laberge
Doucet

Ques. How far a Carpenter can recover on his Count
for a quantum meruit, without proof of a Contract.

Post. Louage. N° 397.

Si l'ouvrage n'a pas un prix courant & ordinaire
comme la façon d'un habit — puta — Si je suis convenu
avec un entrepreneur de me bâter une maison suivant
un certain devis, nous sommes censés tacitement
convenus du prix que l'ouvrage sera estimé lorsqu'il
sera fait. —

Id. N° 37 en fine. — Neanmoins si avant que les
parties se soient plus expliquées, le conducteur est entré
en jouissance, le Contrat doit être jugé parfait, et le
prix laissé à l'arbitrage de la partie — tanquam in
arbitri boni viri —

Carmel
v
Hunters

On note ~~of two~~ money by Dots for the
accommodation of ellis^{ry} Stoyroyd &c

Chitty on Bills
87. & 203 —

When a Bill is given merely for the accommodation
of the Drawee or payee & that is sent into the world
it is no answer to an action brought on the bill, that the
Defendant the acceptor accepted it for the accommodation
of the drawer, and that that fact was known to the
holder — in such case, the holder if he gave a bona
fide consideration for it, is entitled to recover the
amount, though he had full knowledge of the
transaction —

5 Taurl. Rep. 192. Fintum v. Pococke & al.

N^o. 264.In P^t Fournier
Is Montpellier &
Beaulieu.Action en Declaration d'hypothèque.
Lacoux for Plaintiff. L. M. Viger for Defendant

The declaration states, that on 7th Feby, 1820, the Plaintiff obtained Judge in this Court, agt. one Michel Fournier, Amator to the vacant Succession of Clement Racicot, deceased, for £250, by w^t interest from 22nd Aug^t 1812 until paid, and costs taxed at £10. 6. 3, as well in obtaining the s^r Judge as in suing out execution agt. the personal and real Estates of the said Racicot in the hands of the said Amator, the said Writ of Execution, bearing date the 28 Feby. 1820, and 7th March of same year, and upon which ex^m returns of nulla bona & nulla ten. were made — which said Judge was rendered agt. the said Michel Fournier in his said Capacity, for the amount of an Obligation due & owing by the said Clement Racicot to the said Plaintiff, & executed upon Dumouchelle and his Confrere, N^o the 22nd Aug^t 1812, whereby a mortgage was created upon the property of the late Clement Racicot from the date of the said Obligation —

That by deed of sale made and executed before Gibbons and his Confrere, notary & bearing date 17th March 1818, the s^r Clement Racicot sold to the Defendant a certain lot of land of which he the s^r Defendant is now the proprietor & possessor, & by means whereof he the s^r Defendant is bound by hypothecamento to pay to the said Plaintiff, the aforesaid debt, interest & costs — and concludes accordingly —

The Defendant sued out an action en Garantie formelle agt. one Antoine Chenier

Plea of Louis Montpellier —

1st That Plaintiff's declaration is insufficient, as it does not shewly appear that the Plaintiff ever acquired or had any mortgage upon the lot of land in question — That it is not even alledged in by the said declaration that the late Clement Racicot ever was the proprietor ^{or in possession} of the said lot of land, upon q^t Plaintiff now claims a right of mortgage —

23. That the plaintiff did never in fact obtain, nor did, or could the said late Clement Racicot himself create upon the land in question any right of mortgage, by the said Racicot never having been the proprietor of the said lot of land — nor ever having been in the possession thereof.

That if Plaintiff has any right of action by reason of his demands aforesaid, it could be maintained only as a land which was belonged to the said Racicot, and now in the hands of Antoine Chemier, by virtue of a deed of Exchange, made between said Chemier & Racicot on 17 March 1818, passed before Globinsky Not^r. & not as the lot of land mentioned in the Declaration.

On this Plea issue was taken by the Plaintiff —

The parties having been heard on the plea of exception to the sufficiency of the Declaration, the same was dismissed.

It appears, that by deed of Exchange made between Clement Racicot, and Antoine Chemier, dated 17 March 1818, the said Racicot ^{from Chemier} acquired the lot of land mentioned in the declaration, but it was stipulated, that he should enter on the possession thereof at the next St. Michel. 29 Sept. 1818 —

On the same day, 17th March 1818, Clement Racicot sells the lot of land in question, which he had so acquired of Antoine Chemier, to the Defendant, with the stipulation et a commencer la jouissance à la St. Michel prochain.

The objection therefore raised by the present action ^{was} that as Clement Racicot never was in poss' of the land in question, no mortgage, by reason of any act or debt of his could attach upon the land —

By the Roman Law, Hypothèque was not created by

a simple Convention - tradition as well as stipulation were necessary - this was changed by the Pastoral Edit, from the difficulty attend^s actual tradition - Tr. des Hyp. 419 -

L'Hypothèque étant un droit dans la chose, c'est une conséquence qu'il ne peut être accordé, que par celui à qui la chose appartient, et qui en est le propriétaire; celui qui n'en est pas, ne pouvant pas transferer à un autre un droit dans une chose qu'il n'a pas lui-même - Id. 427.

Tr. Prop. N° 208 Il y a plusieurs clauses qu'on appose aux Contrats de Vente ou de donation d'une chose, ou autres Contrats semblables, qui sont censés renfermer une tradition feinte de cette chose, telle est la clause qu'on appelle de Constitut. -

N° 210 La clause de rétention d'usufruit dans un Contrat de Donation ou de vente, ou dans quelque autre Contrat, renferme pareillement une tradition feinte de la chose donnée ou vendue; Car l'usufruit étant essentiellement le droit de jouir de la chose d'autrui, et personne ne pouvant, per rerum naturam, être usufructeur de sa propre chose, le donateur ou le Vendeur, en déclarant qu'il retient l'usufruit de la chose donnée ou vendue déclare suffisamment, qu'il ne tient plus la chose en son nom, et comme une chose qui lui appartient, mais au nom du Donataire ou Acheteur, et comme une chose appartenante au dit Donateur ou Acheteur, lequel Donataire ou Acheteur est censé par la en prendre possession par le ministère du Donateur ou Vendeur -

Cormier.
Henry Val.
Baroness of
Longueville opp.

On question whether *Lods & Ventes* are due
on a Sale void in law, but which has not
been so declared, & the purchaser still holds
~~posse~~^{posse} ~~if purchaser can set up~~

Hervé. Théorie de la Matière féodale - Vol. 3. p. 7. Du Quint.

Il en seroit de même d'un Contrat nul — Car un
Contrat nul n'est pas un véritable contrat — Cependant
tant que la nullité n'est pas jugée, le quint est exigible
et l'acquéreur ne seroit pas recevable à opposer la nullité
du Contrat — mais aussi-tot qu'il a été déclaré nul, le
rapport du profit est dû, quand même il aurait été payé
volontairement, et sans que le Seigneur l'eût exigé —

Prudhomme. ch. 18. p. 183.

Quand un héritage a été vendu par quelqu'un qui
n'en étoit pas propriétaire, les droits ne sont pas moins
dûs au Seigneur qui peut les exiger, parcequ'il n'est
pas obligé d'examiner si l'acquéreur a pris de son côté
toutes les précautions nécessaires pour acquérir avec
sûreté —

Il suffit que le Contrat de vente soit régulier en la
forme, qu'il y ait un vendeur qui ait par avance intention
de vendre, et que l'acquéreur ait également en dessein d'acquérir
que l'héritage fasse l'objet principal pour lequel il y a eu un
prix déterminé ou payé, pour que le Seigneur soit fondé à demander
à l'acquéreur les droits de *Lods & Ventes* : Car une pareille vente
transfère à l'acquéreur la possession civile de l'héritage, il peut
par conséquent transférer la propriété par le moyen de la possession
non interrompue ; puisque l'acquéreur peut opposer par la suite
la prescription si l'on n'est point trouble, avant qu'elle soit
acquise par le véritable propriétaire —

C'est pourquoi un acquéreur ne peut se dispenser de payer
les droits de *Lods & Ventes* au Seign. à cause de son acquisition,
surtout quand il s'est mis en possession de l'héritage —

No 258.

Bourret. -
Grandjines }

But when the verdict has proceeded on an error in point of law, whether committed by the Judge, or by the Jury, the Court will set aside the verdict - even for smallness of damages 1 Str. 425. -

Grant's Summary
211. 12.

1 Mod. Reps. 2

The Court have a power in all cases of excessive damages to grant a new trial. 1 Term Rep. 277. - In personal torts, however, and in all actions where it is the peculiar and strict province of the Jury to estimate the extent of the injury, they will not disturb a Verdict, because the damages are excessive, except they appear to have been given from passion, partiality or prejudice -

su notes & authorities referred to here -

su 1 Corp. 231.
Gilbert. & Batenshaw

Grant's Sum. 240.

In Duckier v. Wood. 1 Term Rep. 277. which was an action of assault, L^d Mansfield said, there was no doubt, but that the Court had the power of taking the opinion of a second Jury in any case where the damages were excessive. -

Id. - 241

In Jones v. Sparrow. 5 J. Rep. 257. action of assault by Hearse-Coach Master -

In Chambers, v Caulfield. 6. East Rep. 256. - which was an action of damages for criminal conversation the Court declared that if it appeared to them, from the amount of the damages given, as compared with the facts of the case laid before the Jury, that the Jury must have acted under the influence of undue motives, or of gross error, or misconception on the subject, they would have thought it their duty to submit the question to the consideration of a second Jury -

The Court in its charge to the Jury in this case weighed more upon the Circumstances which could attach culpability to the conduct of the Defendant than on the nature and extent of the damages in case they should be of opinion against him — And in regard of the Culpability of the Defendant the Court were disposed to think that as the Plaintiff was his domestic servant, a greater degree of responsibility would attach to him, in regard of his conduct towards the Plaintiff, inasmuch as he was bound not only to shew a good example in his house & family, ~~but~~ also to check any irregularity, or at least to discountenance it when it ^{came} to his knowledge — That ~~was~~ the Circumstances of Familiarity appears between the Plaintiff & Defendant which between persons not standing in the relative situation of master & servant, ~~they~~ might be considered as indifferent & innocent, yet where they tended to destroy the distinction of master & servant, ^{& that} of Superiority & subordination, which ought to exist between them they were presumptions of the master, they were degrading to his situation & character, & gave room to suspect an illicit connexion by thus paving the way to it —

Upon further consideration of the above charge I see nothing in it which was incorrect, but the damages appear to be excessive — That is comparing this case with what has generally been adjudged by Juries in former cases equally favorable, and I am rather disposed to think that had the Court charged them more particularly on the subject of the damages, they would not have given so much, but not being directed on this head they have been carried away more by their feelings than a steady and correct principle of decision — The ~~principle~~ reason for allowing damages in cases of seduction is upon the principle that it may have been effected through a promise of marriage, and therefore when the Defendant is a married man this principle cannot be admitted and the damages are much diminished sometimes wholly denied, the only compensation allowed being to indemnify the Plaintiff for expenses of living in other actual damages but nothing of a vindictive kind, as the presumption of Law is against her —

Sce. Repre v^e Grossesse, p. 338
L. Ed.

Ainsi on accorde une plus grande faveur à une fille mineure contre un Major ou à une fille surnommée par le ^{le} ~~la~~ accusé, qui à une autre dont la condition seroit égale.

1. Dareau. 187.

Lorsqu'il paroît qu'il y a eu promesse de mariage, ils, (les dommages) peuvent être beaucoup plus considérables; car une promesse pareille achève souvent de consommer la séduction.

Id. p. — 189.

Lorsque c'est un maître qui abuse de sa servante, il n'est pas plus à l'abri qu'un autre des dommages & intérêts. — Il est presumé avoir exercé l'empire qu'il avoit sur elle, et il doit réparer le tort qu'il lui a fait. — on a noté — it is said —

Il est établi au Traité de la Séduction, qu'il n'est point du des dommages et intérêts à la servante qui s'abandonne à son maître, sans espoir raisonnable de l'épouser, néanmoins par commisération, plutôt que par exacte Justice, on en accorde quelquefois à de pareilles filles. —

Id. — p. 195.

Si la personne abusée a eu juste cause d'ignorer l'état du séducteur, ses dommages & intérêts sont comme vis-à-vis ceux d'un homme libre — si au contraire elle a connu son état, elle paroît coupable d'une plus grande incontinence, dès qu'elle n'avoit aucun espoir de parvenir à des liens indissolubles avec lui — des lors l'indemnité doit être moindre. —

On a noté. — L'indemnité doit être moindre. — Les bonnes mœurs voudroient même qu'il n'en fût point accordé du tout. Ce qui peut seul excuser la faiblesse d'une fille, et faire naître la commisération en sa faveur, c'est la supposition qu'elle n'a cédé aux efforts de son séducteur, que dans l'espoir de le voir bientôt devenir son époux — Cette supposition est la seule base raisonnable sur laquelle on puisse assoir une demande en dommages & intérêts pour une fille abusée. —

Or cette ressource manquant absolument à celle qui s'est livré à un homme marié, à un prêtre, ou à un homme d'Eglise la délinquante n'offre plus qu'une fille libertine & sans mœurs qui ne mérite point d'être plainte, et qui cesse d'intéresser. —

See also Bentz. v. Grossesse —

Traité de Séduction. p. 8. 66. 67.

Pearson.
Vanderbyl's

How far it is necessary to shew, in an action for a malicious complaint & prosecution for felony, that the proceedings have been determined —

11 East Rep. 514 — acquittal by the Jury, when followed by Judgment of the Court, held ~~sufft~~ ^{so} after Verdict, where proof of such Judgment was made, altho' not specifically alledged — Hence it may be ~~lawd~~ ^{infined} that acquittal by the Jury without Judgment by the Court would not be sufft — see also same point. Will's Rep. 517. Hunter v. French & al.

Stra. 11A —

Hammond's N. P. p. 251. The practice is to shew by what means the original action came to an end, and that such form of pleading is essential seems to have been the opinion of the Court in Lewis v. Farrel — If the allegation that the original Suit is at an end is omitted, a Verdict will cure the defect, for the fact must have been proved at the trial, or the Plaintiff could not have recovered. ^{cites. 10 Mod. 209. Helleys Rep. 166. Butts v.} Foster. —

Esp. Prae. Treatise on the settling of Evidence for Trials at Nisi Prius. — p. 277. On Ev. on act for Mal. prosⁿ —

But in every Case the Plaintiff must prove the proceedings which the Defendant instituted agst him to be at an end — as in the case first put, he must shew that the Justice dismissed the Complaint — in the second his acquittal — and in the third that the Suit commenced by the arrest is at an end either by a Verdict — non pros^r — or his continuance — In which case of a Verdict of non pros^r he must have an exacted copy of the Judge's Roll — in the second he must produce the Rule — and all these proceedings must be proved by written evidence and cannot be dispensed with. —

+ what is meant by acquittal — see 2. Hale. 243. — "But it is to be known, that there must not only be an acquittal by Verdict, but a Judgment thereupon — quod eat sine die — for the bare Verdict of his former acquittal is not a sufficient bar without a Judgment pleaded also — though the acquittal regularly is a warrant for entry of the Judgment at any time after. —

See many of Cases collected. 1 Bac. Abt. p. 95 —
Tit. actions on Case — on note —

In actions of this kind the Plaintiff must alledge that the original suit wherever instituted is at an end. Doug. 205 — for otherwise the point would come to be tried too soon & disorderly Yelv. 117 — It must be legally at an end, and therefore in an action agt. a Justice for an illegal commitment on a supposed charge of felony, the Court held an allegation, that the Plaintiff was discharged from his imprisonment, to be insufficient because there are various ways by which a discharge may be had without putting an end to the Suit — it ought to have shewn, "How discharged?" — 2 Term Rep. 225 — Stu. 11A — Hob. 206. 266. 10 Mod. 245 — So in an action for maliciously holding to bail, it must be shewn what is become of the original action — 1 Saik. 15 — Dy. 285 — If it has been abandoned, it should seem that the action ~~would~~^{will} lie, for abandonment is an indication of its being false & hopeless — W. Jones. 93 — So where the Plaintiff suffered himself to be non-suited — Bull. N. P. 13 — But a Nolle prosequi by the Attorney General, is not such a termination of a Criminal Suit as will authorise an action. 6 Mod. 261 — 10 Mod. 219 — Gibb. Ca. 185. &c —

Whether the defect of stating the original action to be determined may not be cured by a Verdict, or plea in bar — Raym. A18. 2 Keb. 256. 753 — 3 Keb. 781 — Saund. 229. —

See also —

Incladon. v. Berry, 1 Cal. 1 Camp. N. P. Ca. 203. note (a) The Plaintiff produced the record of acquittal — and proved, that the Defendant had abandoned the prosecution —

Wallis. v. Alpine — Id. p. 204. (note) Plaintiff proved, that at the sessions to which he was bound to appear, no Indictment was prepared — and that the Plaintiff was therefore discharged from his Recognizance. —

Bristol v. Haywood, & Camps. N.P. Rep. 213-1A. Even in an action for a malicious arrest in a Civil Case, the suit must be shewn to be at an end -

1 Nov. Pigeau. 160 - La demande de caution doit étre proposée avant toute exception - Si le Défendeur propose les autres exceptions sans exiger préalablement la Caution, alors négligeant la Sécurité que lui accorde la Loi, il reconnoît trouver dans la probité de l'étranger, une sécurité suffisante et renonce tacitement à la faculté d'exiger Caution.

Primer
Reddington }

On questions whether Defendant by pleading to the
^{Judicatum} Declaration has waived his right to obtain Security
for Costs -

22 Viner. 530.
531 - When one pleads in abatement, & also in bar, the plea in
bar waives the plea in abatement -

If one is sued by the addition of baronet, who is not so + yet
if he appear & answer by that name, he is bound -

When matter is pleadable in abatement, the benefit of
it is lost by pleading to issue -

The mo. is in nature of an Exceptⁿ Dilatoire -

1 Pigeau. 166 -

Sous la réserve de ses autres exceptions ou moyens contre
la telle demande, requiert, que faute par le Demandé d'avoir
donné la telle Caution - il soit déclaré non recevable en sa
demande &c

Denvrarp. re Caution Judicatum Solvi - N. 16. La demande
fin de Caution, étant une exception dilatoire, une espèce de fin de non
recevoir, puisque l'Etranger est non recevable à poursuivre jusqu'à ce
qu'il y ait satisfait, devoir être proposée avant le fond, même avant les exceptions
précédentes, pour y être préalablement fait droit + refers to art. 5. tit. 5. 4th 1667
& to an arrêt 27 June 1705 - & Case in Appeal, arrêt 8 Aout 1718. -

John Wragg.
Thomas Hunter
Isabella Cowen
opp^t

On opposition of the wife claiming the
effects saved on Ex' on of the husband, as her
separate property under a clause of exclusion
of Communauté in her marriage contract. —

1 Bourj. p. 511. ch. 2. lue. 1. dist. 2. N° 6. 7. 8 —

N° 7. Le mari nonobstant cette exclusion de Communauté
jouit de tous les revenus de sa femme, & fait les fruits
siens, tout l'effet de cette clause étant d'exclure la femme
du bénéfice de la Com' — lui en donner une autre ce
seroit l'étendre au-delà de ses limites. —

N° 8. En effet les fruits lui sont destinés pour les charges
du mariage, mais il n'en seroit pas de même s'il y
avoit séparation contractuelle ; la femme en ce cas jouit
de ces revenus, c'est le juste effet de cette autre clause
qui frappe la capacité personnelle, comme ses biens. —

see also Posth. Comte N° 261. 2. 3. par

N° 1852.

Turner. —
McNider & als. }

Dic. Droit de Ferme. V^e Marchand &
Négociants.

Il faut remarquer que l'on peut assigner tous ceux qui
sont associés pour fait de marchandises au domicile d'un
seul, et cela pour la facilité du commerce ; autrement ce
seroit des longueurs infinies qu'il faudroit essuyer, par
l'éloignement de chacun des associés, s'il falloit les assigner
chacun à leur domicile particulier. — Il y a plus, c'est que
chaque associé pour fait de marchandises, est l'homme, et le
facteur de la société — c'est pourquoi, il peut vendre & acheter
recevoir l'argent & payer — actionner les débiteurs, et par
la même raison étre actionné, et engagé par la ses associés

N^o 1852Turner.
Menidesal

On service of process on one partner for all the
others -

Old Denizt. v^e associé. N^o 27 - Il n'est point nécessaire de donner à chaque associé ou intéressé une copie des exploits de demandes, de significations, - procédures & contraintes qui se font contre des associés; une seule copie suffit pour tous. -

N^o 28 - This principle applied to the Joint Proprietors, of the Canal de Briare

Repos v^e Ajournement. p. 291 -

Quand on veut assigner pour obtenir une sentence contre plusieurs marchands associés, ou autres débiteurs de billets solidaires, les huissiers doivent avoir attention de n'assigner qu'un de ces débiteurs, tant pour lui, que pour ceux qui ont signé ou endossé les billets avec lui - la même chose doit s'observer pour les autres procédures, sans que sous quelques prétextes que ce soit les huissiers ou leurs gars puissent en user autrement. -

Now. Denizt. v^e assignation. § 7. N^o 13 -
same bus in Republique, above cited -

Dec. Droit. v^e marchants -

Old. Denizt. v^e Société. N^o 27. 28 - see above -

Cours du Droit

Commercial. 3. Vol.

p. 120. N^o 1040 -

see also 1st vol. p. 42

N^o AA. -

Dans l'usage le nom de Société est donné plus particulièrement à l'union d'un petit nombre d'individus; et l'on appelle Compagnie une réunion d'associés nombreux pour un objet d'une haute importance & d'une grande étendue - Ainsi on a connu autrefois la Compagnie des Indes - d'assurance sur la vie - ou contre les Incendies de -

= Maritime insurance is considered an act of a commercial nature
Ed. N^o. 47. -

No. 981

M. Ch. Lemire de
Longueuil &
Fran^s. Charron

Action for Recovery of Goods & Werts

The depl^r stated - That the Plaintiff is Saguenay
Proprietor in possession of the Barony & Seigniory of
Longueuil & is such entitled to all Goods & Werts & other
Supernatural rights & dues accruing thereon - That on the
19th day of June 1812, by a certain act or deed made
and passed before Cadieux & Provost Public Notaries,
Charlotte Vian widow of the late Frans Charron deceased
did give assign and make over to the D^r Defende her
son by her marriage with the said late Frans Charron a
certain lot of land in the said Barony w^t or -
which said conveyance was made by the sd Charlotte Vian
for and in consideration of the sum of a sum of 1400⁰⁰
being for the balame of his rights in the succession mobilier
of his deceased father, of which the D^r Defende in by the
D^r act did discharge and acquit the said Charlotte Vian
and also for and in the further consideration that he the D^r
Defende should pay to Marie Frans Charron & Marguerite
Charron his sisters at their age of majority to each of them
the sum of 3300⁰⁰, being the amount of their respective
rights in the succession mobilier of the said late Frans
Charron their father, established & fixed by the act of
partage of the property of the Community which had
subsisted between the said late Francois Charron & the said
Charlotte Vian, bearing date the 11th day of March 1812
passed before Cadieu & his Collagene Notaries, which
said several sums of money make together the sum
of 8000⁰⁰ equal to £333. 6. 8 - And the D^r Plaintiff saith
that the said act or deed of Conveyance is equivalent
to a deed of sale & passed after the partage aforesaid
and that there beams due and owing by the D^r Defende
for

for Costs & Expenses theron to the Plaintiff the sum of £27. 15. 6½
together with the sum of £2 paid for Copies of the said
Notarial acts, to support this action & filed herewith —
Conduces to the payment of a sum of £29. 15. 6½ w. intent
& Costs —

Plea — Nil deb — & further that Plaintiff cannot have
or maintain his action & demand a recovery for Costs & Expenses
on the deed of Conveyance in question, inasmuch as by Law the
same carries no Costs & Expenses, being an arrangement or family
and a Devotion from a Parent to a Child on terms which
give no claim for said Costs & Expenses

Replication comes —



Gerrard & Son
vs
Nickless & Co.

Cases cited -

1 H. Bl. 81. Williams vs. Millington -

An auctioneer employed to sell the goods of a third person by auction, may maintain an action for goods sold & delivered agt. a buyer, though the sale was at the house of such third person, and the goods were known to be his property -

Repre vs Revendication. - p. 619. -

Il n'y a régulièrement que le propriétaire de la chose qui puisse intenter l'action de Revendication. - Il suit de la que l'acheteur, à qui la chose achetée n'a point été livrée, ne seroit point fondé à intenter l'action de Revendication, parce que la tradition d'une telle chose est nécessaire pour en acquérir la propriété. -

and p. 621. - Au surplus, celui qui revendique la chose, et qui en a fait faire l'entierement, est obligé de prouver son droit de propriété ; si non celui sur qui l'entierement a été fait, doit en obtenir mainlevée, avec dommages, intérêts & dépens. -

See Cases -

Cox. vs. Harden. 2. East. Rep. 211. -

Waring. vs. Cox. 1 Camp. & T. Rep. 369. -

Sargent. vs. Morris. 3. Barn. & Ald. 277. -

see also - Evans. vs. Marlett. 1 Raym. 271. - contra - but among cases then referred to see 12 Mod. 1 Rep. 156 - where the principle of this action seems decided. - L. C. 3 Salk. 290 -

No 1836. u

Carmel
Chisholm. }

Action on draft drawn by James Stewart
 James T Colroyd & David Carnegie Low, merchants
 & Copartners under the name or firm of Stewart
 Colroyd & Co on the Defund^d payable to the
 order of the drawers, and by them endorsed to Plff, date
 22nd Decr. 1819, for £100. 18. 7 - The same was afterwards
 endorsed by Plff to R. Griffin, who caused same to be protested
 for non-payment, upon which an expense was accrued of
 £1. 5 - which added to principal sum forms that of £102. 3. 7
 in which action is broug^t

Plea + Non-assumpsit. —

- 2 Payment, by acceptance of Mr & Thos Hunter.
- 3 Payment of 10/- in the £ by dividend of Defd^d Estate —
 to Drawers Colroyd & Co —

Protest. dated 25th
April 1820. u

N° 891
De Longueville
v.
Charron.

On question whether Lods & Ventes are due
on a Cession by a mother to her son of a lot
of land, in consideration of his paying to each
of two sisters 3500^f due to them as their share
in the succession mobilaine of their deceased father &
being quit w^r the son for a sum of 100^f due him on same
act. —

The authority cited by Buff from Pothier Tr. Tuf. p. 153
is ag^t him, as he appears to accede to the opinion of the
Dr. Lebonne & Guyot.

The authority from de P. 155. 6, refers to general principle
of transaction — but says nothing as to the particular kind of
transaction between parent & child —

Proudhom. p 257 — if the debt paid could be considered as
equivalent to the value of the land, in a donation en ligue
dure — this wd^t be considered as a Sale — & Lods due
But this fact not proved a value of land

so however what this author says. p. 259 — La donation
faite par le pere à un de ses Enfants à la charge de payer
ses dettes de sa succession, ne donne ouverture à aucun
droit — parque les dettes d'une succession sont les charges
des biens qui composent la succession —

The arrêts referred to as cited from Rep^{re} v. Lods &
Ventes. 9. 8. p. 616 — appear to be cited only to shew the opinions
of particular writers, or what former decisions had been, for
this author, after citing them, says — "Mais ces Arrêts
quelque précis qu'ils paraissent, sont combattus par
un grand nombre d'autres, qui ont enfin emporté la
balance" — cit^r — Caroudas. — Guyot. — Lapeyrière — arrêt
du Parlement de Paris —

The arrêt cited from Grainville p. 261 was this — Si
une femme donataire de la moitié des propres de son mari
par son contrat de mariage, et qui en paiement de sa dot
et des dettes par elle acquittées, reçoit l'autre moitié des biens
par acte passé entre elle & les héritiers, et ce, ayant renoncé
à la Communauté, doit des Lods & Ventes de la portion
qui lui est donné en paiement — Judgez ag^t her —

She was not in line of succession to this property — & it
is so by the Substitut du Procureur General, in his moyens,

arrêt du 31 Août
1739.

Cet arrêt est fondé sur le principe certain qu'un Coherrier créancier d'une succession, ne doit pas empêcher les héritages de la succession qui lui sont délaissés pour sa créance + in speaking of an arrêt ne plus t. of 1688 - touching a Cession made by one Sister to another

= The authority cited from Freninville 5. Vol. p. 740 - is more decisive & positive & refers to several decisions -

But on authorities on the other side

Hervé. Théorie des matières Féodales & Censuelles. 3^e. vol.
p 84. says - Toujours sur le même principe d'accommodement
de famille, on décide encore, qu'il ne se fait point de
rente, lorsqu'un père donne un Fief à son fils, soit à la
charge d'acquitter ses dettes, ou telle portion de ses dettes,
soit pour s'acquitter lui-même de ce qu'il doit à son
fils, par exemple, pour les reprises de sa mère, pour
le reliquat d'un compte de tutelle &c - Deux arrêts
l'un de 1688, et l'autre de 1733, rendus après partage
d'avis, ont confirmé cette décision" -

Renaudon. Dic. des Fiefs. V^e Lods & Rentes. n° 204

Il n'y a pas aussi lieu aux Lods & Rentes lorsque un père
fait une donation à son fils à la charge de payer ses dettes
aliquid dicendum - si une telle donation étoit faite en faveur
d'un parent, ou d'un Etranger -

see after p. 46 - +

Boutaric, Traité des Droits Seigneuriaux - p. 145

Il reste deux questions importantes dans cette
matière. - La première, de savoir, si ces trois sortes de
donations lorsqu'elles sont faites par un père à ses
enfants échouent également lieu aux Lods - Et la seconde
si elles sont sujettes aux Lods lorsque la charge ne
regarde pas le profit du Donateur -

cd

A l'égard de la première question, elle a été diversement décidée par les auteurs et par les arrêts — Duplessis rapporte deux arrêts des années 1607 et 1661, par lesquels il fut jugé, que d'une donation faite par un père à ses enfans pour demeurer quitte envers eux d'un compte de tutelle, ou de la dot de leur mère, il étoit du des Lods — Henry rapporte un arrêt du 12 Juillet 1650, dont la décision a été la même, dans une espèce où il n'y avoit d'autre différence si ce n'est que le Contrat avoit été qualifié de Vente ou Bail, en paiement de ce qui étoit du aux enfans.

D'autre part, le Journaliste des audiences rapporte un arrêt du 12 Mai 1631, par lequel un fils, donataire particulier de sa mère à la charge de payer 9000^{fr} de dittes, fut relaxé de la demande du Sénéchal — Basnayz en rapporte deux du Parlement de Rouen des 18 Decr & 8 Janv^r 1672 qui l'ont jugé de même et dans la même espèce — et M. Guyot en rapporte deux autres des années 1688 et 1733, par lesquels, des donations faites à des enfans, pour demeurer quitte de ce qui leur étoit dû, furent déclarées exemptes du droit de Lods.

Tous les auteurs qui ont écrit dans ces derniers tems, se sont rangés à cette jurisprudence —

Les donations faites aux enfans à la charge de payer des dittes, ou à la charge que le père demeure quitte des droits que ses enfans avoient sur lui ont été regardées comme n'étant qu'une anticipation de ce qui devroit arriver un jour, lorsque les enfans devenant les héritiers du père seroient obligés de payer ses dittes, ou confondroient celles dont eux-mêmes étoient créanciers. —

+ Renaudou. Traité des Droits Seigneuriaux liv. 2. ch. 2
p. 164. 5.-

Lorsqu'un héritage sensuel est donné en paiement d'une dette, il y a ouverture aux Lods & Ventes, si toutesfois le paiement se fait d'étranger à étranger ; car quand c'est du père au fils ou Coheritiers on y met quelque différence. — Quand par exemple le père donne un héritage Censuel à son fils en paiement de ce qu'il lui avoit promis en mariage, un tel délaissement ne produit point de Lods & Ventes : Il en seroit d'autant contraire si le père donnoit à son fils l'héritage Censuel en paiement d'une somme que lui auroit prêté son fils, [ou de ce qu'il lui rediroit pour reliquat de compte de Subdell]

Entre Coheritiers, lorsqu'il s'en trouve un Crancier de la succession et qu'on lui donne hors part en paiement, un héritage Censuel, il ne doit point de Lods & Ventes. — Il en est de même quand on donne à l'un des Coheritiers un héritage Censuel à la charge d'acquitter les dettes de la succession. —

Fonmaur. Tr. des Lods & Ventes. partie 3. ch. 17. p. 30. N° 499.-

Les négociés des peres & mères avec leurs enfants doivent être affranchis des Lods, selon Guyot. Entrons dans le détail des preuves de cette exemption :

see arrêts cités. N° 1. 2. 3. 4 & 5

See also. N° 500. p. 32. —

Blackwood
Therrien & al

Quest. as to right of sume drawee & endorser of a note
in same action as solidairement oblige, —

O. Denet. v^e Endosseurs N° 11 —

Le dernier porteur d'une lettre de change ou billet de commerce, a pour débiteurs solidaire, tous les endosseurs tireurs et accepteurs — mais il doit diriger son action dans les termes régis par —

Judg. 19 Oct. 1821. — Rep^{re} v^e Endossement. p. 709 — bottom last column
Nous avons déjà dit plus cius fois, que le dernier porteur d'une lettre ou billet de change a pour garans solidaires, tous les endosseurs tireurs & accepteurs. —
and p. 712. cas n^o point. De la Vanackre o. Lajordé & Denet —

Repu de l'ur. de Mulin. v^e ordre (billet). p. 837. 8. N^o 7.

Poth. Com. Change — N° 115. — (162) 181 en fine — 212 —

= Rep^{re} v^e Billets. p. 382. 3. — C'est pour quoi si le débiteur du billet ne paye pas à l'échéance la personne qui aura la propriété à une action en recours, tant contre celui qui a endossé le billet à son profit, que contre tous les endosseurs précédens — elle est en droit de les faire condamner solidairement à la payer. —

Société —

Lorsqu'un marchand a fait banqueroute après la dissolution de la Société, les créanciers de la Société n'ont un privilège sur les effets qui la composoient à l'exclusion des créanciers particuliers du marchand, postérieurs à celle dissolution —

1 Arrêt d'Aix-en-Provence p. 736. —

Par arrêt rendu à la quatrième chambre des Enquêtes le 11 Juin 1692, jugeé, una voce, qu'un créancier de la Société est préféré sur les effets de la Société, au créancier de l'associé, quoique ce créancier fut antérieur à celui de la Société. — Les effets n'étoient que des marchandises — Dec. des arrêts de Brillon, N^e Société N^o 7 (Société Dettes). p. 208 —

Eo. loco — p. 209 —

De la préférence d'obligation sur le fond d'une Société — Jugeé au même parlement de Grenoble le 22 Aout 1637 que les dettes faites pour la Société, sont préférables aux étrangers, que l'un de la Société a contracté en son propre et privé nom, quoique antérieures à la Société — Barret Tom. 2. liv. 5. Tit. 2. Ch. 11. —

1. Montagu on Partnership.¹³¹

Dividend — The Joint Estate is applicable to the payment of the Joint debts, and the separate Estate to the payment of the separate debts; and the surplus of either estate must be added to the other deficient Estate. —

See cases cited —

Pardessus. Cours du Droit Commercial. 3 Vol. p. 17.

Une autre conséquence de ce principe, est que le créancier ne pourroit venir faire saisir les effets et autres choses formant l'actif de la Société, sous pretéti qu'une partie indivise appartient à son débiteur — Il doit attendre la liquidation — se borner aux oppositions capable de consurer ses droits, & exercer seulement ceux de ce débiteur dans le partage des profits annuels — De même celui qui seroit créancier d'un des associés & débiteur de la Société, ne pourroit ni invoquer dans son intérêt la compensation pour se libérer — ni être repoussé dans les poursuites qu'il exercerait contre son débiteur par l'exception de compensation qui prroit valoir celui-ci. —

Durocher de
Blambien 3

Our action of assent agt. Defendants Esqrs &
Trustees of late Mrs B. Blambien -

Quest. whether, the Gréve de Substitution for
the usufruit only, can be considered as holding

the property, and as the proprietor after death during that
enjoyment, so as to be considered as forming a part of the succession
of the Gréve, on failure of the ^{persons} Substitution. -

Post. Tr. de Substitutions. Sec. 3. art. 1. p. 508. -

Règles sur l'interprétation des Substitutions, & sur celles
de quelques conditions, clauses, & termes qui s'y
rencontrent. -

La principale règle est, qu'on doit rechercher ce qu'a voulu
l'auteur de la Substitution, sans s'attacher aux termes. -

¹⁵⁰ C'est en conséquence de cette règle qu'il a été jugé par
arrêt du 10 Juin 1719, rapporté au 7^e Tom. du Journal
et par Auzourd, que les termes dont se servent les Notaires
ignorans dans les Substitutions, que celui qui en est grévé
n'aura que l'usufruit des biens substitués, n'empêchant
pas que le grévé ne soit considéré comme propriétaire
de ces biens, et que le terme d'usufruit employé dans le
testament, devrait s'^{en} étendre, non d'un usufruit proprement
dit, mais d'un droit de propriété, qui au moyen de la
Substitution, devrait s'éteindre et se refondre en la
personne du grévé à sa mort, et qui à cause du
rapport avec l'usufruit qui s'éteint de même, avoit été
appelé usufruit. -

Id. art 2. § 1. p. 513. Si l'auteur de la Substitution a prescrit lui-même l'ordre
dans lequel elle sera recueillie, et nommé ceux qu'il
entendoit préférer aux autres, on doit suivre, ce qu'il a ordonné,
si non, ce sont ceux de la famille qui sont en plus proche degré
qui doivent la recueillir -

Mais

Mais sont-ce ceux de cette famille qui sont les plus proches du Testateur, ou ceux qui sont les plus proches du grévé, qui doivent la recueillir ? — Il n'est pas douteux que ce sont les plus proches du grévé, et on n'a aucun regard à sa proximité avec le Testateur, mais à sa seule proximité avec le grévé. —

Id. Sec. 5. p. 521. De l'effet des Substitutions avant leurs Ouvertures, et des Obligations du Grévé. —

Cette matière se réduit en trois principes —

- 1^o L'héritier, ou autre grisé de Substitution est, avant l'ouverture, seul propriétaire des biens substitués —
- 2^o Outre que le grisé est détenteur des biens substitués, ce droit de propriété qu'il a des Immeubles substitués, n'est pas une propriété incommutable — mais une propriété résoluble au profit du Substitué par l'échéance de la condition qui doit donner ouverture à la Substitution. —
- 3^o Le substitué, avant l'ouverture de la Substitution, n'a aucun droit formé par rapport au bien substitué, mais une simple espérance —

art. 1. Le grisé de Substitution, étant, avant l'ouverture de la Substitution, le vrai et seul propriétaire, des biens substitués il suit de là, que les actions actives & passives de la Succession résident en sa Seule personne —
Prescription will run against him —

p. 522 De ce que l'héritier ou autre grisé de Substitution, est, avant l'ouverture de la Substitution, seul et vrai propriétaire des biens substitués, il suit aussi, qu'il a qualité pour recevoir le rachat des rentes, et le prix des alienations forcées des héritages substitués, comme d'une licitation, et que les débiteurs sont libérés en payant entre ses mains —

Potts. Sub. Sec. 5 art. 2. Quoique le substitué tienne son droit de l'auteur de la
 §. 1. p. 560 substitution, et non du grevé, néanmoins il est vrai, que la
 mutation de propriétaire et possesseur se fait de la personne
 du Grevé à celle du Substitué, puisqu'effectivement, la
 propriété et la possession des biens substitués passent du
 grevé au Substitué —

Droits de fiefs - régularisés accordingly. —

D'Essaule Du Savigny. Tr. des Sub. ch. 29. p. 175-

M.533 Quand le fideicommiss s'évanouit par le deces de —
 l'appelé avant l'ouverture, que devient la chose substituée?

M.534. Elle demeure au grevé, qui par là en est possesseur
 libre — Elle ne passe point à l'héritier du Substitué,
 puisqu'il n'y a point de transmission — Elle ne passe
 pas non plus à l'héritier du Substituant — car le
 Substituant en donnant d'abord cette chose au Grevé
 l'a préféré à son propre héritier; et ce grevé n'étoit
 venu de la rendre qu'au Substitué. —

=

ch. 32. p. 189 Il faut donc tenir pour constant que dans le legs
 M. 568. 9 pur, la propriété de la chose léguée réside pendant
 un temps, sur la tête de l'héritier — Elle passe de là sur
 celle du Legataire au moment où il accepte —

M.570. Puisque les fidei-commis sont gouvernés par les
 mêmes règles que les legs, il s'ensuit, que dans les
 fidei-commis purs, la propriété réside également pendant
 un temps en la personne du grevé —

M.571. Le grevé malgré l'ouverture subite de ce fideicommiss
 pur, est propriétaire jusqu'à ce que le Substitué le
 devienne par l'acceptation —

N° 572 Cette vérité est d'autant plus incontestable dans notre usage qu'on y a toujours tenu pour règle indubitable, que la propriété ne peut pas être en suspens — et qu'il faut nécessairement qu'elle soit assise sur la tête de quelqu'un.

=

576 Retenez donc bien, que dans ce fidei commis Conditionnel la propriété appartient au grevé jusqu'à ce que la condition dont le fidei commis dépend, soit arrivée — Tant que la Condition est pendante, le grevé est véritablement et pleinement propriétaire ; toutes les loix y sont formelles.

=

Raison

577 Le substitut ne pouvant avoir la propriété pendant la Condition, il faut bien qu'elle appartienne au Grevé puis qu'il ne peut pas être en suspens —

on note —

Un Testateur aura dit — Je lègue la propriété de mes biens aux enfans à naître de mon fils, voulant que mon fils se contente d'un jouir par usufruit sa vie durant — au décès du Testateur le fils n'a point encore d'enfans — Quis Iuris ? — Par le principe que la propriété ne peut rester en suspens, elle appartiendra au fils, jusqu'à ce qu'il lui survienne des Enfans, malgré la clause, qui le réduit au simple usufruit —

Sacombe. v^e Substitution. Part. 2. Sec 1. N° 10. — p. 502.

(2)

Ainsi de ces termes — En quelque tems que mon héritier ou mon légataire meure, Je veux que mon héritage appartienne à tel — il y a fidei commis — Comme aussi lorsque l'usufruit est légué à l'un, et la propriété à l'autre. —

N° 18. Si un Testateur ayant institué un héritier avec ces termes, sa vie durant, a institué un autre héritier après la mort de ce premier — la seconde institution à force de fideicommiss — De même, quand ces termes, sa vie durant, n'y soient pas, la seconde Institution, après la mort du premier, est prise pour fidei-commis
 Id. dist. 5. N° 3. Donataire institué, ou légataire d'usufruit, grevé de Substitution, est censé Donataire institué, ou légataire de la propriété. —

(3)

Arrêts d'Augeard. 2. Vol. 15. 316 —

affaire d'Estouteville et Lucheu. —

q. Si Adrienne Destouteville, ayant donné par son Contrat de mariage le Duché Destouteville à François de Bourbon, Comte de St Pol, son mari, sa vie durant seulement, et après lui, à leurs enfans à naître, le Comte de St Pol, n'a eu qu'un simple usufruit, ou la propriété grevée de Substitution, et s'il a rempli le degré de l'Institution. — ? —

Une seule réflexion va prouver la solidité de ces décisions. Si dans l'espèce d'une Substitution où admettoit qu'un premier donataire fut réduit au simple usufruit, il s'ensuivroit que jusqu'à l'ouverture de la Substitution, il n'y auroit aucun propriétaire. —

La propriété ne pourroit résider dans la personne de l'Instituant, qui dans le cas de la Substitution testamentaire n'est plus en vie, lorsque l'institué recueille, et qui dans le cas de Substitution contractuelle, est presque toujours décédé — lorsque le cas de la Substitution arrive, et est de même de son vivant dépouillé de la propriété par la réserve ordinaire de l'usufruit, qu'on ne manque que des stipuler. —

Elle résideroit encore moins dans la personne du Substitut qui ordinairement n'est pas né, et qui n'a aucun droit, ni de propriété, ni d'usufruit, avant l'ouverture de la Substitution.

Il faut donc conclure, qu'elle réside en la personne du Donataire chargé de Substitution, quoique la Donation qui lui est faite soit conçue en termes d'usufruit. —

Augeard, loco citato. p. 361. —

Un testateur institue Claude et Guy, ses frères, ses héritiers universels, à la charge de payer ses dettes, et d'acquitter ses legs ; il ajoute, qu'ils jouiront de tous les fruits de ses biens, sans pouvoir aliener les fonds, afin qu'ils puissent appartenir à leurs enfans mâles procéés de légitime mariage. — Au défaut de ses enfans il appelle d'autres personnes de sa famille. — Guy meurt sans enfans mâles. — Claude ne laisse que de petits enfans mâles d'un fils précédent. Il se forme deux questions. — La première, Si les petits enfans de Claude peuvent prétendre la moitié des biens du Testateur, laissés à leur ayeul. — La seconde, S'ils peuvent prétendre l'autre moitié laissée à leur grand Oncle. —

Sur la première question, Dumoulin ne forme point de doute. Il décide que les petits enfans de Claude sont substitués & appellés.

La troisième des raisons par lui alléguées, est, que le Testateur ayant dit expressément, qu'il vouloit, que les Institués eussent les fruits de ses biens, est censé avoir fait un fideicommissum.

Confirmatur, quia expresse se dixit velle fratres suos facere omnes fructus suos, igitur ad vitam suam tantum ; unde fideicommissum resultat. — En sorte que, suivant Dumoulin ces termes — ad vitam suam tantum, forment la preuve d'un fidei commis. —

N° 1784.-

Ant. Orienteaux
In 13^e. ^{av} Tetro.
six^e

action en rescission du Contract de Vente.

The declaration states, That by Deed of Sale made and executed before Mr Delgrave & his compn nobys the 11 July 1815, the defendant sold and conveyed to the Plaintiff two certain lots of land therein mentioned, for and in consideration of the sum of 9000[£] payable as follows - that is, 6000[£] paid immediately on passing the said deed - and out of the remaining 3000[£] it was agreed that the Plaintiff should retain in their hands the sum of 1398[£]. 17^s. 6^d being the share right of the four minor children of the said Defendant Tetro, with his late wife Angelique Dancereau, on paying interest thereon to the said Defendant until the said children came of age - and that the Plaintiff should pay the remaining sum of 1601. 2. 6. in two years from the date of the said deed without, it being agreed that out of this latter sum the Plaintiff should pay what arrears there might be due to the Signior on the said Lots of Land

That by virtue of the said sale the Plaintiff took possessⁿ of the said lots of land at St Michel 1816, as the lawful owners and proprietors thereof, and held and enjoyed the same quietly and peacefully, until lately, when they were informed that one half of the said lots of land was not their property, and that the other half was mortgaged for large sums of money -

That after the said Plaintiff had entered on the possⁿ of the said lots of land, they paid to the Signior of Rouville, the sum of 852. 15, for arrears of Cens Trentes other Liguernal rights due on one of the said lands, and to the Signior Debartelje a sum of 73. for like arrears due on the other lot of land - so that the Plaintiff actually paid and disbursed on the whole a sum of 6925[£]. 13^s. on account & in deduction of the said principal sum of 9000[£] leaving a balance in their hands of 2175.[£] which the Plaintiff retained & were always ready to pay according to the stipulations in the said deed of sale -

That since, that is, in the month of May 1819, the Plaintiff found out and were informed, that the said Defendant had never

been

been proprietors of the whole of the said lots of land, but that one half thereof belongs to Emily, Hubert, Louise & Esther Zets the said minor children of the said Defendant by his said first wife Angelique D'anseran, the said lots of land being conquests of the community that subsisted between them, and which the said Defendants were in nowise authorized to sell —

That the said Plaintiffs have also found out, that at the time of passing the said deed of sale, the said lots of lands, the same were mortgaged for the pay^t. of several sums of money, and in particular for the payment of a sum of 4500[£] due to the said minors — for a sum of 175[£] due to Joseph Pratt, for balance due on the sale of the said lots and of a rent constituee of 20[£] annually, on a capital of 400[£] due to Mr. Boisens, priest, and to whom also there was due a further sum of 140[£], for seven years arrears of the said rent, making with the said principal a sum of 540[£] and further, that upon one of the said lots of land there was a deficiency of 3 feet in width by the depth of 40 acres, qd have been estimated at a sum of 130[£] 3^s and of which the said Plaintiffs would be entitled to a deduction upon the price of the said lots of land —

That the said Plaintiffs in consequence of their said purchase have made improvements on the said lots of land to the amount and value of £246[£] which they are ready to verify —

That although the said Defendants have been often required by the said Plaintiffs since the month of May 1819 to cause the right of property after the said minors in the said lots of land to cease and determine, and to furnish & procure sufficient acquittances and discharges of the mortgages upon the said lots of land for the pay^t. of the aforesaid several sums of money, the said Defendants have always hitherto wrongfully refused to do so, whereby the said Plaintiffs are obliged to have their income aff them and to demand, that as the said Plaintiffs are threatened to be evicted and are in fact evicted from the possession of the undivided half of the said lots of land so belonging to the said minors and being also troubled in their possession of the premises by reason of the mortgages with which they are now affected prior to

the passing of the said deed of sale to the extent of the sum of 5243^t. - do therefore demand that the said deed of sale be rescinded and annulled by the Judge of the Court, and in consequence that the said Defendant be condemned to reimburse and pay to the said Plaintiff 1st The sum of 6925.^t 10^c
paid by the said Plaintiff on account of their said purchase. 2nd
the said sum of 6246^t for the value of the improvements made
by the said Plaintiff on the said lots of land since their said
purchase 3rd a sum of 3000^t for the damages suffered by the
said Plaintiff by reason of their being excreted of the possession
of the said lots of land - or that the Defendant do cause the
right of property of the said minor children in the said lots of
land, the said mortgages, trouble & disturbance in the possession
of the said Plaintiff to cease and determine - wherefore he

Plea - The Defendant states, that on 29 Augt. 1815, the Defendant Teste, as Tutor of his minor children of his marriage with his late wife Angelique Dansereau, on a petition by him for this purpose presented to the Hon. Dr. Ch. Fourdrinier, one of the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas for the district of Montreal, had been authorized to sell in the usual and customary manner the two lots of land in question, of which the said Defendant was proprietor for one half - That in consequence the said Defendant caused the said lots of land to be cried and published for sale at the Church door of the parish where the said lots of land are situated, and on the 3rd Sept. 1815, the same were adjudged to the said Defendant as the last and highest bidder, the one for the sum of 3450^t and the other for the sum of 550^t as appears by the Proces Verbal ^{de la vente ordinaire} after adjudication thereof by Gabriel Catudal, made before L. B. Delapraue this confrme note on the 5th day of Sept. 1815.
That afterwards, on the 9th Oct. 1815, the said Gabriel Catudal in the name and on the behalf of the said minor children and Teste Dansereau, their subrogié Tuteur, made a deed of sale of the said lots of land to the said Defendant for the consideration of the sum of 4000^t payable as mentioned in that deed -
that by virtue of the aforesaid adjudication and sale of the said lots of land, the Defendant considering himself the true and

and lawful owner and proprietor of the said lots of land did in May, June and July of the year 1816, did ameliorate and improve the said lots of land, and lay out monies thereon to the extent of 5000^t -

That the said Defend^d. considering himself the true and lawful owner and proprietor of the said lots of land, afterwards on 11 July 1816 sold the same to the said Plffs for the sum of 9000^t - on the terms & conditions mentioned in the said deed and in consequence of which the present action hath been instituted ag^t the 2^d Defend^d.

That since the institution of the present action, the said Defend^d. hath caused a petition to be presented to the Judge of the Court of King's Bench for this district, in order to name a tutor to the said minor children who might intervene in this action on their behalf, and in consequence of which petition P^r Dancereau the maternal uncle of the said minors had been named for this purpose, who hath this day filed his intervention on their behalf in this cause -

Wherefore Defend^d. prays, that upon the said intervention of the said P^r Dancereau, he may be authorised to make & execute a deed of sale of the said lots of land to the 2^d Defend^d for the sum and according to the terms and conditions contained in the said adjudication, in order that thereupon the 2^d Defend^d may be authorised to execute a good and sufficient deed and conveyance thereof to the 2^d Plff -

Replication - That as Defend^d. by their own shewing never had a sufficient title to the land in question, therefore Plffs are founded in dem anding that deed of sale to them be rescinded consenting however, in case Defend^d. can under any authority of the Court obtain a sufficient title to the premises, the Plffs consent to retain the same & to discharge Defend^d. from the present action on their paying the damages suffered by the Plffs to the present moment & the costs of suit

Intervention

Intervention by P^r Dancereau, Interv ad hoc to the minor
children of Defende^s in support a Justice - add further,
that he has a personae knowledge of the adjudication after two
lots of land in question made to the Defende^s the 3^d Lysh 1815-
for the sum of 4000[£] which he considers to have been the
just and true value thereof, and even more - and further
that after the said adjudication that the o^d Defende^s make
very considerable improvements on the s^t lot of land

By an Intatoratory order of the Court of the 18 Apr. 1821- it was
directed that an estimation & just appraisement by Experts & Justices
should be made of the lots of land in question at the time of the sale
and adjudication thereof to the Defende^s, and also the opinion &
advice of the relations and friends of the said minors, touching
the rights & interest of the said minors in the said lots of land
for which purpose Petimonts. At^r was authorized to receive the
said avis touching the value of the said lot of land, and if it
was in the advantage of the said minors that the said sale should
be confirmed, of all which the o^d Petimonts was directed to draw
up an act & to transmit the same to the Court -

On 30 Mai 1821 act before Petimonts containing the opinion &
advice of the relations & friends of said minors, which states, that the
land in question was sold for its greatest value on 3^d Lysh 1815 to
Defende^s & for the interest of the minors & therefore the sale ought to
be approved - to this avis was annexed the rapport & Experts
of Joseph Guineau & Villeneuve & Jean B^e Cetin, who declare
that they know the value of the land in question, & that when it
was adjudged to Defende^s in 1815, 4000[£] was its just value - and
further that since the sale that o^d Defende^s built a barn thereon
made improvements exceeding 1000[£].

Frans Bleizmy
d' Jarry.
P^re Marmier,
In B^t Leonard, &
Joseph Robin &
Lapointe -

Action to rescind a deed of sale, for cause of
Lesion d'outre moitié du juste prix. —

The declaration states, that by deed of sale bearing date the 19th Aug^t. 1809, the plaintiff sold to the D^r P^re Marmier, 2 certain lots of land mentioned and described in the declaration, for and in consideration of the sum of 6000[£] payable in 30 years from 1 July 1819, by sums of 200[£] annually, and without interest. —

That the Defendants Jean B^t Leonard and Joseph Robin & Lapointe, are now in the actual possession of the first described of the said two lots of land, & claim it as their property —

That the said two lots of land were worth at the time of the sale aforesaid, a sum of 5500[£] ready money, the interest of which in 30 years would amount to a sum of £390, and that the annual produce thereof, cultivated in bon pere de famille, was worth 400[£] —

That the said Plaintiff by the said sale therefore suffered a lesion of more than one half of the true value of the said lots of land, and is therefore founded in demanding that the said deed of sale so made by him to the S^r Marmier, be rescinded and annulled, and the said Defendants adjudged to deliver up the possession of the said lots of land to him the S^r Plaintiff with the issues and profits thereof wherefore we

Plea of P^re Marmier —

1. That action has not been instituted within ten years & cannot be maintained —
2. That Plaintiff ought to have sued all the actual proprietors of the said lots of land, which he has not done, not having sued Jean Frans. Leonard, one of them — so that the prescription acquired by him, must operate in favor of P^re Marmier. —
3. That

3. That there never existed any lesion in the sale of the aforesaid lots of land, the same not being worth more than what they were sold for -
4. That there appears no evident or pressing want of money on the part of the said Plaintiff to part with the said lot of land from the circumstances stated of giving 30 years for the paym. of the price, without interest
5. That the plff by having been in the actual possession of the said lots of land, and cultivated the same, was well able to judge of the value thereof at the time of the sale better than Defendant who had never seen them before the sale -

Plea of Joseph Robin & Lapointe -

That he the Defendant and Jean Frans Leonard (whom the Plaintiff pretends to sue by the name of Jean Bap^t Leonard) the having sold and possessed one of the lots of land mentioned & described in the declaration, for 10 years & upwards, by virtue of good and sufficient titles, the present action cannot be maintained against them - And supposing even that the present action had been instituted within the ten years, the same cannot be maintained without having made the said Jno. Leonard a party to the suit, as holding a part of the said lot of land with the said Robin. - That the Plaintiff admitting that the lands in question at the time of the sale thereof were worth \$500- and were sold for 6000. shows he has no right of action, as the delay of payment ^{without interest} does not alter the price or value of land, but on the contrary shows that the plff was not forced to make a sale from want of money, but that sale was made for the real value of the land, which Defendant is ready to prove - Further, denying the facts stated in the declaration -

Replication to Plea of Pre Marmier - That the

- action was instituted within the ten years of the said
 P^r Marmier which is sufficient to maintain the same —
2. That Puff was not bound to sue the other Defend^s. with
 Marmier —
 3. That there is lèseion in the said Sale —
 4. That Puff did not make any gift to Defoe but a Sale
 and the value of the money given for the lands sold must
 be considered as well as value of land — and that the long
 delay of paying with the annual revenue of the land must be
 considered, as the sum of 200^t paid annually is not equal to
 the revenue of the land —

Replication to pleading of Jos Robin.—

1. That he cannot claim the prescription to set up, as the
 present action was instituted within the ten years of Marmier
 which is sufficient
2. That action is well founded & not vexatious —
3. That there is lèseion in the Sale
4. As above —

The Defend^s filed two deeds of Sale, one by
 P^r Marmier of the first described lot of land to one Fr^s
 Hobert dated 15th Sept. 1809, for a sum of 5000^t — another
 a deed of sale of same land by Fr^s Hobert to Jean
 Fr^s Leonard, dated 20 Nov: 1809 — for £12.10^d rent
 of £20 annually —

Two works prove that this lot of land on 19 Aug: 1809
 was worth 2000^t — & that it might produce an annual clear
 revenue of about 200^t — one work says it might be worth
 2500^t — one says it might produce an annual revenue of
 100^t or 150^t — but — Of the other land nothing is said
 except by one work who says it is a wood land & worth 20^t annually

The Defendants say - that Puff is an intelligent man & knows value of lands - that he cultivates this land & must have known its value when he sold it — That at the time of the sale it was in bad order, both in regard of the house & barn as in regard of fences & ditches — & as to value There is a variety of opinion, some say it was not worth more than a 1000[£] & cannot estimate its annual produce + as to annual value, or a sum - keeping up fences & ditches was sufficient.

As to the action being substituted agt some only of the purchasers - see Rps^m v^o Lescou. p 464 -

Si c'étoit l'acteotin qui eut laissé plusieurs heritiers le vendeur pourroit incontestablement exercer l'action qui resulte de la lesion d'outre moitié du juste prix contre l'un de ces heritiers, sans qu'il soit obligé de l'exercer contre les autres — et il en servirait de même si l'héritage avoit été vendu à divers acheteurs —

No. 127
Galusha
Tecumseh.

} action on Provo^ry note. —

Defend^t was arrested on C. ad resp. — ~~on~~ after 1 Octo
1821 and gave bail to the Sheriff

The Defend^t did not appear at return of writ, nor on
4th and defendant, were introd. at him —

4th Octo. Plff moved for abstraction of evidence ex parte on 8th
11th " mo. for evidence on 12th —

13th " mo. for Judge on evidence adduced —

15th " Mo. on part of Defend^t to give special bail —

" " Mo. to enter appear for Defd^t by Wm Beaubien. —

" " Mo. by Defend^t.

1. That Plff. give security for Costs —

2. That writ of Ca. be quashed, as facts in affidavt
of Plff are not true — ~~as~~ art^s Citizens of State of N. York
when Defend^t had called his creditors together, to obtain
a discharge — wherein debt in question was contained —

3. That rule obt^d by Plff on 4th & Plff mo. of 13th be
set aside as Defend^t was not then a party in Court

4. That delay be granted to Defd^t to plead to 1st Feb^r next.

Judg. on Defd^t. mo. —

17th Plff gave security for Costs —

" — Defend^t filed an Excep. per. a la forme —

18th — Plff filed answer thereto — ~~as no cause of action under right~~

19 — Defend^t filed a Reply —

20 — Plff mo. for hearing on motions & exceptions filed by Defd^t
on 2nd Feby next. —

N^o. 119
Mount
&
Healey
&
Healey opp^t

Touching privity of a Clerk for payt, of his wages

1. Dup. p. 620 — Les Serviteurs l'ont aussi pour leurs gages —

Ferrari. 7^e Domestiques — Domestiques sont ceux qui sont aux gages de leurs maîtres, comme les Intendants, les Secrétaires, les commissaires, les laqueus ou —

N^o. 1024.

Mitchell
&
Russell & May

Question touching novation in Contract —

Where there is no novation —

Repre v^e Novation. p. 231. end of last column

Il semble que ce soit l'avis de Domat. au liv. 4. tit. 3. sec. 1 des Loix Civiles, où il dit avec Justinien, que les changemens fait par les Contractans dans une première obligation, ne font pas de novation, parce qu'ils n'éteignent pas la première dette — à moins qu'il fut dit expressément qu'elle demeuroit nulle —


Brettonnier, en ses additions sur Ferraris. Tom. 2. liv. 4. quest. 44. assure, que la disposition du dernier droit est, ^{même} dans tous les pays de droit écrit — à l'égard des il de ceux du ressort du Parlement de Paris, j'ai écrit dans un procès de Lyon, où cela a été ainsi jugé par un arrêt rendu en la Grande chambre de Grands Commissaires — au rapport de M^r. Meunier, le 23 Avril 1698 —

Id. p. 233. - 1^{re} Col. 2^e sente

De même si le Créditeur et le Debiteur font entre eux quelques changemens à une première obligation, soit en y ajoutant une hypothèque, une Caution ou un Sureté, ou en les ôtant, soit en augmentant ou diminuant la dette, ou en donnant un terme plus long, ou plus court, ou en la rendant conditionnelle, si elle étoit pure & simple, ou pure & simple, si elle étoit conditionnelle — tous

sous ces changemens ne font que déroger à l'ancienne Obligation pour ce qui est exprimé, sans faire une novation parfaite, qui s'étende aux objets dont le dernier Acte ne fait point mention.—

Tous les arrêts connus sur cette matière confirment les maximes qu'on vient d'établir



Opposition afin de charges & de conserver

Thibault - Tr. des Crées. - 2^e part. p. 71. 72 -

Rien de plus inutile dans les Decrets que les oppositions pour conserver les droits Seigneuriaux & les Cens Emphyteutiques une telle procédure ruineuse pour le Débitement et pour le dernier Crédancier, est condamnée par le Règlement de 1614.

Un usage abusif qui sembloit néanmoins en prescrire la nécessité, avoit prévalu de nos Jours, il paroissait donc aussi juste que nécessaire d'en arrêter le progrès — cet objet étoit bien digne de l'attention du Parlement; aussi n'a-t-il pas échappé l'occasion de donner de nouvelles preuves de son amour pour le bien public; Car en fixant par son règlement de 1748 sa Jurisprudence sur quelques points de cette importante partie de notre droit, il a ordonné l'exécution de celui de 1614, et a fait défenses à tous procureurs de faire ni signer aucun acte d'Opposition ni d'en répiter les frais contre les parties —

Intervention — & Reprise d'Instance

Demande
Nouveau Statut
du Châtelat.

} p. 13 — La demande en Intervention est, lorsque dans une instance formée entre deux particuliers survient un tiers dans l'instance, soit pour prendre le fait & cause du Défendeur, ou pour quelque intérêt particulier & différent de celui des parties, mais qui y a rapport

Othier Préc. p. 40 — L'Intervention est un acte par lequel un tiers demande à être reçu partie dans une instance formée entre d'autres parties, soit pour s'y joindre au Commandé, & demander la même chose que lui, ou quelque chose de connexe, soit pour se joindre au Céfendé, & combattre avec lui la demande du Commandé qu'il a intérêt de détruire.

Acte de Notoriété
de Denysart p.
393 — note (a)

} Il n'en est pas de même quand il y a véritablement une mutation dans les personnes de l'instance; la reprise est nécessaire en ce cas — Ainsi par exemple l'héritier de quelqu'un ne peut pas de plano continuer de poursuivre en son nom la procédure de l'instance dans laquelle celui dont il est héritier étoit partie; il doit préalablement reprendre cette instance et se faire donner acte de sa reprise — C'est une formalité essentiellement nécessaire et d'un usage universel. —

Ravaut. 126 Mais on peut douter qui sont ceux qui peuvent reprendre les instances commençées avec un défunt. — Il est sensible qu'il n'y a que ceux qui sont substitués à tous ses droits, comme sont les héritiers, et les donataires et légalitaires universels. —

Il ne faisoit pas que regulierement les Successours à
titre particulier puissent repudier les instances, elles
douent l'etre par les heritiers — et les autres doivent
intervenir pour soutenir les droits qu'ils ont comme Successors
singuliers. — see Post. Prog. Cov. des Repns d'Instane. p. 82.

Civard - Arbitrage -

Potts in
Burton -

On question whether the rapport d'arbitres
sought to be pronounced to the parties - and signified
to them -

Repu^e de Juv. de Merlin. v^e arbitrage. N^o 34. p. 340

Quoique l'ordonnance de 1667. ait abrogé la formalité
des prononciations des arrêts et jugements, il faut
 néanmoins pour la validité d'une sentence arbitrale
 qu'elle soit prononcée aux parties dans le tems du compromis
 autrement elle seroit déclarée nulle - Deux arrêts du
 Parlement de Paris des 18 Juin 1698 et 20 Fev. 1713, l'ont
 ainsi jugé - Et cette lour prudence est fondée sur
 ce que c'est la prononciation qui assure la date de la sentence.

But where there was no Greffier to receive the Sentence
 how is the date of it to be ascertained. — Eo. locw. refus
 to V. Compromis. N^o 4 -

Id. v^e Compromis. N^o 4 - on an appeal en Cassation
 upon an objection taken, that, "le droit des arbitres n'étant
 pas des officiers publics, foi n'est pas due à leur assertion
 en sorte que ladate de la sentence ne peut être réputée —
 certaine que du Jour de l'Enregistrement ou du dépôt" —

Par arrêt du attendu que la date de la décision arbitrale
 est légalement établie au Procès par la Signature des arbitres
 et qu'ainsi il est prouvé qu'ils étoient dans les délais
 du Compromis — Le tribunal rejette les

Repu^e de Guyot. v^e arbitrage. p. 548. 2^e col.

La prononciation doit être faite par le greffier qui a
 reçu la sentence, il dress un acte de celle prononciation ou
 dans les lieux où il n'y a point de greffier des arbitrages

en titre, il faut faire homologuer la sentence arbitrale

dans

dans la Justice Royale, plus prochaine

p. 549. Qd la homologation - ainsi aucunes des parties ne peut empêcher l'homologation, sous prétexte que la sentence arbitrale est injuste, ou autrement vicieuse -

p. 548. Si l'une des parties l'eroit une expédition de la sentence arbitrale et la faisoit signifier aux autres parties, cette signification tiendroit lieu de prononciation

Dec. de Royer. v^e arbitrage. §. 7. N^o 54. p. 95. 2^{ab}.

Un autre arrêt du même Tribunal, du 19 Juillet 1603 - ne considera pas comme une nullité que la sentence qui avoit été dressée par les arbitres, remise au Greffe & signée par le Greffier dans le délai du compromis, n'eut été prononcée qu'après -

Dec. de Droit de Fer. v^e arbitre -

A Paris on remet la sentence entre les mains d'un Notaire, qui en délivre expédition, laquelle est exécutoire sans que la sentence soit homologuée - parceque les Notaires de Paris sont Greffiers des arbitrages, de sorte que le dépôt de la sentence chez un notaire de Paris equivaut à l'homologation qui se fait ailleurs -

N^o 1557Holmes &
Gagnieraction of debt on deed of sale — ag^t Jos. & Jns^t. Gagnier

The declar^s states, that by deed of sale executed before Devozne & his colleague Moraine on 23 Sept^r 1819, the Plaintiff sold to Defendant Jos. Gagnier a certain lot of land therein described &c and in consideration of the sum of 2000^{rs} to be paid by ^{the said} instalments as therein stated — And that for the effectual securing the pay^t. of the said sum of money, the Defendant Jns^t. Gagnier, did in and by the said deed become security, pledge & caution to the Plaintiff — by reason whereof the Plaintiff became entitled to demand & receive from the ^{2^d} Defendant jointly and severally the said sum of money as being jointly & severally liable to the pay^t. thereof. That in March last there became due to the Plaintiff by virtue of the said deed of sale a sum of 866^{rs}. 13^c equal to £ 36. 2. 2½
w^t. interest from the 2^d. 23 Sept^r 1819 — wherefore the

Plan of Jos. Gagnier — That Plaintiff cannot maintain an action ag^t. him jointly with the ^{2^d} Defendant Gagnier, insomuch the said Jns^t. Gagnier did not become bound jointly w^t. him the ^{2^d} Joseph, nor solidamente, for the pay^t. of the money mentioned in the ^{2^d} deed of sale — and further denying all the facts stated in the declaration —

Plan of Jns^t. Gagnier — That he the Defendant never became bound, nor did he promise and undertake in manner aforesaid as stated in the declaration — That he never became bound solidamente w^t. Jos. Gagnier for the pay^t. of the money demanded by Plaintiff — That he the Defendant became bound only as pledge & caution of the ^{2^d} Jos. Gagnier, and not as a principal obligor or solidaire, & therefore Plaintiff cannot maintain the present action ag^t. him —

Replication Lewis w^t —

Frais de Justice - 1 Baguet. 21. № 23 -

Quant aux Procès intentés & poursuivis à la
requête des Procureurs du Roi civillement ou criminellement
il n'y a aucune condamnation de dépens, ne pas de
Justice - Pareillement n'y a aucun condamnation
de dépens es procès civillement intentés & poursuivis
contre les Procureurs du Roi - C'est pourquoi on dit
que Fiscus gratis litigat -

The King
Fraser }
Stuart Intw

Quest. as to privilege of the Proprietor for
house rent on seizure by the King. —

It is an established principle, that where the
King's right and that of a Subject meet at one & the
same time, the King shall be preferred. 16. Vn. 366. 7.
Clatty on Party 290. 381.
, East. 338 - Deter digniori, is the rule in the case of a concurrence
of titles between the King & Subject. - 2 Vent. 268. -

De p. 26 - But in Countries which though dependant on
the British Crown have different and local laws
for their internal governance, as for instance, the
plantations or Colonies, the minor prerogatives and
interests of the Crown must be regulated & governed
by the peculiar and established law of the place

The claim here set up by the Intervening Party, is
for three quarters not become due and in arrear at the
time of the seizure, so that in this respect, although there
was only a verbal lease, the right of privilege in regard
of arrears of rent is the same as if it had been a lease before
a Notary. Rep. re Bail. 23. -

Before the Edit of 13 Augt. 1669. there is nothing
certain to be ascertained in regard of the right of preference of
the Crown in a conflict of privilege between the King &
the Subject, although the preamble to that Edit would
seem to imply a renewal of former privileges & the enforcing
them by more positive enactments under the present law
but I have met with nothing satisfactory on this point.
The following observations taken from the authorities cited
would rather imply the non-existence of this privilege
prior to the above Edit —

see Edit. 1 Vol.
Fer. q. Com v
p. 1A90. -

Avocat Général
en la Cour des
Aydes.

(74)
Lebrut. Tr. de la Souveraineté du Roi
49^e action. p. 556.-

Casual

Question: Si le Collecteur a aucun privilège ou droit de
préférence contre le Propriétaire, pour être payé de la
Taille du fermier? -

Combien que la Taille soit une marque civile de la
sujétion naturelle du peuple envers son Roi, se est ce
nianmoins que nous avons observé, que le Collecteur
d'icelle n'a aucun privilège ou droit de préférence sur
les particuliers pour s'en faire payer. - En sorte que s'il
intervient un opposant qui demande le fermage de
ses terres, sur les fruits qui en sont provenus, ou le louage
de sa maison sur les meubles de son locataire, nous
avons vu, que par vos arrêts il a été préféré au
Collecteur, suivant la disposition commune de droit
qui lui donne ce privilège contre tous créanciers, jusqu'à
la prouver même contre le bénéfice de Cession, quoi que
meilleur permis en toutes autres affaires. -

De fait, nous voyons tous les Jours qu'il est
permis au moindre homme privé de se prévaloir contre
le Fisque du bénéfice de division, de discussion, d'ordre,
et de tous autres introduits par le droit, ~~et dont les~~
~~exemples~~ -

• Ce qui étant ainsi, et que tous les droits du monde
et la nature même, veuille que le propriétaire soit payé
par préférence de la moisson de ses terres sur les fruits
qui en proviennent, nous sommes contraints, de dire que
~~la sentence dont a été intjetée appel~~ (quoique tenus
comme la voix du Fisque, d'en élire les dévots en toutes
autres choses) de dire que la sentence dont a été intjetée
l'appel, auquel on vient de conclure, ne se peut soutenir
en ce que par icelle, les premiers Juges ont ordonné
que

que sans avoir egard à l'opposition de l'appellant, l'indant
afin d'etre payé du fermage de ses terres, suivant le bail
dont il faisoit appartenir les fruits de ses heritaiges seroient
rendus, et les deniers en provenans baillis au Collecteur
pour la Taille de son fermier — Ce qui est, comme nous
avons dit, contrain à l'intention du Roi, a vos arrêts, &
aux anciens reglemens de cette Cour —

Partant, nous consentons, qu'en demandant le Jugement
il soit dit, que les deniers provenans de la vente des dits
grains, soient rendus et restitués à l'appellant jusqu'à
la concurrence de son fermage, selon qu'il est contenu
par son bail, et que le surplus demeure au Collecteur,
et sauf à lui à se pourvoir sur les autres biens meubles
du dit fermier, pour ce qui restera à lui payer de la
taxe d'icelui. — Ce que la Cour ordonna par son
arrêt de Janvier 1597. —

Shuter
Thayer }
Thayer & Kay }
Interv³

The assignment under a Separate Commission passes all the separate property of the Bankrupt and all his interest in the Joint property -

= When the assignment is made the partnership is completely severed - 1. Montg. Bank. L. 639 -

2 Montg. 97 - Execution sued out ag^t Joint Estate by a Separate creditor see - Eddie v. Davidson. Doug. 627.

Barker v. Goodall. 11 Ver. 78 -

Dutton v. Morrison 17 d^e 193 -

—

1. Montg. on
Partk. 74 -

Upon a separate execution against the property of only one member of a firm, the plif is entitled only to the partner's share of the partnership property -

n — 75-6. The Sheriff must seize the whole of the partnership effects seizable under an execution, and sell an undivided moiety (in cases cited on note) Heydon v. Heydon. 1. Salk. 392

Upon Judgment ag^t one Copartner, the Sheriff may take the goods of both in execution - 2 Raym. 871. Jacky v. Butter. - where upon application to the H. B. by him ag^t. whom the Judg^c was not, the Court held, that the Sheriff could not sell more than a moiety in the property of the other moiety was not affected by the Judg^c in the execution -

3. Bos. & Pult. 289. Chapman v. Koops. - where fi. fa. issued ag^t. Dft^r who was jointly concerned in a manufactory w^t 25 other persons -

L^r. Alvanley. Ch. J. when persons enter into partnership they must be aware that the separate concerns of each partner, may in some cases introduce a variety of claims

very

very inconvenient to the general partnership Concern - By the law of England, the Creditor of any one partner, may take in execution that partner's interest in all the tangible property of the partnership, and will thereby become a tenant in Common with the other partners — This the plaintiff has done, and we are desired to restrain his execution because it is alledged that he stands in the Shoes of a partner who would not have a right to molest the other partners until all accounts between them had been settled — But if the other partners wish to take advantage of this circumstance, they ought to file a bill in Equity against the Vendee of the Sheriff, or they may buy in the property when put up to sale —

—, p. 78

see also Parker. v. Pastor. 3 Bos. & Pol. 288 —

=
see also. Dutton. v. Morrison. 17 Ver. 201 —

2. Churk^r Bank. L. Eddie. v. Davidson. Doug. 627. — The Court directed
p. 263. — that it should be referred to the Master to take an account
of the share of the partnership effects, to which Burnie (the
partner at whom ^{Execution} had issued) was entitled; and
that the Sheriff should pay a part of the money levied
equal to the amount of such share, to the assignees. —

Id. p. 289. Taylor. v Fields. A Ver. 396. In the case of a Judgment
by a separate creditor, both the partners being solvent
it has been held, that the creditor may take by execution
a moiety of a chattel, though he is only a separate
creditor — It is clear a partner holds a chattel with
his partner subject to all equities that partner has upon
it

N^o 284

Brunet
Légalet &
Delaunier

On question whether an Execution can be sued out in name of the Creditor after his death, on a Jug^t rendered in his favor

According to the 168^e art. of the Custom, no execution can be sued out by the widow or heirs of a deceased person, until the Jug^t, rendered against the deceased shall have been declared executory against them — but this principle holds only in the case of the Debtor, but not in regard of the Creditor —

Poth. Introduction au Tit. 20. des arrêts d'Execution sur la Cour. d'Orléans — N^o 94 — says — "Non seulement la personne même du Crédancier au profit de qui l'obligation a été contractée, ou le Jug^t de condamnation a été rendu, peut procéder par Execution ses héritiers le peuvent aussi — et même un successeur à titre singulier à qui l'on auroit fait transporter de la dette, pourvu qu'il ait signifié au Débiteur son transport — or — But can differnt as to Debtor —

Fer. Gr. Comⁿ on 168 art. Cour — in his remarks on the article — the widow & heirs must be called in before Exec^t on of them — "Il n'en est pas de même de l'héritier du Crédancier, qui peut exécuter de plein vol, la maxime étant constante parmi nous, que le mort exécute le vivant, et le vivant n'exécute pas le mort."

Loisel. Institut. Cour. lev. 6. Tit. 5. art. 2

= Denozart. re mort. N^o 2. —

= Fer. Institut. Cour. lev. 6. tit. 4. art. 13. p. 474 —

Questions de Droit de La Motte, v^o Mort. N^o 23 of letter M.
p. 282. 3

Ought they to be sworn before operating? —

Fer. Gr. Com^{me} Introit au Titre, Des Servitudes & Rapport des Jurés — 2^e Vol. p. 1A85. —

3^e Ces Experts doivent faire le Serment devant le Juge, avant toutes choses, a ce voir faire, les parties appellées. —

art. 184. — and p. 1500. N° 11. Le serment est requis tant par les anciennes ordonnances, que par cet art. 184 de notre Coutume, de sorte, qu'il ne seroit ajoutée aucune foi au rapport des Experts s'ils l'avoient fait avant que d'avoir fait le serment par devant le Juge ou Commissaire commis pour procéder à la nomination des Experts, et recevoir leur Serment et rapport. —

1667. L'ordonnance oblige incontestablement tous Experts nommés de prêter le serment avant que de faire la visitation & leur rapport — ainsi tous Experts quoiqu' officiers &c

1 Pigeau. 304 — seems to point out a similar course —

Ravaut. Proc. Cour du Palais. p. 108. —

Desmarques. Nouv. Style du Châtellet — p. 76 —

Il faut que les Experts prêtent serment devant le Juge de bien & fidèlement procéder à la visite, & estimation des

N. Denizt. V^e Expert. §. 2. N° 10. —

L'art. 184. de la Coutume de Paris, et l'article 8 du Tit. 2 de l'ordⁿ. (1667) exigent en général que les Experts fassent serment devant le Juge avant de procéder à leurs opérations. —

Bout. on Ordⁿ. 1667. Tit. 21. art. 8. q. 10 — p. 211. —

Les Experts ne peuvent procéder que s'ils n'ayent plutôt prêté serment de vequer fidèlement à leur fonction et notre Ordinance est en cela conforme à la disposition du droit. —


Denizt. V^e Experts N° 17. mais quand ce sont d'autres Experts sans titre, ils ne peuvent faire leur rapport qu'après avoir prêté serment devant le Juge, de bien & fidèlement y procéder &c c'est un usage invariablement observé au Châtellet, et il est de droit commun dans tout le Royaume. —

Experts

2. Borny, p. 30. Tit. 2. Des Rapports & Experts - §. 3.

Nul rapport ne peut étre fait, qu'au préalable les Experts n'aient prêté serment de faire la visite fidèlement &

L'ordonnance oblige indistinctement tous Experts nommés de prêter serment avant que de procéder aux visites et rapports d'où il résulte, que tous Experts sont officiers au



No 63.

Gibb & al
n
M'Pherson -

action for value on lost bill -

Evidence that bill had been removed from an open desk and believed to have been destroyed - the party had indorsed it by a special indorsement -

See Chitty on bills, p. 155. 6th Edit. - If however it can be proved, that the bill has been destroyed, the party who was the holder may recover at law - So if the bill was not negotiable - or has not been indorsed - or has been only specially indorsed, the party who lost it, may proceed by action on such bill, and secondary evidence of the contents may be admitted -

Haut
Raymond }

on question touchz régularité of service
& manne of pleading same —

Lacombe. v^e Compétence —

d'on doit comparaître à toute assignation même devant Juge incompetent, pour n'pas paroître imprisn son autorité. Ce n'est pas approuver la Jurisdiction que de demander communication de l'exploit de demande. —

Jut. 5. art. 5. Ordⁿ 1667. Dans les défenses seront employées les fins de non recevoir, nullités des exploits, ou autres exceptions peremptoires, si aucunes y a, pour y être préalablement fait droit. —

Irousse. — Ces nullités se couvrent par les défenses de la partie assignée —

Si la partie assignée prétendoit n'être pas assignée devant un Juge compétent, il faudroit avant tout qu'elle décline la Jurisdiction — Sur

sur les motifs de nullités as proposés au Rég. au 1^e Pigeau. 160. —

Auchambault
dal +
Fullum dal}

Quest. as to right of discussion - whether it
is to be considered as a plea of loup^{re} dilatory or
presumption to the action. —

Rép^r v^e Discussion - see model of pha^t
Lugt - agrees with Argou. 1 Vol. p. 186. 187. —

Id. v^e Caution - p. 773. 4th col.

Lorsque la Caution est attaquée il dépend d'elle alors
de demander la discussion — Car cette discussion n'est
due que quand elle est exigée par la Caution. —

= 2 Bourjon. p. 432. —

= V^r Baillc. v^r Brunelle. 4 Oct 1810 —

= Post. obl. N^o 410 —

It is called a benefice —

Le benefice de discussion doit être demandé avant la
condamnation définitive & ne peut être supplié par le lugr
Aux amb. 394. aux amées —

= avancer les deniers pour faire la discussion —

2^e Argou ch. 13. p. 475

Le créancier n'est pas obligé de faire cette discussion
si elle n'est pas demandée par la Caution ou le Tres détenteur
Il ne suffit pas même qu'ils demandent la discussion, il
faut qu'ils indiquent des biens du principal débiteur
qui puissent être discutés ; car s'il n'y en avoir point
inutilement opposera-t-on la discussion ; ils sont-mêmes
obligés d'en avancer les frais, sauf à les reprendre sur
les biens discutés —

Su aft^r. p. 84 —

Observ. sur quest. 34
de Henrys. liv. 4.

H. Russell & Co
W^m. Teasdale & Co
Davis & Opp^t

On question whether Plaintiff or Sale of the
movables in case of a deconfiture, is
entitled to the costs of obtaining Judgment
at Court - in preference to other Creditors,
as necessary costs in effecting sale -

Olivier de la Vart - Comme sur les Cout. de Maine &
Anjou - 4^e Vol. p. 446 - Celui qui a fait
la saisie est seulement privilégié pour les frais de
l'execution et de la vente. —

2 Bouv^j - p. 684. Tit. Des Executions - § 50 -
Voici la Cause du premier privilége. — Les frais
de la vente et ceux faits pour y parvenir se prennent
sur les deniers de la vente par préférence à tous -
Ce privilége l'emporte sur tous les autres - Ces frais
sont inevitables, et c'est par ceux que les privilégiés
seulement peuvent parvenir à leur paiement. —

Duplessis - Des Executions - p. 619 -

Frais de Justice - sont ceux faits, tant pour la
vente des meubles, que pour leur garde -

Fer. Inst. Cout. liv. 4. Tit. 1. art. 74. p. 58. —

Les frais de Justice faits pour la Saisie, execution
et vente des meubles, vont les premiers, et sont préférés
à toutes autres dettes. —

Other Proc. Civil. p. 191 -

La créance la plus privilégiée est celle des frais de
Saisie, de garde, et de vente - Car ils sont faits pour la
cause commune de tous les créanciers. —

archambault val
Fullum val }

On question of discussion -

Fr. Vast. Comme sur les Cout. d'Angouleme et de Maine
4^e Vol. p. 377.

L'exception de Discussion, est une exception que les tiers Detenteurs ont droit d'opposer contre l'action hypothecaire pour l'arreter, jusqu'à ce que les créanciers ayant discuté les biens des débiteurs et des Cautionns -

Cette exception, n'est pas une exception préemptoire mais seulement dilatoire, car elle ne détruit pas l'action et le créancier à qui cette exception est opposée, peut, après la discussion, si elle ne lui a pas procuré le paiement de sa dette, suivre son action - C'est pourquoi cette exception, comme toutes les autres exceptions dilatoires doit être proposée avant la contestation en cause. —

Ravaut. Pro. de Chalifet. p. 21. —

Il y a encore une autre exception dilatoire qui est accordée aux Cautionns et aux tiers débiteurs, c'est la discussion -

Jn/B^t Lervreau
Geo. Birch }

On question whether in an action petitement
Part ought to set out the title under which
he pretends to be proprietor —

Ravaud. P^r. du Chalotet — p. 10.

Les actions réelles sont celles par lesquelles on demande la chose qui se trouve entre les mains d'un autre — On doit conclure à la restitutive de la chose et exprimer le titre en vertu duquel on est propriétaire. —

= 2 Pigeau 113 — see formula +

N° 1980
Smith
Beers }

On Wagers & Gageures

1. Despeissis. p. 264 N° 2 — Or, les gageures sont valables, non seulement lorsque la chose, dont on a convenu pour gageure a été actuellement déposée entre les mains d'un tiers — mais aussi bien qu'elle n'ait pas été baillée, mais que seulement on ait promis de la battre —

Denoit. N° 2. Gageures. Art. 2. Les Juris consultes tiennent de même, que les gageures, ne sont permises ou défendues qu'en tant que leur objet est bon, ou mauvais, et que leur cause est honnête ou déshonnête —

Id. N° 6. Quoique les gageures soient nulles, si le dépôt a été délivré au vainqueur, il ne peut être répété + —

In England —

3 T. Rep. 69A
Good. vs Elliott
Mr. J. Grou.

It is then held, that wagers are not void, qua, Wagers — and that the restraints imposed on certain species of wagers by acts of Parliament are exceptions to the general rule, & prove it —

a wager wh^t w^t be an incitement to a breach of the peace
 or tending to immorality -
 or one that w^t affect the feelings or interests of a 3^d person, or
 expose him to ridicule, or libel him. -

These are considered not only as injurious to a third person
 but as tending to disturb the peace of Society. -

Wagers are Sound policy -

But when the bet is not equal, as to the uncertainty of
 the point in question, it would seem, the wager is void -
 see - Danty. Ch. 10. N° 16 - Wager between Cleopatra &
 Marc Anthony -

Fer. Du. de Droit. V^e Gageure. - L'injustice rend aussi
 une gageure illicite, comme lorsque de deux parieurs, l'un
 est certain de son pari, et l'autre est incertain du sien. -

Poth. Com. Lem. N° 20 - en faveur - Mais cet avantage que
 je vous fais, étant un avantage que je ne puis ignorer
 et que je vous fais de mon bon gré, et avec une pleine
 connoissance - ne contient aucune injustice -

A. 669

N. 1740

Jas Henderson
D'abutty - }

Action on lost note, made by Defd to Plff for £100. - dated in Oct. 1817. payable in clay follow³ - The Plff indorsed the note to mess^r Porter & Frost for value rec^d - the indorsement not full & not such as w^d be a suff^t transfer, as Defd was not a merchant, a trader &c - on this indorsement mess^r Porter & Frost bro^t their action ag^t the Defendant - but it was dismissed, from the defect in the Indorsement - An action was afterwards instituted by the present Plff ag^t Defd on same not, as the payee, but on his declar^s that he had no interest in the note, and that it was not for his benefit nor at his risk the same was instituted the action was thereupon again dismissed, there being no Plaintiff substantially before the Court - The present action is bro^t again by the same plff as payee on the same note, but under different circumstances - The Plff in consequence of the value rec^d from Proctor & Frost considering the beneficial right to the note to be in them by a special transfer in writing dated 23rd March 1820, conveys to ~~them~~^{Robert Frost} and ~~them~~^{he} assigns all his right & interest therein, & authorises them to prosecute the payment thereof either in his or their name or names and on 9th Sept. 1820, Robert Frost transfers all his rights under the said assignment to his partner Wm Mc. Nish Porter - And by a memorand^m on the back of this instrument, it is stated that the present action is bro^t at the request, and at the proper Costs & charges of the S^r Porter -

It is clear enough that by these instruments the right of Henderson the plff, to recover the amount of this note

note is vested in Mr Porter, and the Plaintiff when examined on oath, admits that he has no interest in the suit, which constitutes the main point of dispute in this action - The question therefore seems to rest here, whether Mr Porter ~~can~~ maintain his action in the name of Mr Henderson, either by operation of law, or under the special transfer made to him, without any allegation in the declaration that the beneficial interest being so vested in him, (Porter,) he is entitled to sue for the money in the name of the original payee -

By the law of England, where a chose en action is transferred, the action must be in the name of the assignor, su chutty on bills. p.7. except in case of bills or and by law of France - Le Cessionnaire peut agir pour action utile en son nom, soit que l'action cédée soit personnelle ou réelle, ou au nom du Cédant. - Saccombe v. Transport R. 5. - by which an option appears to be given to the Cessionnaire, to sue in ~~his own right~~ - There appears no reason here why Porter should not have sued in his own name - was he bound to do so - perhaps not - but does he deprive the Defendant of any right by suing in the name of the payee - I should think not -

This action is therefore materially different from the former instituted by the same Plaintiff - as we here see the person at whose instance & for whom benefit the action is brought in the former suit this was not the case - and then the action might have been brought by Henderson to put the money into his own pocket without the property's consent of the real owner, after a transfer of all his right to that owner -

Please set up -

1 Chose Sûrée - If case varies in nothing from the former
this will apply, & but this to be enquired into. -

2 Testimony of Frost & Plecknett ought to be rejected
this will depend much upon the nature of the
evidence which governs the Case - whether it accords
to the law of England or not - Now a billet payable
a order, is a negotiable instrument - see A. Denierart.
v. Billet de Commerce. §. 2. n° 15 - "Quoique comme nous
" l'avons dit, les billets à ordre n'entraînent la contrainte
" par Corps qu'entre marchands & pour fait de commerce
" il n'est pas moins vrai que ces billets sont negociables
" quoique souscrits par d'autres que des négocians
" comme ils le servent s'ils avoient été souscrits par
" des négocians." - Henderson & Armour. v. Diessenbach
July 1809 - In appeal - The St. 34. Geo. 3. does not
destroy this negotiability, but directs the indorsement
to be made in a certain manner - and in regard of proof
the exceptⁿ word in the last section of the Statute would
seem to imply, that the notes only which are subscribed
with the mark of the maker, shall require 2 witnesses
to prove them -

and see cases noted. p. 6. when parties to the bill
may be witnesses -

3. As to ex^b. N^o 1. being rejected - This the Court conceives
here to be a material paper - it shews who is the substantial
Plff - It is a transfer of the payee to Porte & Frost - with a
right to them to sue either in his or their name or names for the amount
and also a transfer by Frost to Porte - There seems to be
no reason why this action might not have been in the name
of Frost, but we see he is the substantial Plff, he holds the
interest and brings the action in the name of the present
Plff, at his own risk of expense -

Geo. T. Knower
Sethcalf Haven
vs
Isaac Gregory

under form of Known & Haven

Action by Pliffs as Traders & Copartners ^{as} of Defendant for defamatory words spoken of them as such Traders by Defendant

"The words were - Knower of Haven, are not of a good standing in business - they have been guilty of an act as bad as robbery by inducing you (one Riegel) to become responsible to me (Dippe) for the amount of the note — their business, is merely a floating business which appears good to day and will be bad to morrow — You, will do well to provide for the payment of the whole of the note, by the time it becomes due, for they, (the Pliffs) will not be able to pay it." — Concludes in damages generally —

Plea of Demurrer - that action cannot be maintained in this injury by Pliffs jointly, or as Partners without alledging a special damage —

The cases upon this point in the English law are not numerous, and in the French authors none can be met with - the English authorities incline rather to support the plea of Dippe - we must therefore look to principles to guide us in the decision of the question —

The Rule, ^{to be followed in} on this subject seems very simple - where two or more suffer by an injurious act, and the damage to one is the same as to the other they are jointly entitled to repair it — applied —

One loss only has been sustained, and therefore one satisfaction only is due — and to this satisfaction the one has not a better claim than the other,

*Joint Rights of
delicto.* —

of

of necessity their both are jointly concerned in demanding it. — But where the injury, or inconvenience to one is distinct from that to the other, their right of indemnification must also be distinct, since what affects the one is matter of indifference to the other

^{The Injurious act}
It is not which forms so much the Cause of complaint as its consequences

By the law of England many words are not actionable which would be so by the laws of Canada yet if a special damage is laid the action may be maintained, because if a Special injury arises by the act of another, although not prohibited by law, yet an action will lie — & would seem to be the principle of the Law from 3. Bos. & Pull. 150. Cook v. Batchelor
Let us see what the Editor of Sanders's Rep. says on the point — "Though there was special damage laid in the declaration in this Case, yet if words are actionable only because they were spoken of persons in the way of their trade, I conceive that two or more Partners may join in an action for the words though they had sustained no special damage thereby. —"

^{of the case from}
^{2 East 226 - states}
Hammond on actions

41-

Now it is laid down, that if Partners are slandered in their trade, the injury is joint, because the means of acquiring property is the object impaired, and in those all are concerned — If one partner sustains in addition to a general, a special damage, he has in addition to the joint, a separate claim. —

Where several are injured by a malicious prosecution or vexatious suit, they are in general separately aggrieved, since the damage to each is distinct — one does not suffer by another's imprisonment, by the diminution of his fame, by expending his funds, or by injuring his relative rights. — To this rule exceptions occur, where the suffering parties being partners are scandalized in their trade by the prosecution — and where they are joint owners of the money paid for defending it, as where borrowed on their joint account — and other exceptions which rest upon the same principles as these, may readily be conceived —

Archambault,
Fullum & al.

On question whether the Cautions are bound by the Judge, as the principal, to which they were not parties —

Post. Obl. N° 908 — would incline to this opinion that they are — but by allowing that they can be admitted to a hearing in appeal and there to propose their objections as the demands, seems to admit their right to offer any new matter of defence of which the principal may not have availed themselves — and is conformable to what is said in N° 380 —

Repos v^e Caution. p. 774. Nous observerons que si le Debiteur avoit des moyens suffisans pour échapper l'action et qu'il les négligeat, le fidejusseur seroit en droit de les opposer, parce que la caution ne demeure obligée, qu'autant que l'obligation principale peut subsister —

In action after June Term 1822.-

Scott & ab
Phoenix Insurⁿ
Co.

Action on Policy of Insurance for recovery of losses by fire
Plea - not guilty - nil. deb. & statement that by Policy all matters
in contest were agreed to be referred to arbitrators - Issue joined
and demurrer -

The Defend^ts obt^d a Rule on pleff to shew Cause why all
matters in dispute shd not be referred to arbitrators - Defend^ts
naming their arbitrator & calling on pleff to name one -

It has been argued that the right of appointing arbitrators
by a Court, is a matter of public law, and as such ought to
be determined according to the Laws of England as the Law of the Sovereign
State to which we belong - In ~~suspension~~ the right of the Court to
delegate a part of its authority to arbitrators ^{to be thus determined} ~~is to be considered~~ in
question, this ~~may~~ be considered as a question of public law and ~~is~~
be determined according to the principles of the public Law of England,
but this question is not before the Court, as the parties have -
obviated that by their own act and consent - All the Court has here
to determine is what is the effect to be given to this consent in this
action and on the rule obtained by the Defend^ts - In order to
determine this point, were we to look to the Laws of England
we find several decisions of the Courts there both at Law & in
Equity which have judged, that an agreement to refer matters to
arbitrators is no plea to ^{bar} an action, and that there must be a reference
~~some~~ say a reference or award to bar it - But this being a question
of Civil right between the parties must be determined by the

Mitchell v. Harris

4. Br. Ch. Rep. 312

2 Ves. Jun. 129.

Thomson v. Charnock

8 J. Rep. 139. -

Tattersall v. Groot

2 Bos. & Poll. 131

Laws of Canada - According to the authorities cited both from
Pothier & Denivart, ^{+ Bonvin} the parties might claim a right to be sent
before arbitrators, if the demand were made before contestation
en cause - these authorities, it is true, are taken from particular
laws or ordinances, the Code Martin & Code de l'Anjou,
neither of which are considered to be in force in Canada - Still
the principles these laws establish upon this point appear
reasonable, and may be found in the French Law, without reference
to their particular ordinances - The period of Contestation

en cause, is intended to show, that after this was had, the Judge or Court were seized of the Cause, and the party ~~would not~~ was considered to have waived all claim to demand his being sent before Arbitrators, or before another jurisdiction - The question therefore is, what are we to understand by the Contestation en Cause - The 104^e art. of the Custom says - it is, "quand il y a règlement sur les demandes et défenses des parties, ou bien quand le Défendeur est défaillant et déboute de défenses." -

Novv. Demvt.

re Contestation en Cause

§. 2. N° 1. 2. -

Par l'ord^e 1667. tit. 5. art. 2. l'usage des deboutes de défenses, dont parle cet article est abrogé - C'est pourquoi cette ord^e Tit. 14. art. 13. dit que, "la Cause sera tenue pour contestée par le premier règlement qui interviendra, après les défenses fournies, encore qu'il n'ait point été signifié" -

Salle on ord^e 1667. en cause cannot be considered to be complete - 1^o Qu'il n'y ait eu des défenses fournies - 2^o Que la Cause n'ait ensuite été portée à l'audience, et qu'il n'y soit intervenu un susp-
Valin. Ord^e Marin soit Interlocutoire, soit definitif -
2. Vol. p. 15A. art. 70.

The Cause here therefore seems not to have advanced to this stage of Contestation en Cause, and the Défende^r come in time to make their application - As to the ~~posteroftte~~ Défende^r having pleaded to the action before making this application, it was perhaps better they should do so, because it enables the Court to see whether the points in issue are proper for the decision of Arbitrators, for it might happen that although the parties had a right to go before Arbitrators & had even agreed so to do, yet if the matters in contest, were not proper for them to determine, the Court would retain the Cause - but when this is not the case, the points in issue will serve to direct the attention of the arbitrators to the objects contested - in this case it is said - "les conclusions des parties servent à fixer le
point de la contestation comme devant un tribunal ordinaire."

Dec. de l'In. & de
civis. re arbitre
n° 64. p. 109. — Extrait pour François 2. Aout 1560, d'après les parties shall go before arbitres
in cases of divisions & partages, comptes de Teste & autres administrations
restitution de dot, & douaire & les differens entre proches parens — and
the ordonnance de Moulins rendue par Charles IX. en Fevrier 1566. — que
to the above & civis differens entre parens. —

Blackwood v.
Guy. et al.

Action for acket, & for fruits issues & profits of
real estate held by Defendt belonging to one Jos.
Guy, the Debtor of Opp^r, ^{an absentee} in whose rights they claim
to be subrogated -

Plea - that Jos. Guy and Defendt w^t several others were
coheirs in the Estates in question, and that they agreed to
a voluntary liquidation thereof, in which one, Herriens, as
Curator to the said Jos. Guy, then & still an absentee,
joined, under the authority of the Judge granted on the
advice of an assimblie de parens - on which liquidation
the Defendt became the purchaser & now holds the property
as lawful owner & proprietor thereof -

True as to power of Curator to alienate, or to join in the act -

Merlinis. Rep^re de l'ur. v^e Curateur - §1. N^o 3+

Guyot. Rep^re Curateur
p. 194 -

Si l'acte de Curatelle s'étendoit en général à toutes sortes
d'affaires, sans aucune explication particulière, le Curateur n'aurait
de pouvoir suffisant que pour les affaires ordinaires - Car s'il
s'agissait d'un mariage ou d'une alienation de fonds, le Curateur
ne pourroit y consentir sans avoir pris auparavant un avis
de parens. -

Denizet. v^e Curatelle - §1. N^o 1 Curatelle est la Commission
donnée à quelqu'un par la Justice d'administrer les
biens d'autrui -

Denizet. Acte de Notorité - p. 309. note (a) Dans l'usage actuel
c'est le Curateur qui fait la vente en présence des créanciers
parce que la propriété réside fictivement en sa personne,
c'est en son nom & à sa requête que tout se fait. - Mais
ce sont les créanciers qui dirigent les démarches. -

Fer. G. Com^r art. 344. L'Héritier par bénéfice d'inventaire
ou Curateur aux biens vacans d'un défunt, ne peut vendre
les biens meubles de la succession ou Curatelle, si non,
en faisant publier la vente devant la principale porte de
l'Eglise de la paroisse, où le défunt demeurait, à l'issuë de la
messe paroissiale, & délaissant une affiche contre la porte de la maison
du défunt. - See after, p. 103.

Thayer. v.
Peirce & al. }

Action by Pluff as indorsee ac^t Copew^{ds} as
payees & Indorsers of 2 promy Notes, - drawn
by H. & E. Curtis. -

Plea 1st If ever they did promise and undertake or they
before the bringing of the present action have wholly paid
the sums of money demanded by Pluff in & by their declaration

2. Non assump^t. under which plea they intend to prove
 1. That Defend^s lent their names to the Notes for the sole
accommodation of Henry & Elijah Curtis
 2. That they rec^d no value from the Pluff for the 2 promy Notes
 3. That Pluff as well as Defend^s indorsed the Notes in order
to accommodate the said Henry & Elijah Curtis, without
any understanding express or implied, that in case of non-pay^m
the Defend^s should pay the whole or any part thereof to Pluff
 4. That Pluff holds & possesses divers goods monies credits &
effects of the said H. & E. Curtis by means whereof Pluff
hath been, or might have been fully paid the amount of
said Notes. - by means whereof Defend^s are discharged from
any responsibility. -
3. Notes indorsed without any valuable consideration
given them by Pluff -

Inventorial demand - for goods sold etc

On 1st Feby. 1822 - a Consent rule of reference to arbitrators
to hear evidence which shd. be reduced to writing by them, &
returned into Court with their award -

Award being filed & evidence adduced returned - the Pluff
dissatisfied therewith contends that Court ought to set it
aside and give Judgment for Pluff, & to examine the evidence
adduced as well in Court as before the arbitrators -

This presents two questions - First, can or ought
the Court to investigate the proceedings before the
arbitrators, so as to correct their Judgment in case the Court
should be of a different opinion with them? and

2^d) Does the evidence as stated before the Arbitrators warrant the Court in drawing a different conclusion from it than the Arbitrators have done?

On the first question, it may be observed that a reference to arbitrators to decide differences between parties necessarily gives them that power as effectually as the Court itself could possess it - and if they proceed regularly, their Award is equally binding as that of the Court. It is true that Courts exercise a control over the awards of Arbitrators and will occasionally set them aside, but this is done only where ^{there is} misconduct or partiality in the Arbitrators - It is contended here that as the reference made to them contained an injunction on them to return with their award the evidence taken before them, that the Court intended thereby to exercise a right ^{not only} of examining their proceedings, but of correcting their Award - if they saw fit, ~~if it appears inconsistent with the evidence so laid before them~~ with the evidence so laid before them - but this is a wrong presumption, as the Court are not bound to this investigation unless it becomes necessary from the misconduct of the Arbitrators, and the direction that they should return the evidence taken before ^{them}, can be meant to inform the Court only as to the regularity of their proceedings - It is unprecedented for Courts to judge the Award again after the opinion and Award of Arbitrators, and if parties were left in to expect this of the Court, a submission to Arbitrators would not only prove nugatory, but protract a cause by useless proceedings & heavy expense - if in every case the losing party could claim a new hearing before the Court - Then the Arbitrators have proceeded regularly, & being Judges of the parties own choosing their award must be final.

But

But supposing the Court were disposed to enter upon the investigation demanded, they are here enabled to say from what they have seen of the Case, that the Arbitrators appear to have formed a just and correct Judgment upon it - The action is founded on accommodation paper signed by the parties to assist a declining trader - and had it not been for the peculiar form of the instrument drawn up for this purpose, no such action could have been brought - the evidence adduced however gives us a complete view of the transaction, and enables us to see that as between the Plaintiff & Defendant no value was given nor intended to be given as between them, nor was it ever contemplated that liability should attach upon the one in favor of the other, in a transaction in which they were cooperating to favor their common Debtor - and this is the more strongly to be urged at the Plaintiff, as he had been proceeding by a variety of ways to get the property of this Debtor into his hands, to indemnify himself of a responsibility he had contracted to the Banks - and although this property has not been so productive as he expected, yet his acts show his views and intentions in laying hold of ~~what the Defendant means~~, in what the Defendant has an equal right with himself -

Award confirmed - demand in chief dismissed and Supt. for Plaintiff on incidental Remand.

William Peddie of
Montreal, Merkt. Plcy

John McRider of Quebec, Merkt.
Louis Massue of de
Michael Scott of Montreal
Charles Bowman of de ✓
Auguste Perrault of de ✓
Turton Pen - of de ✓
Sam'l S. Bridge of de ✓
Le Harry Gauvin of de ✓
Joseph Gauvin of de ✓
A.L. McRider of de ✓
Robt. Armour of de ✓
Mr. B. Doucet of - de ✓
Eleanor Stoyle - of de ✓
Henry Grand of de ✓
Foster J. Weeks of de ✓
John Geo. Smith of de ✓
John Smith - of - de ✓

Action ag^t the Defendant as
Co-partners associated together
for insuring against accidents
by fire and carrying on business
as such at the City of Quebec, &
at the City of Montreal, under the
name style or firm of the Quebec
Fire Assurance Company -
for a breach of Covenant

By policy of Insurance of
9th May 1821, made at Quebec &
signed by the president & one of the
Directors of the s^d Quebec Fire Assurance
Co (which did of Insurance hitherto been
since burnt or lost) the Plaintiff paid into
the Fire Assurance Co £19/3 for Insurance
on Household furniture for £300.
from 9th May 1821 to 8 May 1822 - That
at time of policy & during its continuance

the Plaintiff was possessed of & interested in household furniture
in the house in question, to the value or am^t of £750 which
was lost and consumed by fire on 15th Augst 1821 - completely
to pay of £750 damages -

Defendant pleaded to Jurisdiction which was overruled

Plea - That Defendant never signed any policy of Assurance w^t
Plff - & that action should be directed ag^t those only who had signed
such policy - That Dfndt owe any indemnity to plff, it can't
only for a sum of £238. 19. 6, as the effects burnt were not the
only part assured, but the whole effects of Plff were insured to the
extent of £350 C^t, which cannot be demanded in the entire
measure as the Plaintiff has saved the greater part of
his effects see , whereby the Insurers as well as the
insured ought to benefit equally by the Contract, in
regard of the effects which have been saved, as is
usual

usual in such cases, and in cases of ~~Jetsam & Accidents~~
at Sea, where the effects saved contribute tow and the value
of those lost or thrown over board, in order to indemnify the
Insurers or proprietors of such effects, unless the proprietors of
the effects lost or damaged will abandon the part which
has been saved in order to recover the amount of the whole
from the Insurers — That the Plaintiff here cannot pretend
to demand the whole of the loss by him sustained inasmuch
as he does not offer to abandon the effects which were so saved
and therefore ought to be dismissed without —
Further that Defendants are not indebted to the Plaintiff in
manner & form as by him demanded —

Procureur when liable for misconduct -

see. Denizart. v^e nullité N° 25. 26. — 3

Arrêt de L'Asse — Rapp^u v^e nullité, p. 260 —

Denizart — On pense aussi qu'un procureur est garant des nullités procédants de son fait, qui se rencontrent aux procédures de son ministère dans les poursuites de décrets c'est l'opinion commune du châtel.

Rapp^u — Same authority —

Socfve. — Socve Cent. I. ch. 99. p. 106 — also ch. 67.

Procureur tenu de représenter un Prisonnier élargi par surprise sur une requête presentée signée de lui ou de payer la dette —

1. Desp. p. 171 Procureur est tenu de toute Confére, grande & lige

Ferrari v^e Procureur Il est tenu de sa négligence quand elle est grossière, et peut être considérée en quelque manière comme dol. Car si l'on excusoit dans un Procureur une telle négligence, ce seroit donner à quelques-uns d'eux un prétexte de couvrir leur malice —

Socfve — Cent. I. ch. 67. p. 66 —

Procureur est responsable envers sa partie d'un manquement dans les procédures —

Larombe v^e Procureur — etc above cum from Socfve —
etc

(see p. 110)

Blackwood

cont'd from p. 96.

Guy. et

On the note on this art. the Commentator observes thus -
 Cet article ne regle pas les solemnités qu'il faut garder en la vente des Immeubles par un héritier par bénéfice d'Inventaire: d'où vient qu'on fait cette demande, savoir, s'il est nécessaire d'y garder les solemnités du décret? -

opinion de

Fortin

Plusieurs l'estiment ainsi, je suis néanmoins d'avis contraire et crois que mon opinion est d'autant plus favorable qu'il est notable que les frais qui se font aujourd'hui aux créées d'un héritage en absorbent la plus grande partie - Aussi cette opinion n'est elle pas destituée de raison, vu que c'est une règle de droit que les solemnités surabondantes ne sont jamais absolument désirées, si elles ne sont particulièrement prescrites par les loix, ou qu'elles ne soient fondées en une nécessité comme absolue - Or en l'espèce proposée, notre Coutume, ni aucune Ordinance ne prescrivent point cette solemnité - et d'ailleurs on peut pouvoir par une autre voie à la Sécurité des Créditeurs, savoir, en vendant les Immeubles publiquement en Justice, et par forme de licitation, car pour lors, l'héritier ne pouvant être d'intelligence avec l'acquéreur, la vente ayant été publique et en Justice, les créanciers ne peuvent prétendre contre lui, ni contre l'acquéreur aucune plus value des Immeubles qui auront été ainsi vendus -

The formalities required by this article are not adhered to, and when injury is made appear the Curator is bound for the just value of the effects sold - see M. 2 & 3. on Glob. remarque au bas art. -

The Héritier par bénéfice d'Inventaire, is compared to the Curator to the Succession -

M. 5. La Coutume ne parle pas des Immeubles, à l'égard desquels, il faut observer ce qui est porté en l'article 343. de celle d'Orléans, qui porte "et quant aux Immeubles n'en peut faire vente, sinon, en gardant les solemnités requises en matière de créées d'héritage." - néanmoins on se contente

contente souvent de faire les ventes et adjudications après trois affiches et publications, pour éviter aux frais des créanciers c'est le sentiment de M. Ricard, qui dit, que les héritages étant ainsi vendus, les créanciers ne peuvent prétendre contre l'héritier bénéficiaire, ni contre les acquereurs la plus value des Immeubles ainsi vendus. —

Et d'autant que l'héritier bénéficiaire est repute maître et Seigneur des biens de la succession de même que l'héritier pur & simple, il s'ensuit — qu'il auroit vendu des biens du défunt, meubles ou Immeubles la vente seroit valable, et que les acquereurs en auroient acquis la propriété, sauf aux créanciers leurs recours contre cet héritier, au cas qu'ils prétendissent que les ventes eussent été faites à vil prix — et aux créanciers hypothécaires, leur action hypothécaire contre les acquereurs des Immeubles affectés & hypothéqués à leur dû. —

See art. 35: Cont. Difference between the Commission of Curator
Ter. q. Com^{ee} to the Jur Saisi. —

The one is a temporary agent — the other possesses locum
domini. — see Dumoulin's opinion. p. 629. N° 2. Sicut emigru

2 Vol. q. Cont.
p. 909. N° 8
— Item —

S'agit en la personne du Curateur, lequel ne peut agir & soutenir les intêts d'une succession, mais il n'en peut vendre les biens sans l'autorité de la Justice —

1^{er} Arrêt d'Auxard
p. 234 —

Si une femme, qui a été interdite pour cause de démenance et qui dans la suite est rentrée dans son bon sens et dans la jouissance de ses biens, est restituable contre l'aliénation faite d'une de ses Immeubles par son Curateur, en conséquence d'un avis de parents et d'une sentencia de Siege. —

Que la maison sera vendue après trois publications au plus offrant —

Pothier
ou
Toucherat

Decisions de Fromental. p. 329. 1^e Fideicommiss —

Durochers
ou
Beaubien

Un mineur peut il faire une disposition entre vifs, ou une disposition à cause de mort en faveur de celui qui n'a été nommé son Tuteur ou son Curateur que pour un acte particulier comme un partage, ou pour l'assister dans ses procès — Recueil des Ques. de Jurisprudence proposés par M. Daguinseau à Tous les Parlements. p. 380 —

Banc d'Eglise -

Poussse. Admin.
des paroisses
p. 56. 57. -

Elles ne peuvent non plus étre faites que ~~après trois~~
pour la vie des personnes auxquelles ils sont concedés,
et pour autant de tems qu'ils demeureront sur la
paroisse, sans qu'il puisse étre concedé qu'un seul
banc à la même personne, et au même chef de famille. —

See also. Code des Curés. 3^e. Vol. p. 619. — Arrêt de la Cour
du Parlement, concernant les concessions des bancs
dans les paroisses du Ressort de la Senechaussee de
Bauzié —

Lois des Seigneuries. Ch. II. art. 68 — Et quand
il y a permission par écrit des Gagets ou Marquilliers
encore est-elle revocable à toujours, comme un précaire
pour ce, qu'ils ne peuvent obliger l'Eglise sans le
consentement universel des paroissiens — toutefois si
elle est donnée pour argent entrée au profit de l'Eglise
il faut rendre l'argent avant que d'ôter le banc —
Mais si elle est donnée par les habitans en Corps avec
le Curé, elle n'est revocable qu'en vertu des lettres & en
cas de lesion, ou bien que la place du banc fut
necessaire à faire quelque batiment pour l'Eglise; et
principalement quand cette permission a été concedée
pour argent, il le faut toujours rendre. —

The King
v.
Morill M'Goon

The Prisoner charged with two Indictments
one for Forgery - and the other for Larceny
applied to the Judges in vacation for a
writ of Habeas Corpus. in order to be admitted
to bail. -

The Pris. alleged various grounds in support of his
application -

1) The Judges in K. B. have authority to bail in all causes
according to circumstances of Case even after Indictment
4 Bl. Com. 298 - and even after Conviction. 3 Hawk. P.
301. -

Persons indicted for Larceny by inquests taken before
Sheriffs may in the discretion of New Sup: Courts be bailed
3 Hawk. 208

2) The length and hardship of the imprisonment, 3. Hawk. 223.

3) In Capital cases where there is any circumstance to
induce a Court, to suppose the P^r innocent - and in
every case where the charge is not alleged with
sufficient certainty. - 3 Hawk. 225. -

4) The instrument forged of no value - issued by an illegal
association - Montreal Bank. St. 1. Geo. 1. ch. 18, extended
to the Colonies by 14 Geo. 2. - Instrument void on the
face of it, no forgery. 2. East. 948.

5) Crime was committed by other persons ~~in~~ a Foreign Country
in Vermont - D^r S^r Harvey - work on Indictm^t must
be so admitted also for P^r alibi. It w^t be a verdict -

6) The charge insufficiently laid in the Indictment - no
forgery sufficiently charged - No person clearly
stated to have been defrauded. -

7) At most P^r could be considered only as an accessory before
fact - and bailable -

8) Good & sufficient bail offered. -

1 Chitty 129.

4 Bar. 2539.

Although the Kings Courts and Judges in the vacation may ~~exercise~~ ^{have} a discretion in bailing pris^r on Hab. Corp^s yet we find in the rules which they observe they are guided by a series of decisions, which limit and govern this discretion, so as to confine it within those limits, to which an honest man, competent to discharge the duties of his office, ought to restrict himself

de-p. 123. 1^m First then - we find that all P^rs are entitled to claim the benefit of the Hab. Corp^s act, - excepting however such as are committed for felony or treason plainly expressed in the warrant, as well as persons convicted, or in execution ~~are~~

This would seem to exclude all discretion as to the excepted Cases - yet persons so situated may obtain a Hab. Corp^s to enable the Judges to look into depositions to see if the charge is warranted - and if the facts there sworn to sum to amount to felony they will remand the party to prison -

Rex. v. Horner
1 Hatch. 270.

3 East R. 157.

1 Hatch 270. 483.

Rex. v. Greenwood
St. 1138.

B. R. will not bail a person charged with a highway robbery, if the prosecutor attends, and insists he is the man, notwithstanding many affidavits to prove an alibi.

3 East Rps. 163.

Rex. v. Marks.

L^d Ellent. as it appears from the depositions that there is a corpus delicti within the meaning of the act which constitutes it felony, it is our duty to remand the prisoners. -

Le Blanc. I. Yet if upon the depositions returned the Court see that a felony has been committed & that there is a reasonable ground of charge against the Prisoners, they will not bail but remand them -

Ld Mohun's
Case -

Salk. 102.

1 Chitty. 129

If a man be found guilty of murder by the Coroner's Inquest, yet the Court of K. B. will bail him — because the Coroner proceeds upon depositions taken in writing which the Court may look into : Otherwise if a man be found guilty of murder by a Grand Jury, because the Courts cannot take notice of their evidence, which they by their oath are bound to conceal. —

Rex. v. Action. Stra. 851. — Nor will the Court at all admit of extrinsic evidence; so that they refused to examine, whether a man brought up before them had been previously acquitted of a charge precisely similar. —

Kandershuyss.
" Bleury.

Quest. How far an Attorney is liable for irregular or vexatious proceedings, whereby a defendant was wrongfully held to bail.

see authorities cited p. 102. —

3. Wilson. 368
Bartur, widow
Barham &
Norwood. —

Trespass re & armis for false imprisonment lies as well against the Attorney as against his Client, who sues out at the suit of his Client an illegal writ of Capias ad satisfacendum against a Defendant and causes such Defendant to be imprisoned thereupon. —

1. Dureau, Jr. by
Inj. p. 13A. 5.
—

An attorney and his Client condemned solidarium in a sum of 500^d. damages & all costs, for a Memoire published by the Attorney reflecting on the character and reputation of the Complainant.

Fisher
Lacasse }
Lacasse &
App

On question whether, a Defendant by making an ill founded opposition to the sale of his property or effects, is liable to a Contrevent par Corps, as for a Contempt.

No authorities in support of this principle can be found in the ancient laws of the Country, nor in those Courts where the practice of oppositions of this kind must have been well known and established — but in order to supply this dearth of authority, recourse is had to the principles of the English law, and it is attempted to be shewn from those principles, that whatever tends to obstruct the due and regular course of Justice, must be considered as a contempt of the Court and punishable as such —

The Authorities from the English law are to the following effect —

1. To impose on the Court by bringing a fictitious action — 1. Com. Dig. tit. Attachment. A. 2. — and this kind of opposition has been compared to a fictitious action —
2. So an attachment lies against any one who abuses or does not pay obedience to the process or injunctions of the Court — Id. tit. Attorney. (B. 13.) 4. Bl. Com. 283. —
3. So the practising a fraud under colour of a legal proceeding and many other instances may be found which according to the practice of the English Courts would render a party liable to an attachment as for a contempt, but all these authorities proceed upon the principle that the means used to effect the illegal end, are prohibited and contrary to the course and practice of the Court. — But in regard of the particular object before us the making of an opposition by

by the partie Saisie both by the law and practice of the Courts of this Country, — when I read this principle from the books of practice — "Il peut y avoir des oppositions qui arrêteront la vente jusqu'à ce que le Juge y ait prononcé 1667. tit. 33. art. 12." Ces oppositions peuvent venir de la part du Saisi, ou de la p. 502. — "part des tierces personnes — Le Saisi peut demander la — Cassation de la Saisie, ou parce qu'il prétendra ne rien devoir — ou parce que le terme ne sera pas échu — ou parce que le Saisissant ne sera pas le véritable Crédancier — ou parce que la saisie ne sera pas faite dans les formes prescrites?"

According to this principle, the right ^{of the partie Saine} to make an opposition, is as much recognized by law, as his right to bring an action or institute any other claim or proceeding in a Court of Justice — but it is ^{argued} contended that this proceeding is attended with bad consequences, ^{is used for bad purposes} is ruinous to Creditors, and delays the payt. of just debts — But if all the proceedings which are allowed in our Courts, and which have more or less the same tendency, were to be ~~settled~~ considered as a contempt of the Court, and visited with a contrainte by the party — there would this operate in regard of the numerous exceptions which are made in the progress of a Cause, which are often ill founded, and ~~more~~ frequently made with no greater hopes of success, than a temporary stay of a final judgment ^{by opposition}. These escape like the oppositions are allowed by the law & practice of the Courts, although both are disconcerted, yet the Judge must decide before their insufficiency is determined, the course of practice in regard of both has been as summary as Justice would permit — although in the case of oppositions made by the Saisi, some of the commentators are of opinion

Sipillon on Tit. 33. art. 3. ord^e. 1667. — "Que toute audience doit être refusée aux débiteurs qui me cherchent que des difficultés et des chicane pour retarder le paiement de ce qu'ils doivent légitimement" — but none of those commentators have gone the length to say, that

that the party making such an opposition should be liable to a contrainte, for having made it, and certainly the frequency of these oppositions must have given ample room for eliciting this opinion, had there been law for it. But on the contrary, the opinion entertained, was, that as such an opposition was injurious to the Creditor, he might have his action of damages or such reparation as the Court gave him for that injury.

Salle. Ist. 27. art. "Empêcher l'execution des Jugemens par des
7. Ord. 1667" Oppositions & autres subterfuges, c'est une entreprise
"temeraire, qui doit être réprimée par des dommages
& intérêts, et autres peines civiles proportionnées"

Id. on note (a) and what are these peines Civiles. - why we are referred to an Ord. of 1539. art. 96. - "Et ou le condamné
sera trouvé appellant, opposant, ou autrement pivolet
& indument empêchant l'execution du dit Jugement
ou arrêt par lui, ou par personne suscitée ou
interposée, il sera condamné en l'amende ordinaire
de 60^{fr}. Parisis, et outre, en autre amende extraordinaire
envers nous, et en grosses réparations envers la
partie ; empêchant indument ladite execution
condamnée à faire executer ledit Jugement ou arrêt
à ses propres costs & dépens dedans certain brief délai
qui pour ce faire lui sera préfix sur ces grosses peines
qui à celui seront commis, et en défaut de ce faire
dedans ledit délai, sera constraint par emprisonnement
de sa personne" - Here we see the punishment determined
for improvident oppositions - damages to the party injured,
and imprisonment for the payt of those damages - but
nothing said or supposed, that the making such an opposⁿ
was a contempt of the authority of the Court, or gave
room for a constraint on this account -

That

That the Contrainte par Corps may be granted by
 this Court against pleaders or others whose innocent
 or otherwise reprehensible conduct may merit it, we
 entertain no doubt; but this proceeding is not to be adopted
 upon light grounds, and certainly not ^{upon one} for the exercise of
 a right which the law has permitted — By the ordé
du Moulin, we find that the Contrainte par Corps was
 granted as a civil remedy for the payment of a debt, after
 the expiration of 6 months — But by the ordé of 1667
 Tit. 34 — all contraintes par Corps have been abrogated
 except in Criminal & Commercial cases, and generally
 in all Civil matters except some particular cases
 mentioned in that ordinance — The 4^e article is very
 express on this subject — and one of the Commentators
 on this Title of the ordé observes — "L'homme tient
 la liberté de la nature, et on ne peut l'en priver
 légitimement que pour des choses qui blessent la
 Société, ou aux quelles la Société a un intérêt direct
 et immédiat — Or bien loin que la Société soit
 intéressée à ce qu'un particulier soit empêtré par
 un autre des condamnations prononcées en sa faveur,
 elle l'est aux contraincs, à ne se point priver sans
 une nécessité évidente, des secours et de l'industrie
 de Citoyens, que leur détention dans les prisons, lui
 renvoient inutiles." — And we find also in the
 Recueil des Actes du Notorieté, an act of 24 Juillet
 1705 — qui porte — que l'on ne prononce plus de
 contraintes par Corps, sinon pour les cas exprimés
 par le Tit. 34^e de l'ordé 1667 —

But even in cases of contempt

The constitution and practice of the Courts in England are different from ours, and what would be considered a contempt before them, would not be so in this Court, for instance - The non-payment of Costs awarded by the Court upon a motion - The non-observance of awards duly made by Arbitrators on a submission made a rule of Court - which are cited merely to show that the rule in England cannot be the rule here in all cases, and that we must look to our own laws and our practice to settle and determine what shall be considered a contempt, in regard of the Civil proceedings before us -

N^o 404
Letourneau &
St Denis -

On question whether relations can be
heard as witness to prove facts q^{ue} happened
in the house or family of the parties - l'intérieur
de la famille -

Tousse on art. 11 Tit. 22. date 1667 makes this one of
the exceptions to the general rule - 2^e - Lors qu'il s'agit
de vérifier un fait qui s'est passé dans le secret d'une
famille, dont les étrangers n'ont pu avoir que peu de
connaissance - art. Léprêtre. Cent. 3. ch. 119. -

Bonnie on same article, says, they may be examined
"lors qu'ils sont témoins nécessaires".

Rodier - d^o - says, relations may be examined as wits.
Lors qu'il s'agit de vérifier un fait qui s'est passé dans
le secret d'une famille. -

1. Pégeau. 281. 3^e Lors qu'il s'agit d'un fait passé
dans l'intérieur d'une famille, et dont les parents
seuls peuvent avoir connaissance. -

The Rep^{re} de l'Insp^a would incline to a different
opinion - see. 1^v Témoignage. p. 66. -

Turner & Co
Mc Nider & Co

Points pleaded - That Defend^ts had a domicile at
Quebec & whenceonly they could be sued.

This elected domicile, does not destroy the domicile
established by law & that intent to sustain it &
as all Defd^ts except 2 were resident at Montreal,

2. The President & Directors only persons only had a right to bind
the Partnership -

This is the private contract among Defend^ts, not
bound by it - the general principle in partnerships, that
every Partner is the agent of the others in the trade they carry
on - ~~etc etc~~ The act of Mc Nider in striking out words
in policy & is in the usual course of the business of
issuing & and he admits that he was warranted &
authorised so to do -

~~The conclusions of Declaration demand that at Defd^ts jointly &~~
~~severally but by terms of policy this cannot be granted, as Defd^ts~~
~~stipulate not to be bound beyond their individual share of claim their~~

Peddie.
Mc Nider & Co

Defend^ts contend. 1st That service of facts last, on
parties not within Court's jurisdiction not binding -
service on President & Director by leaving copy of Interrogatories
at the Fire Insurance Office -

This has been held sufficient in regard of the original
process - parties legally before the Court. -

As to the liability of the defendant to pay the whole damage, as part
of the goods were saved -

according to the principles of Maritime Insurance
the person insuring below the value of the goods, is
considered as his own insurer for the remainder
and must contribute towards the loss in proportion.
But it is said this principle does not hold in
Insurance at Land office - And to shew what

the

usage is in regard of other Offers of Insurance on this point, the evidence of Mr. Audjo is adduced - In regard of this evidence it must however be observed, that what other Insurance Companies may do, or claim, in this respect cannot well affect the contract between the parties here - The evidence does not go far enough to reach the case before us - As it ought to have been made to apply to what was understood to be the general meaning and interpretation of some clause of the agreement between the parties - we are however induced to be of opinion that by the Policy in question the Defendant ought to pay the whole of the damages - The words in the Policy are - That the Defendant undertake to pay, "all such loss or damage" ~~"as shall happen by fire to the property insured"~~ that in the event of any loss or damage by fire in the premises - they will pay the same, on the conditions referred to - And one of the conditions referred to is - "that when any loss or damage shall have been duly proved, the insured & shall receive immediate satisfaction, without allowance of Discount, fees, or other deduction" Then ~~words~~ ought to be strongly taken agt. the Defendant they are the terms they hold out to the world ~~for~~ upon of they offer Insurance - and as the conditions contain a variety of exceptions in which they do not consider themselves bound, but this not being one of them, of paying only a proportion of damages when part of goods has been saved, must be considered, as falling within the deduction not intended to be made -

No 512

Hunterdale }
Perrault, and }
McKenzie }

Action agst. Defend^t for goods sold & delivered
Pla.^{nt} by ^{McKenzie} and that Plff. accepted the
promissory notes of Defend. McK. payable at different
periods, which was a novation of the debt —

Lebrun
vs
Charles.

On action of separation de fiefs &c bens

The Defendant was by Law of the Court ordered
to render an ac^t of the Community that

subsisted between him and the Plaintiff, which he did
after repeated orders to this effect, but in so imperfect a
state as not to be considered as in anywise such an ac^t
as required by law — The Plaintiff instead of objecting
to the form or sufficiency of the ac^t filed debats de
compte, and with it, a statement of what she considered
the state of the Community to be amount to £2938. 10. 2
and of which she claimed the one half — Upon these debats
de compte the parties proceeded to make proof — The Plaintiff
produced 2 witnesses in support of her claim —

1st Stewart Spragg — who states that since the action he
had sold goods at auction for Defendant to amt. of £118. 5
and still had goods on hand, to amount of 27 —
That since the action he had seen goods in Defendant's poss^{ession}
to the value of £6 or 700 — In the garret, to value of £500 —
and deer skins in the yard to amt. of £3 or £400 — That
from the nature and extent of trade carried on by Defendant
believes he must have had a stock of goods to amount of £2000
at least — and thinks his property moveable & immovable
to be worth £5 or £6000 —

2^d John Russell Jr^d D y m^d house Rent for many years
at rate of 25/- per month, since inst^t of action to 1 May 1822.

3 & 4th Lucile Charles and Nathaniel Charles — two
children of the parties — who state that Defendant kept no
clerks or servants but them — prove the full extent of the
statement annexed to the debats de Compte —

This evidence objected to by Defendant —

4. Jonathan Alger who values the Defendt's goods at £2000 —

In regard of the real Estate titles are filed to support
the debate —

There are two questions arise touching the amount
of the moveable property, first, will the Commune
renommie be admitted here, on the default of the Diffr
to produce and file the amount required? — and 2^d
Can the evidence of the two Children be admitted as
competent in this Case? —

Blackwood
Guy —

see p. 96. & 103.—

1 Muli - 8. 9

In considering the power and authority of a Curator in regard of the property which he administers, it ~~may~~ must be looked on as the same as that of a Tutor over the property of the minor. Tutors and Curators are by law strongly assimilated, and the only distinction appears to be that the Tutor is principally appointed to the person, the Curator to the property — They derive their authority from the same source, they regulate their conduct accordingly, and what acts they do under this authority seems equally warranted — It is necessary to establish the similarity of right and authority in the Tutor & Curator, because in the arguments of the Council, a very material distinction was attempted namely, that the Tutor has a power over the property of the minor greater than that of a Curator, in this, that under the opinion of an assemblie de parents, he may be authorised to alienate the real Estate of the minor — but that the Curator, more especially to an absentee has no such right, nor can the opinion of an assemblie de parents in regard of an absentee, warrant such an alienation by the Curator — But this is not the Case, for if such alienation can be warranted in the one case it is equally lawful in the other — Other Curators, even of an absentee, does not merely represent his person, but also his Estate, as much as the Tutor is warranted ~~to~~ upon the estate of the minor — and all proceedings to be had in — the principal regard of this Estate, whether by creditors or others, must be had up. him, as the fictitious proprietor — he possesses locum tenens and liable to all actions in regard thereof which the absentee himself would be, if present — Demr. actes de Notorite — p. 309 — Dans

~~Demande de curatelle~~ l'usage actuel c'est le Curateur qui fait la vente en presence

D. 3. M. 3
des créanciers — parceque la propriété réside fictivement in
sa personne — c'est en son nom, et à sa régence que tout se
fait — It therefore the Curator represents & holds the property
how will the opinion of an assemblie de parents under the authority
of the Judge warrant him to alienate? In general, it is either
the necessity of the case, or the interest of the party represented
which induce the Judge to call for this opinion of the soicens —
and

and on this principle it is no doubt a prudent precaution when the estate to be alienated belongs to an insolvent debtor that his creditors should be called, as the persons most interested in this respect - as they cannot be considered as bound by an act to which they were not parties - perhaps the assemblée convoqued upon the present occasion consisted of such creditors although this may not be material here to enquire, as what was opined upon this occasion arose from the necessity of the case - And it appears that such a voice & opinion may, be received in the case of a Curator as well as of the Tutor -

N. Denys. v^e Curatelle
§. 3. n^r. 3. — Rep^r du Curateur. p. 194 - says - Si l'acte de Curatelle s'étendait en général à toutes sortes d'affaires, sans aucune explication particulière, le Curateur n'aurait de pouvoir suffisant que pour les affaires ordinaires - Car s'il s'agissait d'un mariage, ou d'une alienation de fond, le Curateur ne pourroit y consentir, sans avoir pris auparavant un avis de parents" —

This was not a proceeding had by the Curator to establish a debt against him, or to alienate his property for the payment of a debt, but to liquidate the rights of Co-heirs in a joint Estate - although the interest of Creditors might be concerned, yet the interest of the family was acting principle upon which the proceedings were grounded and in such a case it would seem that the advice and opinion of the parents & amis may be received. —

^{wanted}
Access to the litigation.
^{wanted}
in question;

The question then arises how far the Curator was ~~authorised~~ to ^{wanted} sell under the homologation of this avis de parents and the authority of the Judge — The Court is disposed to think the authority sufficient, when we consider what the general course and practice has been on this subject — but at all events we cannot look upon the authority so given, as a mere nullity — The Curator had the administration of the property of the absentee, ^{and was by contract bound to do so} as ~~an administrator~~ subject to the control of the Judge, who is required to assist & direct the Tutor or Curator in his doings — The ^{want of} shortness of formality in sales by Tutors & Curators has not always been the cause of setting them aside, the numerous instances in which we find the decisions of the Courts maintain alienations made without the shortness of formality

formality, shew us that they often acquit that collusion, injustice or injury should also concur to set aside their alienation - And the present action would have stood on better grounds had it been tried to set aside the sale ~~concluded~~ by the Curator under some of these allegations -

But the opinions of Courts have not alone been guided by the circumstances under which such alienations have been made, but some Commentators also on the Custom, in cases assimilated to that of the Curator, have considered the formality of sale, as if made by a Decut, not to be requisite - I refer to what is said on the 344^e art. by Mr Fauvel - That article says - "Si l'heritaire par benefice det l'Inventaire, ou Curateur aux biens vacans d'un defunt, ne peut vendre les biens meubles de la succession ou Curatelle si non, en faisant publier la vente devant la principale porte de l'église de la paroisse, ou le defunt demeuroit à l'issüe de la messe paroissiale, et delaisstant une affiche contre la porte de la maison du defunt. -

No 246
 Boutillier,
 Preston, }
 m.

In action on Promissory Note endorsed
 to Puff - Puff a minor Dfd. Silvasmuth.

Pleas, 1^o note made at Albany in the United States
 and at time (Defend) was a minor

2^o Non assumpsit -

3 General Demurrer. -

Interrogatories proposed by ~~Puff~~ to ~~Boutillier~~

1. If Puff gave any such value for the Note
2. If the Property of note is not now in Puff's possession
3. If the Payer endorsed the said Note on 1 Aug 1822 or at any time previous to the institution of this action
4. If the Indorsement & Signature thereto have not been written on said note since the institution of the action
5. If the said Indorsement & Signature or part thereof hath not been written on, not subseqt. to the institution of the action

Hunter &
Brown

On question - whether Dfde. who has given
bail to the Sheriff, can come in after 2
defaults entered against him, & claim a right
to give special bail before appearance
& defend the action. —

6 Feby. 1822 Cases cited by Dfde Galusha v. Tremen ^{Sup. 64.}
20 Oct. 1 Inst.

Hart. v. Goodhue. 10 Oct. 20 mo. by bail to Sheriff
~~that they be permitted to give bail to the action~~ —
Granted — 2 Sh. 876.
1 Sillons Prae. 137. 167. 8
1 Burnes Notes. 369. —

Culver v. Woolsey — mo. by bail to surrender Dfde
on 5th day after return. —

Sequestration of Profits of Office. —
see Imprey's Sheriff p. 129 - case of

N° 1754.

Armour }
Puddie }

On question, whether holder can sue the drawer upon non acceptance of the bill without waiting for the expiration of the time limited for pay —

Poth. Com. Change - N° 70 - says, the drawer contracts the obligation in this case of being bound to give security or pay the amount of the bill, but this does not say that the Poth is bound to restrict his demand to asking security only, he may ask for the pay — the giving security is a favor to the drawer because he has failed in his contract with the holder, in this, that the drawee has not done what he the drawer promised he would do — accept the bill — This breach of contract, entitles the holder to recur to the drawer for his money — the giving security, is a thing introduced for the benefit of the drawer, for his risk that by waiting till the expiration of day of pay — the bill would be honored — but the drawer must run the risk and do the diligence to effect this —

According to Savary & Léger ^{Fonte} Writers on bills, this action may be brought for the pay of the money —

1 Pandinus. A 05

N° 382.

Le Porteur peut ensuite recourir contre le tireur et les endossseurs, qui sont solidaiement garants du refus d'acceptation, et leur demander le remboursement des montants de la lettre, des frais du portef & du change, il peut à cet effet poursuivre collectivement les divers obligés, ou s'addresser indistinctement à celui qu'il lui plait de choisir — et la personne ainsi poursuivie, doit donner caution ou pay —

N° 1663

McConville
Ritchie
Eno & opp^t

The Plaintiff having sold or sold a lot of land
in the possession of the Defendant as his property
whereas he held it only by bail Empphy testique
Drs. Is the Opposant, the proprietor of the
foros, entitled to claim the proceeds, as I
representing the foro which was so sold, there being
still 80 years of the bail Empph. to run?

N. Denon. v^e Decret d'Immeubl. S. 5. N° 16 — says, that the Decret
in such case does not destroy the right of the proprietor
to claim the foro at the expiration of the bail, and refuses
to an arrêt reported by Augant. law. 3. ch. 8 —

Poth. Poor. Crv. p261. Le quatrième privilège est celui de ceux dont les
oppositions, afin de distraire, ou afin de charge, ayant
été formées à tard, ont été renvoyées à l'ordre — s'il est
jugé qu'ils avoient un droit de propriété ou rente foncière, ils
douvent être préférés sur le prix de la chose sur laquelle ils avoient
ce droit, préférablement à tous autres créanciers. —

Denon. V^e Opposition

N° 23.

Mais quand quelqu'un a omis de s'opposer afin de
distraire ou afin de charge, avant le conseil d'adjudiquer, au Parlement
ou aux Requêtes du Palais et avant l'adjudication aux autres Juridictions,
et qu'il n'est pas la déchéance, il peut du moins, comme tous autres
créanciers, s'opposer sur le prix après l'adjudication pour y venir
en ordre pour l'estimation de sa chose; auquel cas il sera
préféré à tous autres créanciers comme ayant privilège réel.
Cela est décidé tant par l'Edit des Crées de l'année 1551 — que par
l'art. 356. de la Coutume de Paris —

See also. 1 Duplessis - 638 —

2 Bouyg: p. 724. §. 97. p. 725. §. 107 —

N^o 1715
Armour }
vs
Therien — }

In February Term 1823.

This was an action on a promissory note payable to the Plaintiff, as Cashier for the benefit and in behalf of the association carrying on business in the name of the president Directors & Company of the Bank of Canada — The Defendant made default —

Queso — My dear Justice Ryke, can this action be maintained by the Plaintiff — and ought it not to have been instituted by the persons for whose benefit it is payable He considered, that if the laws of England were to guide our decision, the present action was maintainable — 1 Esp. Rep. p. 123. — 8 T. Rep. 123. — but doubted whether by the French law, this would be the case —

The Court gave Judge for Plaintiff — The principles of this decision are conformable to what was held by the Court in the case of Mr. Tavish et Gellaway vs Parisien — 15 Feby. 1819 — see M. S. Cars 3^o. Vol. p. 623. —

N^o 1663
McKenzie }
vs
Ritchie }
&
Ennapp

See 1 Vol. Hericourt. p. 49. N^o. 3. —

N^o 477

Stacey. or
Ernatinger } On liability of Sheriff, on Escape of Debtor from
Gaol.—

Imps. Sh. 48. Gaolers are also the Servants of the Sheriff, and he must be responsible for their conduct

By St. 14 Ed. 3. c. 10. The Gaols shall be rejoined to the Sheriffs, and the Sheriffs shall have the custody of the same as before; and they shall put in Keepers for whom they shall answer. —

51. As the Gaoler is but the Sheriff's servant, therefore he may discharge him at his pleasure; and if he refuses to surrender up or quit possession of the Gaol the Sheriff may turn him out by force, as he may any private person. Or

" If the Sheriff's Gaoler suffer a prisoner to escape the action must be brought against the Sheriff not against the Gaoler; for an escape out of the Gaoler's custody is by intendment of Law an escape out of the Sheriff's custody. — 2 Lew. 159. 2 Mod. 124 — 5 Mod. 41A. 41G. — Bar. Abr. Tit. Sheriff. p 159. —

Com. Dig. Tit. Escape The action for an escape shall be brought ag' him B. 2. p. 598. who has the custody of the Gaol. — tho' he have it de facto only, and not de jure.

Id. p 599 But an action for an Escape shall not be against the Superior, if the Inferior be sufficient

Id. (B. 3). But in all cases where the Inferior is insufficient debt lies against the Superior for the Escape —

If he be insufficient at the time of the action brought tho' he was sufficient at the time of the commitment or Escape for that is the time to be regarded. — and

And therefore a verdict is not sufficient, if it does not find the insufficiency when the action was brought, though it finds him insufficient when he was keeper, or at the time of the Commitment or Escape -

(B.3.) p. 599 So it lies ag^t the Superior, though the Inferior was admitted by the Court -

^{2 Instit.} ³⁸² & This w^t p^t - The Superior against whom the action ought to be brought, is he, who by his estate in office, or by his authority without Estate, has the power of putting in the Inferior

The Sheriff of London are the Inferior - the Mayor & Commonalty who have the office of Sheriff in fee, are the Superior -

So debt does not lie against the Superior upon a general declaration for an Escape, but he ought to be specially charged for the insufficiency of the Inferior.
2 Lev. 160 -

Bac. Abr. Tit. Although all Gaols and prisons regularly belong to the King Sheriff. II. 5. p. 157 yet the Sheriff shall have the Custody of all persons taken by virtue of any precept or authority to him directed, notwithstanding having any grant by the King of the Custody of prisoners to another person. -

If the Gaoler cannot be considered to be the servant of the Sheriff in this Case, - he being appointed by the Crown & not answerable to Sheriff - how will this affect the gaoler -

Imp. St. p. 157. - See case in Ca. Temp. Hard. 310. 311 - when it was held, that as the turnkey was not the wardens deputy, the escape in question, by the act of the turnkey could not affect the warden so as to constitute it to be a Voluntary Escape.
its. 2 Bl. R. p. 1048.

Imp. w^t - p. 157. And it is reason that he (Sh^t) not in such keepers for whom he will answer. -

2 Instit. p. 382 (Et caveat sibi vicecomes, vel custos ejusdem Gaolo si sit infra libertatem) This act extends to all keepers of Gaols, and therefore if one St. Westm. 2. hath the keeping of a Gaol by wrong, or de facto, and suffereth an escape he is within the Statute, as well as he that hath the keeping of it de Jure. -

By St. 45. Geo. 3. ch. 13 - Act to provide for the erection
 of a Gaol - by Sec. 5 - it is directed that the ^{Shriffs of the} said
 "Districts for the time being, shall severally & respectively
 have the keeping of the said Gaols" &c

Appointment of Deput. by Commission of 24 Decr
 1810 - by which the prison in his Circuit, is committed
 to his care & keeping -

=
 Writ of Capias of 20 July 1820 - Sheriff returns
 that he had taken the within named Alex^r Grant
 whose body remains in the prison of our Lord the
 "King under my custody" &c -

=

N^o. 27.

Mathews & Co
 Forbes & al
 Gerrard & al

On question touching the liability of the Tres Saisi to account to the plaintiff as Creditors of Dr & Mr Forbes, monies rec'd by the T. Saisi from Wm Forbes shortly prior to his decease -

Three points are raised by the plffs as grounds on which ~~this action is grounded~~ they contest the declaration of the Tres Saisi,

- 1st. The insanity of Wm Forbes at the time he gave the Draft in favor of T. Saisi
 - 2^d. The Insolvency of Dr. & Mr Forbes at the time, & the consequent right of their Creditors to a share of the money. -
 - 3^r. The special promise of Sam'l Gerard to receive the money & account for it.
- =

1st As to the first point, there is no evidence to establish the fact, the general belief of one or two of the witnesses that they did not think the deceased in a state fit to transact business, is more than counterbalanced by the particular evidence of Mr Le Saulnier, of Dr Remond's certificate, and of the signature of Robert the brother in law of the deceased to the Draft in question - can leave no doubt on this head. -

2^d On the question of Insolvency of Dr. & Mr Forbes - Then we have to regret the inefficiency of our laws on this subject, and how little calculated they are to afford protection to Creditors, and ^{secure} facilitate their rights & claims on the property & estate of their Debtor - What shall constitute Bankruptcy - when it shall be said to commence, so as to tie up the hands of the Debtor from disposing of his property

Should not be left in doubt, nor be of an equivocal nature, or so difficult to ascertain, as to leave doubts in the minds of any, or delay ^{the} occasioned in securing the ^{rights} interests of all who have an interest in the Estate of the Insolvent Debtor - We cannot look at the Code Marchand in this respect, it has been held not to law in the County, and if it were, its provisions on this particular point are too limited and inefficient to afford that prompt and effectual remedy which ~~delays~~ Creditors would require in cases of insolvency of their Debtor - What is the consequence? Creditors are left to pursue their individual remedy ag^t their Debtor, and ^{of} his property, until by a long course of litigation & proceedings at law, that property is wanted, or so much diminished, as to be of little benefit to those interested. But however defective the law may be on this subject, it is our duty to administer it such as it is, until the Legislature of the County shall see fit to change it -

By the 180^e. art. of the Custom of Paris we are informed what deconfiture is - Le cas de deconfiture est, quand les biens du debitEUR, ne suffisent aux créanciers apparaens. Now what do the Commentators say on the interpretation of this article - Boujon. 2^e Vol. Titre des Exécutions N^o 32. p. 675 - La deconfiture est bien l'état d'impuissance du debitEUR de satisfaire tous les créanciers; mais elle ne se presume pas, tant que le debitEUR est en possession de ses meubles, et qu'ils ne sont pas saisis et exécutés sur lui; ainsi au défaut d'une telle saisie et exécution, le privilège du premier saisissant, ainsi que celui résultant de la priorité des autres saisies contre les saisies postérieures, ont toujours lieu - sauf l'exception ci-après - what is it - cependant le décès du debitEUR & une apposition du Scellé, font présomption de deconfiture - c'est exception -

Fer. Dec. 1^{er} Déconfiture, says, that Déconfiture signifie l'insolvenabilité d'un débiteur, dont les biens sont saisis et qui a plusieurs créanciers qu'il n'est pas en état de satisfaire, après discussion faite de tous ses biens. —

^x
How I would observe
that circumstances
may often occur
of wth not regaining
all this course of
proceeding, and that
although we do not ^{po}our satisfaire ses créanciers saisissons ou opposans.
adopt the Code ⁼
maritime in it ⁼

Il faut donc, pour qu'il soit constant, qu'un homme est déconfis et insolvable, que tous biens, tant meubles qu'Immeubles, ayant été saisis et vendus publiquement, et que le prix qui en est provenu ne soit pas suffisant pour satisfaire ses créanciers saisissons ou opposans.

We have nothing in the case before us that comes ^{form & practice}, yet within the notion or description of this insolvency, it is true we see the decease of one of the partners, but no ^{in substance} proceedings taken upon it, that carry a presumption of insolvency, the very reverse is apparent, the survivor is allowed to remain in possession of all the partnership property, and what seems singular, if we can credit the testimony before us, was allowed to waste and destroy that property, when there were creditors on all hands, whose interest it was to have prevented it — Whatever the reason for this ^{inactivity on the part of your creditors} might have been, it was attended with this legal presumption, that there was no insolvency in the partnership business of D. & W. Forbes. The first step taken towards establishing this insolvency is the saisie and suez out in this Cause, but whatever may arise out of this saisie and, taken nearly two years after the decease of one of the partners, it cannot have a retroactive effect, insolvency can operate only from the day it is ascertained, no prior bona fide transaction can be affected by subsequent insolvency, if the transaction was not bona fide, then an other grounds & principles upon which it can be attacked & set aside — There does not therefore appear a shadow of right upon which this transaction can be attacked on the score of Insolvency.

As to the 3^d Point - whether S. G. the T. Saisi rec'd the money in question under a special promise to hold it as the property of D^r & W^m Forbes & be accountable to them for it - that is, whether it could be considered in the nature of a Deposit in his hands. -

The testimony of Corbett, is the only evidence we have on this head, and would certainly lead us to presume that the T. Saisi did not act as the Creditor of Danl. W^m Forbes, but as a friend, as the depository of the money - the conversation however as stated by this witness is somewhat desultory, and there is no precise stipulation ^{no portion} ~~on my part~~ ^{T. Saisi} ~~undertaking~~ on the part of the T. Saisi - ~~on my part~~ ^{on one occasion, that} It is stated to have said, it was no trouble to him to draw the money from the Public office & to receive it - on the 2^d occasion when Wm Forbes sworn to the acc't. Danl. Forbes was present - now Danl. Forbes had a material interest in this money, and his ^{act's} observations ~~must~~ constitute a strong feature in the case - D. Forbes objected to Mr G. getting the amounts & vouchers, when he deceased observed, that Mr G. was their good friend, and he had much rather the money should remain in his hands than ^{than} any body else - That Mr G. observed - "I do not know what D^r Forbes can mean by making objections to my receiving the accounts - I have no interested motives in taking this trouble, I merely do it for my friend Wm Forbes, who is not now in a situation to transact business, and if any other person will take the trouble I have no objections." - This language marks strongly the character of a friendly, disinterested motive in the T. S. tend his receiving the money upon this principle would no doubt make him now accountable for it - This appears to have been on the 8^d Nov^r by connecting this part of the evidence with the Certified copy of the account sworn to before Mr Caldwell - Between this day and the 22^d of Nov^r when the receipts were signed and the draft given by Wm Forbes to Mr G. - we have nothing to shew what took place between

the

+ nothing seemed then
to have been concluded
upon between the
parties

the parties, Dr & Wm Forbes may have talked over this matter, as being of interest to them, they may have changed their sentiments on this subject — on the 22nd. Nov. when the receipt and draft were signed by Wm Forbes, we find Mr. G. holding himself out as a creditor of the second, at least as far as his communications went with Mr. Lesauvain and could we take up the answers of Mr. G. to the facts & art. he appears to have acted upon that occasion only in this character — but this being evidence in his own favor — cannot be relied upon as the legal means of establishing the fact — but what leads us to believe that Mr. G. did act as a creditor upon this occasion, & did receive the money on account due to him & his partners, are the subsequent declarations of Dant. Forbes, as stated in the testimony of John Fisher & Mr. Dillidernier, who ^{said} ~~said~~ to them, that this money had ^{been} paid to Mr. G. on ac't. of what was due to him & his partners by Dant. & Wm Forbes — This declaration of the debtor with the facts in evidence that the money so received had been ^{soon after} applied to the satisfaction of a part of this debt, soon after it was received seem to establish sufficiently that this money was ^{given} paid and received as a payment, and not as a deposit in the hands of the T. Saisi. —

Denoit. V°
Saisie arrêt
N° 10. —

Ces sortes d'affirmations se font au Greffe par les Tres Saisis et le Saisissant est reçu à prouver par écrit la contraire de l'affirmation; ce qu'on n'admet pas ordinairement en d'autres circonstances que le serment est délivré in litteris. —

1. Pigeau. 658.

Mais si l'on soutient que son affirmation n'est pas sincère, par exemple qu'il a moins payé que ce qu'il dit, ou qu'il n'a pas du le faire, qu'il ne doit point avoir de terme; alors de simple témoin qu'il étoit dans l'affaire, il y devient partie intéressée, et peut par consequent demander sur cette contestation à être renvoyé devant son Juge naturel. — On ne peut pas lui opposer son affirmation comme une soumission à la Jurisdiction où il l'a faite, pour l'obliger à y rester parce qu'encore une fois, cette affirmation, n'étoit pas une défense de sa part mais un simple témoignage rendu à la vérité. —

St. Albans
Decr - 8

On a writ of Execution sued out at the
Lands & Tenements of the Defendant the
Sheriff seized and sold to the Plaintiff the
following lot of land - "a lot of land situated
in the Seigniory of Delaney, in the first range of
Concessions in the said Seigniory on the river
Richelieu, containing Sixteen arpents in width
by 28 arpents in depth, with a house & other
buildings thereon erected, commonly called
Watson's Point, bounded in front by the said
River Richelieu, on one side to the North by
unconceded lands, on the other side to the South
by lands belonging to Thomas Johnson, and in
the rear by unconceded land." —

The lot of land in question contained $18\frac{1}{2}$
arpents in front by 28 in depth, was bounded on
the north by the lands of one Gaborneau, & on the
south by Thomas Johnson — The Defendant abandoned
16 acres on which the house & buildings were erected, but
retained $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres on the north side, as his property
contending that the same had not been seized or sold
Decr 8 —

It is ~~law is~~ ~~law has been~~ established by legal decision
that where there is a deficiency in the thing sold by
Decret, there shall be a proportionate diminution of price
to be allowed to the purchaser out of the purchase
money on his opposition to this effect — The question
however is, shall this principle apply in all cases, or
does the law make a distinction when quantity is
the thing sold, or where a certain object, without
consideration as to quantity or extent, is the thing sold —

If the thing here sold, called Watson's Pound
+ with known was of that certain and determinate nature, that no
limits & boundaries person could mistake it, had it contained only $13\frac{1}{2}$
acres in front instead of 16, the purchaser would be
entitled to no diminution of price, and if it contained
 $18\frac{1}{2}$ the purchaser would be entitled to claim them -
According to a received principle in the interpretation
of Contracts, as to what shall be considered a sale of
a corps certain, and what shall be considered a sale of
2 Henrys. L. & C. b. quantity, it is held - qu'aux ventes, que incipient

2 Henrys. liv. 8. ch. 6. quantity, it is held — qu'aux ventes, que incipient
2uest. 85. — "a corpore, on se doit plutôt user par les confins

" a corpore, on se doit plutôt regler par les confins
" que par la conterue, et que ce n'est que pour une plus
" grande expression qu'elle a été déclarée — qu'au
" contraire aux ventes qui incipient à quantitate, le
" vendeur est obligé de maintenir la conterue que le

contract points — According to this rule, the Plaintiff must fail in his action, for the sale here made is, of a lot of land containing 16 acres in front by 28 in depth — Then have been delivered to the Plaintiff, and what right has he to more? — why because he says, that he purchased what was called Watson's Point, & all that belonged to it, but neither by the legal interpretation of the Contract, nor by the grammatical construction, can the words Watson's point be made to apply to any specific quantity of land — on the contrary the words, Watson's Point, would apply to the antecedent words, houses and buildings thereon erected, as the relative with of they are connected —

The words are (a lot of land ~~ver~~) whereas had
Watson's point, been the principal thing sold, it ought
to have been thus described (a lot of land, called Watson,
Point ^{ver})

Watsons Point here seems rather to be an accessory to the thing sold, than to be the principal object of the sale — it does not therefore come within any general principle, but rests upon the particular description here given —

See Case 2^e Vol. Thébaud. Tr. des Grecs - p. 139. 140 where he refers to Henrys - where the converse of the proposition was held -

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What does Bougian say on this head -

1 Vol. T. 4. liv. 3. Tit. 4. p. 482. N° 50. — he states in the preceding N° that when the sale is by measure the seller must warrant the quantity — & in this N° 50, goes on to say — Cette garantie avoit lieu encore que le contrat de vente contint les confins, et les tenans et aboutissans des 30 arpens vendus ; c'est toujours certaine quantité vendue, et qui doit être garantie par le vendeur, la délivrance de cette quantité étant l'objet et la fin d'un tel contrat — celle juris-
providence est fondée sur ce que dans le cas que la vente à la mesure, l'énonciation des confins est
surabondante, et comme telle, c'est la quantité,
c'est la mesure marquée qui prédomine sur celle
de

Here the predominating thing sold was the measure, for not only is the name Watsons Point, a name of uncertain nature and extent, but the pretensions of the Peuff here go beyond the limits of his deed for he claims on the north line up to the land of our Gabourien, whereas the lot in question is stated on that line to extend to ungranted lands -

The care of Chabotter in Lavallée is very different from the present - see Oct Term 1820 - 8th Vol. Ca. p. 188 -

un emplacement situé au faux boug St. Antoine de la contenance de 72 pieds plus ou moins de front sur 80 pieds plus ou moins de profondeur - prenant par devant à la rue St. Antoine, par derrière à ladite Dame Vendeville & à ses Enfans, joignant d'un côté à la rue St. Marguerite, et d'autre côté aux représentans de feu Dame Josette Guy Rue

De Rouville
+
Fr. Gaucher &
Bourdalaïs

Duo. If the Procureur ad negotia
can be examined by his Principal —

Alphonse Dumont, a witness produced on the part of the Plaintiff, ex. on his voir dire, said, that he has been for some years past ^{now} the Agent and Attoz of the Plaintiff in managing the affairs of his Seigniories, and transacting all matters concerning them, and lives in the Plaintiff's family —

Defende^r objected to Mr^r as being incompetent

The 14^e art of 22^e Tit. of Ord 1667 — says — Au commencement de la déposition sera fait mention du nom, surnom, âge, qualité & demeure du témoin, ou serment par lui prêté, s'il est serviteur ou domestique, parent ou allié de l'une ou l'autre des parties, et en quel degrés. —

Rodier on this
art. 2^e quest.

Post. ob. N° 827.

S'ordonnance entend elle exclure absolument le témoignage des Serviteurs et domestiques? — Non mais elle veut que le témoin déclare sous la religion du serment s'il est parent, allié, serviteur ou domestique sauf en jugeant à rejeter cette déposition, ou y avoir égard selon les circonstances —

Serviteurs ou domestiques ne sont pas termes synonymes Domestiques, sont ceux qui restent dans la même maison qui sont commensaux de la partie sans faire aucun ouvre servile — tels que les Commis, agents, Clercs, Recepteurs ou gouverneurs et pensionnaires — Serviteurs sont les gens destinés aux œuvres serviles dans la maison et que y sont nourris et entretenus aux dépens du maître, soit qu'ils aient des gages ou non. —

Surpillon on 14^e art.
of the 2^e Tit —

Post. ob. 827 —

Les dépositions des Serviteurs ou des domestiques sont sur tout rejettées, lorsqu'ils sont entendus pour et à la regrette de

de leurs maîtres — On cite à cet égard la loi b. ff. du Test. qui dit — Idonei non videntur esse testes, quibus impunari potest ut testis fiant. — Cette loi ne reçoit pas néanmoins une application parfaite — cela est dit des esclaves et des fils de famille qui étoient soumis à une puissance à laquelle il n'étoit pas en leur pouvoir de se soustraire au lieu que nos Serviteurs sont des personnes libres. —

M. Joussy sur cet article observe, N° 3. sur ces mots, Serviteurs, Domestiques — qu'ils n'y ont pas été mis pour rejeter leur témoignage, comme on le croit ordinairement et comme il est dit à l'égard des parents en l'art. II ci-dessus; mais pour y avoir égard par les Juges suivant les circonstances — et en effet, si l'ordonnance avait en intention de rejeter le témoignage des Serviteurs et domestiques, elle n'auroit pas manqué d'en faire une disposition comme elle l'a fait à l'égard des parents; et vu l'ayant pas fait de même à l'égard des Serviteurs et Domestiques, c'est une preuve qu'elle l'a laissé à l'arbitrage du Juge conformément à la disposition du droit

The Court were of opinion to admit the testimony of the witness, saving such objection as might be made to it, according to the matters dependant.

And here it would seem that where the evidence of the Domestique or Serviteur did not apply to certain facts, where they could be heard only as timorous, necessary their depositions were liable to be rejected —

see Denoixart. &c Reproches —

1 Pagan —

Salle on ord. 1667.

Bonnie —

N°1974
Archambault & Cie
Fullum &c. S

on question whether the Deposed Masons
and Entrepreneurs for building a Church, are
answerable for employing in that building
insufficient materials furnished by the Parish, by
reason whereof the workmanship was imperfect, &
a part of the building fell to the ground. —
vid. Repn re Maçonnerie —

Si on Juge ainsi contre un Entrepreneur quoique
conduit par les plans et l'inspection d'un Architecte
quoiqu'autorisé par les pouvoirs d'un propriétaire,
qui peut douter qu'on ne doive prononcer de même
contre un maître-macon qui aura fait des ouvrages
avec des matériaux fournis par le propriétaire ? —

Cette circonstance ne peut l'affranchir de la garantie
il est également responsable pendant dix ans des vices
de sa construction, parce qu'il a toujours à s'imputer
les causes de sa défectuosité. —

En effet, ou les vices qui se découvrent dans les dix
ans, et dont les suites se manifestent, proviennent
d'un défaut dans la bâtiſſe, c'est à dire, d'un défaut
de liaison, d'un mauvais assemblage, d'une position
sans soin et sans proportion, ou ils proviennent de
la mauvaise qualité des matériaux employés — Le
premier cas est constamment celui de la garantie
parce qu'il ya ignorance ou négligence — le second
cas n'est pas plus favorable — l'entrepreneur peut
être également argué d'imperfection, ou de défaut d'attention
parce qu'il a du connoître la mauvaise qualité, et la
connaissant, il a du refuser d'en faire usage, et
cesser absolument l'ouvrage. — Tel est l'usage
constamment observé en la Chambre des batimens
et dans tous les Tribunaux de Paris — Telle est la
regle

rigue observée par la Compagnie des Experts dans les visites et rapports qu'ils font. —

Des experts

1. p. 273-

La raison pour laquelle les maîtres sont chargés de répondre en leurs propres noms des événements, dépens, dommages et intêts causés par le travail qu'ils font au mur mitoyen, est, qu'ils doivent savoir ce qui est de leur art et profession ; et la faute qui se commettrait proviendrait de leurs faits, soit par leur ignorance, ou par leur négligence, et ils ne pourroient pas aléguer pour leur défenses l'ordre express qu'ils en auroient reçu du propriétaire de la maison ou hôtel où ils travaillerioient, parceque c'est à eux à avertir ledit propriétaire de ce qu'il doit observer à cet égard. —

N° 1064

Warwick & al
Ayult & al
Baudreau
Gardien

On question whether the Gardien is by law discharged from his responsibility, in the effects seized & committed to his keeping are not sold in 2 months after his appointment when there has been no opposition. —

The 172. art. of the Custom says, "Les executans sont tenus de faire vendre les biens dedans deux mois après les oppositions jugées ou cessées." —

For Gr. Com. on this art. Glos. Un. N° 1, says — Cet article décide la question, savoir, combien l'exécution et dans quel temps l'executant est tenu de faire vendre les meubles exécutés, savoir dans deux mois du jour de l'exécution, au cas qu'il n'y ait point d'opposition formée par le débiteur saisi, ou par un tiers. —

The Code Civil. Tit. 19. art. 20. — says — "Les séquestrés demeureront déchargés de plein droit pour l'avenir aussitôt que les contestations d'entre les parties auront été définitivement jugées ; et les gardiens et commissaires deux mois après que les oppositions auront été jugées, sans obtenir aucun jugement de décharge — le tout néanmoins en rendant compte de leur commission pour le passé." —

Here the delay is evident — but it then becomes a question whether the Gardien shall be discharged without rendering any account "de sa Commission pour le passé" —

Sousse in his observations on this article says, that the séquestré shall be discharged whether the effects have been delivered into his hands or not — et il n'importe que les effets séquestrés aient été mis

mis entre les mains du séquestre ou non — but this is in direct contradiction to the latter part of the article, q't says — le tout néanmoins en n'tenant compte de leur Commission pour le passé — And Joussi seems to admit this in a subsequent observation on the same article when he says — Les séquestrés et gardiens sont contraiables par corps pour la reddition de ces comptes, comme étant dépositaires de biens de Justice? — And Fer. on his Rémarques, on the 172^e art^t says — ~~en rapportant~~ to an arrêt cité. Cet arrêt, doit s'entendre quand les gardiens n'ont été chargés que de parole, et non pas quand les meubles leur ont été mis actuellement en main, auquel cas ils demeurent chargés de les représenter pendant trente ans, si ce n'est qu'ils les aient restitués, ou s'en soient fait déchargez — ainsi jugé par arrêt du 31 Dec 1617. in l'audience de la Grande Chambre —

Rodier on this art — observes same thing as to discharge of the séquestre when the thing seized has been put into his possession —

Le Camus on this article puts the question in the right point of view — "Les Exécutans qui ne font déplacer les meubles que

+ and N. 3. of the
gross. —

Pickett & Co
Manning & Co
al'

One arbiter was appointed Curator to the Estate of Plett as being vacant, the Plett having left the Country - On the same day

he was appointed Curator he presented petition to be authorized to sell a certain real property of Plett stating therein several grounds which rendered this necessary -

Upon the supposition that these grounds were well founded the Curator was authorized to make the sale after 3 cries at the Church door in the usual manner -

The land was adjudged to one Dr. Eno, for £400⁰⁰ - The Surveyor, Mr Cuthbert re-treated the land from Dr. Eno and afterwards sold a part of it to Manning one of the Dfds, retaining the rest for himself - under this sale Cuthbert & Manning have enjoyed the land since 9 Nov. 1811 -

It is now found that the authority given to the Curator for sale of property was not strictly pursued - as only one cry was made at Church door - and besides it appears that the facts stated in the petition upon which the authority was given are not true - and the land in question appears to have been sold at an under value - This has occasioned a suit to be bro. by Plett to set aside the sale & re-enter upon their property - this will admit of no difficulty - but the question arises in regard of the improvements made on the property by the Dfd. Manning since he has been in possession - he claims to be reimbursed the amount of these improvements - One can be considered a possessor in good faith - or can he claim

claim from the Plffs. the reimbursement of improvements they do not want, and would never have made upon the property; supposing the Defend. to be a rich man who has built houses & barns and made improvements on the property, much beyond its value - Shall the Plffs be deprived of their Estate by this means, unless they can reimburse such improvements

But the nature & extent of the ameliorations is not as yet known - ought the Court to suspend giving judgment in favor of the Plff. till this is ascertained? - or ought the Court to suspend the right of Plffs to enter upon their property, until this amount shall be previously ascertained? - But see order 1667. tit. 27. art. 9.

In regard of right of Cpts. to reimburse their ameliorations - see. N. Denys. v^e Ameliorations §. 3. N^o. 3 - the 4th case given in case of minor - p. 493. & p. 495
N. 3. -

Joseph Bouchard
Meunier à St. Thérese, Blainville
Ings. Bélanger, habitant
du même lieu.

Cause in the Inferior Court

The decision of this Cause rests upon
the question whether the Miller is
bound to return to the Censeur

out of the grain carried to the mill to be ground
the same weight in flour, farine, as he received in
wheat, allowing for the quantity deducted for mouture

The rules, regulations and Customs which were
observed in France touching mills and millars
were very numerous and variaient and by no means
uniform - Tremiville in his Pratique des Terres
2 Vol. p. 291, observes as a general rule where difficulties
occur - que quand il y ^{aura} ~~est~~ des doutes, il faut suivre
le sentiment de la Villette sur Personne, & prendre le
moindre droit, par la faveur de la libération -

This principle seems further admitted from that kind
of interpretation which was put upon the different laws
& ordonances made on this subject - The same author observes,
p. 292. "Or les loix et les ordonnances sont toutes -
uniformes pour la faveur de la libération, en sorte,
qu'a supposer que s'en soit usé de la part du sujet
de payer en argent plutôt qu'en grain, il lui doit être
libre de se déterminer en ce paiement à sa volonté, c'est
à dire de payer en argent ou en grain -"

Id. p. 300 -

Par l'ordonnance du 19 Sept. 1439, les meuniers sont tenus
rendre pareil poids en farine que celui du bled qui
leur aura été donné à moudre, excepté deux livres par
septier pour le déchet - art. 8. -

Le septier de bled, mesure de Paris, pese en froment 240 livres

p. 301

Par l'ordonnance du Roi Jean 1^{er} du mois de Fevrier 1350. tit. 6.
il est ordonné, qu'il soit établi des poids pour peser le bled
quand on le portera au moulin, auquel poids sera pesé
la farine qui sortira du dit bled

sur arrêt du Parlement de Bretagne du 15 Mai 1631 - ordering same thing
considered a general law -

12. 304. 5.

And by some Customs of France, the seigneurs are held personally liable for the defects or neglects of their mills -

2. Vol. Edits. p. 131

The law of this Country in regard of this object we must gather from local usages or particular regulations which have been adopted to regulate the rights of the parties - The first I find is an arrêt of the ^{the Suprem Council} 20 June 1667, "qui règle les moutures à la 14^e portion" - This arrêt was made merely to increase the amount of mouture, to the 14^e part of what was ground, in all other respects it refers to what the law as practised in France, as will be, as to be thereafter followed - observe what it says - "Sur la
 " requête Civile presentée en ce Conseil par la pluspart des
 " Propriétaires des moulins de ce Pais, tenand ante a remontrer
 " que les moulins de ce Pais content le double et le triple
 " de Ceux de France, tant pour les Construire, les reparer,
 " et les entretenir, que pour gages et nourrir les meuniers,
 " en consideration de quoi, ils pourroient demander que
 " le mouturage fut proportionné aux dépenses, et par
 " consequent au dessus de l'ordinaire de France, neanmoins
 " qu'ils se contentent que ce qui a été pratiqué en ce Pais
 " des son commencement, conformement aux Ordonnances
 " et Edits Royaux soit continué dorénavant comme il a
 " été jusqu'à présent; et que la Coutume de Paris qui
 " est seule reçue en ce Pais pour toutes choses, le soit
 " aussi pour celle-ci - Le Conseil a ordonné sur"

Reference is here made to the Royal Edicts & Ordinances of the King of France as the Rule of Law which had obtained and which was still to be observed in the Country - Reference is also made to a local ordinance of Mr. De Lavaud - but it is not to be found in the Collection of the Edits & Ordonnances and we cannot say what it was - Now by the ordinances of the King of France prior to this period, certain weights

wights and measures were established, and toll to be taken - and although this Arrêt, varies therfrom in regard of the quantum of mouture to be taken and that it was to be taken in livres, yet in all other respects, what was the law in regard of weight and measure in France, ~~had been &~~ should be continued to be the law in this Country - and indeed we find in this arrêt a part of the Law of France more particularly enjoined in regard of weighing the grain carried to the mill to be ground - en ordre of Jean 1^{er} du mois de Fevrier 1350. tit. 6. -

su ait. Denys. 4^e Meunier. N° 4. Il y a néanmoins une ordonnance du 19 Septembre 1439. qui porte, que les meuniers seront tenus de rendre pareil poids en farine que celui du blé qui leur aura été donné à moudre excepté deux livres par septier (de froment mesuré de Paris) pour le déchet - and according to Tremiville above cited this septier is 240 livres pesant -

Repr 4^e Meunier. p. 507 - A Paris on paye la mouture en argent - les meuniers recourent les grains au poids, et rendent la farine de même, en leur faisant établir du déchet, qui a été évalué par les ordonnances à deux livres par septier -

su ait Renaudou Th. des Droits Seigneuriaux liv. 4 ch. 1. Quat. 7. p. 263. 4

The opinion of the Court therefore was that there should be allowed the diminution of 2^{1/4} for every 240 for déchet, or waste - & as it appears that double this quantity had been taken here, the action was dismissed -

Contraute par Corps contre femme mariée
sa Descision de Tremunville. v^e Prisonniers, p. 583

Chartier
Descelles }
Descelles }
mis à cause }

On question touchant conditions of sale imposed
by the Sheriff.

Dec. de Royer. v^e adjudication. see. charges
& conditions. p. 765.-

On ne doit pas permettre des adjudications à condition pour l'adjudicataire de se charger des evenemens d'un proces, parce que cela éloigne les enchères, et que par ce moyen les choses sont vendues et adjugées à vil prix, au grand dommage de la partie saisie et des créanciers - On ne doit donc pas laisser à l'avidité d'un promouvoir ait de droit de charger un brief de clauses dures et déraisonnables, qui tendroient à lui procurer plus vite la rentree de sa créance, mais qui écraseroient tous les autres intéressés - Les charges imposées à un adjudicataire doivent être simples et légères. -

N^o 354
Beaujeu
Trusdell }

In donation by one Lusher to the Dene of
a lot of land, on condition that the Donee
should build a house of the value at least of
£ 200 - on the lot so given, & for his the Donee's
own benefit - Ques. Is this such a charge
for which lods & ventes are due to the Seigneur

Foumaur Tr. des Lods & Ventes.

N^o 18. p. 16. Cette origine du droit des lods, nous mene jusqu'à la source, et à la racine des principaux usages, et des règles fondamentales relatives à ce clevoir — de la vient —

1° Que le vendeur en étoit communement chargé parce qu'il est attaché à la permission que lui donne le Seigneur de vendre, quoique par la nature de la chose cette charge doit regarder l'acheteur —

2° Que'on a toujours dit, Lods & Ventes — et non pas Lods & achats — Parceque la vente étant l'ouvrage de deux parties, la prestation des Lods, est attaché au fait du vendeur, et non au fait de l'acheteur

3° De la vient, que c'est une portion du prix que reçoit le vendeur, et dont il profite, et non de ce qu'il en coûte à l'acquéreur, ex. gr. pour les étrennes frais de proxénètes & loyaux couts. —

N^o 351 p. 187 Les frais du Contrat, ceux des extremetieurs, les dépenses des voyages et autres loyaux couts de l'achat n'entrent pas en considération, pour augmenter le montant des lods — c'est ainsi que la question fut jugee par un arrêt du 31 Janv. 1557 — Cette prudence est fixée sur ce qu'il n'entre dans la fixation des Lods, que les objets qui tournent au profit du Vendeur, et non les loyaux couts, qui sont communément à la charge de l'acheteur. —

Hervé. Théorie
de l'at. Feodale

3^e vol. p. 167 Enfin on ne doit pas considérer les meliorations dont l'acheteur est chargé pour sûreté d'une rente que le Vendeur se retient, parceque c'est l'acheteur même qui profite de ces meliorations. —

Boutain
des Lods
p. 146 —

A l'égard de la seconde question, M^e Guyot a décidé qu'il n'y avoit point de Lods, si la charge apposée dans la donation n'est point en faveur du Donateur, ou ne tourne point à son profit, si elle a été stipulée pour l'utilité d'un tiers. —

Poët de
l'ivomme
Tr. de Tufs
p. 129 —

p. 238
238

Les Lods & Rents ou se payent que sur le pied au prix qui tourne au profit du Vendeur —

Ni pour la Constitution ni libération des Servitudes —
Ni constitution de Rents —

Interrogatoire sur Faits & articles —

Nouv. Demande v.^e Faits & art. 8^e. N^o. 3 —

L'Interrogatoire sur Faits & articles peut-être mis en usage, soit pour acquérir une preuve soit pour compléter celle qui est déjà commencée soit pour détruire celle que l'on oppose —



N^o. 1866.

Perrault
Meilleur }

On action of assumpsit & prav. -

Salle on ord. 1667
Tut. 2. art. 1.

Ce sont les conclusions qui constituent une demande; par conséquent elles forment la principale partie d'un exploit d'assignation. — Mais ce n'est point assez de faire connoître à quelqu'un ce que nous lui demandons il faut encore lui expliquer les motifs de notre demande et les moyens sur lesquels elle est fondée — afin que si nonobstant ces précautions, il s'obstine à s'opposer à une prétention juste en elle-même et bien justifiée, il ne puisse imputer qu'à lui la condamnation de dépens qui est la peine naturelle des plaideurs teméraires —



Boutarie
on de —

La raison pour laquelle toute assignation doit être libellée et contenir les moyens sur lesquels la demande est fondée est marquée en en la loi première ut sciat reus utrum cedere, an contendere debeat. —

Les anciennes Ordonnances marquent une raison particulière qui oblige à libeller les citations, et à y exprimer clairement les moyens de la demande —

Ravant
p. 9 —

L'ord^a Tit. 2. art. 1. explique, ce qu'elle entend, lorsqu'elle exige que l'exploit soit libellé, en ajoutant, qu'il doit contenir l'objet de la demande, et sommairement les moyens sur lesquels elle doit être fondée

Les demandes qu'on peut former en Justice, sont ce qu'on appelle actions, et on les distingue en Réelles ou Personnelles —

Les actions personnelles sont celles qui naissent de l'obligation de la personne, et elles proviennent des Contrats — Quasi-Contrats — Delits — & quasi-delits, qui sont les sources des obligations des hommes —

Les Contrats sont toutes les Conventions par lesquelles on s'oblige de livrer quelque chose à un autre, ou de le faire pour lui — Pour libeller un exploit fondé sur un pareil titre, il faut conclure à ce que celui qui l'on assigne soit condamné à livrer une telle chose, ou à payer une somme qui est due au Demandeur en vertu de la convention faite entre les parties, dont il faut expliquer la nature, et les clauses principales. —

Le quasi-contrat est un fait légitime, comme s'il y avait une convention — Telle est l'acceptation d'une succession, et autres choses semblables — En ce cas on conclut à ce que le défendeur soit condamné à payer les sommes dont il est débiteur en la qualité qu'il a prise, ou en conséquence du fait qui donne lieu à l'obligation. —

Rodier ou
ord^a 1667. de
p. 16 —

S'assignation doit être libellée — c'est à dire, quelle doit contenir, d'un côté les conclusions que l'assignant ou — Demandeur veut prendre contre l'assigné ou Défendeur Quid petatur, soit parce qu'il faut que le Défendeur connaisse ce qu'on lui demande, soit parce qu'il faut que le Juge sache sur quoi il a à prononcer, et que la sentence doive être relative à la demande — Et d'autre part, l'assignation doit

doit contenir, du moins sommairement les moyens de la demande, c'est-à-dire, en quelle qualité, a quel titre, et sur quel fondement, on demande — Causam petendi, et cela pour les mêmes raisons —

1 Stark. N.P.Ca. 181. Waller v. Drakford —

Woods.
Vanderbilts }

On question touching misconduct
of Jury. -

2 Com. Rep. 525. Philips. v. Fowler. -

A verdict was set aside where the Jury cast lots
how they should give it - S. C. Barnes. 441 - And. 383 -
on account of 2 q. Juries.

1 Stra. 642. Hale. v. Cove - Verdict set aside where Jury
drew lots - Costs to await event of a new trial. -

1 Term Rep. 11. Vaise. v. Delaval. - affidavit of a Juror
that the Jury having been divided in their opinion
tossed up & that plff's friends ~~were~~ ~~associates~~ ~~aboard~~ - The
Court would not receive the affidavit from the Jury
themselves, as it was a high misdemeanor in them, but
said, that in every such case the Court must derive
their knowledge from some other source, such as from
some other person having seen the transaction thro'
a window or by some such other means. -

8. Geo. 2.

Barnes. 438. Par. v. Seames &c al' - where halfpence were
nudged in a hat - This matter not appearing on the
oaths of any of the Jurors, but by affidavit, that two of
them had confessed the same - The Court staid entry of
final Judg' to give plff an opportunity to procure affidavits
from some of the Jurors - but this the Jurors even fearful
to do & declined it -

2. Salk. 645. Dent. v. Hundred of Hertford - A new Trial
was granted upon affidavit that the foreman declared the
Plff should never have a verdict, whatever witnesses he
produced -

2. Lev. 205. Foster. v. Hawden. - 4 p. 140. The King. v. Fitzwater.
where verdicts were set aside, from Jury casting lots, but
not said in what manner the Court were informed of the
fact. -

2. Bl. Rep. 1299. — Where the Jury not being able to agree in their verdict, wrote the names of the Jurymen on slips of paper, and shaking them together, left the decision of the verdict to the first six which were drawn — The Court refused to grant a new trial, because this matter was only brought before them by the affidavit of the Attorney to whom several of the Jury had confessed it — there being no affidavit of the Jurymen, or any other that was cognisant of this transaction. —

1 New Rep. 326. Owen & al. vs Warburton — The Court refused to set aside the verdict upon the affidavit of a Jurymen that it was decided by lot —
1805 —

Sir Jas Mansfield Ch. J. we have conversed with the other Judges on this subject, and we are all of opinion, that the affidavit of a Jurymen cannot be received. — It is singular indeed, that almost the only evidence of which the case admits, should be shut out, but considering the acts which might be used if a contrary rule were to prevail, we think it necessary to exclude such evidence. — If it were understood to be the law, that a Jurymen might set aside a verdict by such evidence, it might sometimes happen, that a Jurymen, being a friend to one of the parties, and not being able to bring over his companions to his opinion, might propose a decision by lot, with a view afterwards, to set aside the verdict by his own affidavit, if the decision should be against him. — we are therefore of opinion that there is no ground to support this rule. —

Tavernier
Cuvillier }
Stylivin op:

On question touches validity of proceeding on Exon
of Defendant after death of Pluff - on Difp^t opposⁿ

There seems to be a distinction to be taken between
an opposition by a Defendant who has been condemned
and a third person - The one has no right to raise
objections to the right of proceeding on the Exon - as in regard of
him be most execrable inf - but the other may have more substantial
grounds to allow & ought to have a substantial person with
whom to contend. -

This case seems to differ in nothing from what was
determined in the case of Breunet v. Legault. see p. 78. -

Mc Armour &
Peddie - }

action by Endorsee av. Endorse of a Bill of Exchange
Bill dated at Kingston in U.C. 3rd Jan^y. 1822 for £1000st
by one Hall on Jas. Aubrey at 60 days after sight -
On 2nd March 1822, bill was presented for acceptance
and protested -

on 29th March 1822, one Alex^r Muller, the Clerk of
Defendant being at Glasgow in Scotland, Rob^t Shedd^t, one of
Pluff ^{the M^t bth w^t} had been protested for non-acceptⁿ. That 4 days afterwards
Shedd^t proceeded to Canada & Muller set out next day - & both
arrived at Montreal on 20th May - Shedd^t arrived on the
Saturday even^g - and called on Defendant on the next Monday or
Tuesday w^t the bill & protest - he returned them to Pluff allowing ex.
a reason for not settling it, w^t that the bill ought to have been
presented for non paym^t as well as for non acceptⁿ

The objection now rests upon the delay in forwarding the notice
of protest from 2nd March 1822 - to time Shedd^t left Scotland
in April 1822. -

This objection however seems obviated ~~by~~ ^{by} the principle held
in the Case of Elliman & al. v. D' Egurino. 2 Hen. Bl. 565 -
That the purchaser of a foreign bill of Exch. payable at a
certain

certain time after sight, which is publicly offered for negotiation, is not bound to send it by the earliest opportunity to the place of its destination — It is sufficient if notice of a bill drawn in England on a person in the East Indies, being dishonoured, is sent to England by the first direct and regular mode of conveyance, whether it be by an English or a foreign ship — the holder is not bound to send such notice by the accidental, though earlier conveyance of a foreign ship not destined to this Country —

The Wits says, that a mail leaves London for most parts of the United Kingdom every day, and that trading ships proceed to New York one way fortnight

Dorronsal
Dorrons

On action by heirs at law to be restored to
the possession of the property after succession
of the late Læ. Dorrons, their father, of which
the Respondent took possession as Executrix & Legatary under
the last will & Testament of S^r. Læ. Dorron. —

See Opinion of Riccard. Tr. des Drs. Turky
Pape de laus de Guyot. v^e Leyatain §. 5 p. 69. —

Rep. de Merlin
v^e Leyatain
§. 5. N^o. 16.

Il faut cependant remarquer que ce dispositif
ne produit pas un grand effet — Si un héritier,
(dit Riccard), demandait en semblable rencontre à être
saisi réellement de la chose léguée, sauf à requérir par le
légitataire la délivrance de son leg^z, sans autre intérêt
que de l'ouvrir du privilégi qui lui est accordé par la Coutume
et sans coter aucun vice contre le Testament, ni proposer
aucune raison pour laquelle le légitataire doit être en
définitive privé de son leg^z, il ne devrait pas être recevable
à vouloir évincer le légitataire qui se trouverait en —
possession de la chose qui lui devrait enfin retourner,
d'autant que la bonne foi de notre Jurisprudence
ne souffre pas ces actions inutiles et frustratoires ;
mais suppliant par équité tout ce qui serait —
nécessaire pour parvenir à l'accomplissement de
la rigueur de la loi, et les circuits qu'il faudroit
faire pour cet effet, elle feindrait en même tems que
le légitataire est possesseur de la chose qui lui a été
léguée, en aurait ressaisi l'héritier, et puisque l'héritier
en aurait fait délivrance au légitataire, sans requérir
que toutes ces Cérémonies s'excutassent réellement
attendu qu'il n'en resulterait aucun fruit ni utilité
pour aucuns des parties — L'usage est conforme
à cette doctrine — cets some arrêts —

Robertson
vs
Davis.

In question, whether the tradesman is liable
for alleged defects in his work, after it has been
received & paid for upwards of 15 months.

Repr^e de Merlin. V^e Louage. n^o 11. Quand un ouvrage
est achevé, le bailleur doit le recevoir, c'est à dire, l'approver
s'il n'y trouve point de defectuosité — Si au contraire il
trouve l'ouvrage defectueux, et qu'en conséquence il ne
veut pas le recevoir, le Juge doit en ordonner la visite
par experts. — L'ouvrage est presumé reçu quand le
bailleur a laissé passer un certain temps sans s'en plaindre
et surtout, lorsqu'il en a payé le prix sans protestation.
Repr^e de Guyot. ea. Vab. p. 47. —

Repr^e V^e Louage
p. 46. —

Le Contrat de Louage d'ouvrage est un Contrat
synallagmatique, qui forme des obligations reciproques;
il a d'ailleurs beaucoup d'analogie avec le Contrat de vente. —
Justiniens dans ses Institutes, dit, qu'on doive, si certains
contrats, sont contrats de vente, ou Contrats de louage, et
voici la règle que cet Empereur donne pour les discerner. —
Quand c'est l'Ouvrier qui a fourni la matière, c'est un
contrat de vente; si au contraire on a fourni à l'ouvrier
la matière de l'ouvrage dont on l'a chargé, c'est un Contrat
de louage. — Si par exemple je fais marché avec son
bailleur pour qu'il me fasse un habit, et qu'il m'en
fournisse l'étoffe, c'est un Contrat de Vente — si je lui
fourni l'étoffe, c'est un Contrat de louage. —

Kidd
Raymond

On action hypothecaire -

Defd. purchased a house and lot of land from one Arel for £75 - on which lot Plft had a right of mortgage unknown to Defd. The defendant subsequently built another house on s^d lot, valued at £200 - Plft bro^t his present action ag^t Defd. who claims to be reimbursed his £200 by Plft, before he be held to give up the premises to be sold for paye of plft's debt.

The law makes a distinction between the different kinds of improvements, because the remedy for the money is differently favoured - there are 1. les necessaires - or ~~absolue~~ ⁱⁿquisite for the preservation of the thing - 2° - les utiles, those by which the value of it is increased - and 3° - les voluptuaires - or those of mere fancy or embellishment, without being considered either as necessary or useful -

In regard of the Tiers-détenteur, he is entitled to keep possession of the estate, until the creditor shall reimburse to him the amount of the ameliorations, or expenses ^{impenses} necessaires, it being considered that by means of these expenditures, the property has been preserved and the recourse of the creditor thereby secured to him upon it - the same preference is therefore given to the Tiers-détenteur for these ameliorations as to the person saving property from loss or destruction by his means or exertion - and he would be entitled to retain the possession of the property till these expenses were reimbursed.

Poth. Hyp. p. 439. §. 4. "Le tiers détenteur peut opposer par exception contre l'action hypothécaire, qu'il a fait des impenses necessaires à l'heriage hypothéqué, et qu'il ne peut être contraint à le délaisser qu'il ne soit remboursé des dits impenses - ou du moins que le créancier ne lui donne caution de faire monter l'heriage à si haut prix, qu'il en soit remboursé sur le prix".

As to the impenses utiles, under which head those in question may be considered, the Tiers Detenteur, was also entitled to be reimbursed - but the authors are not agreed as to the right of preference in this respect - Loiseau. Jr. du Degueut. holds that in this case the Tiers Detenteur has a privilege to be reimbursed only on, la plus value du prix, of the property in consequence of such improvements - others, that although the Tiers detenteur had a privilege upon the fonc amelioré yet it was limited to the sole object of amelioration and not to the whole fonc - this however might in many instances be impracticable, as in the present instance, where unless by means of a ventilation, no actual separation could be effected. The principle of Loiseau ~~to whom~~ seems to be that generally adopted, and that which the Court would be disposed to follow, could it be made to apply in the present instance,

The reason why the tiers detenteur is privileged for his impenses utiles, is, upon the principle, that what he has been laying out in the property in this way should not go towards the part. of another mans debt - neminem equum est cum alterius detrimento locupletari - but in this case the plaintiff does demand any of the Defendant's improvements and does not extend so far as to recoup these improvements - he demands only that out of the value of the lot as it stood before any improvements were made upon it, ~~that~~ he shoued be paid his debt, this is reasonable and right, and the Defendant can oppose nothing in law ~~what~~ to resist it - If the lot was worth more than would pay the piff before the improvements were made on it by the Defendant can be compel the Piff to pay these improvements before he can claim what was sufficient to satisfy him before any improvements were made? - Certainly not. - The Case would have been different had the Piff's demand been so great as to comprehend a part or the whole of those improvements beyond the original value of the lot, because it might then have been said, and with Justice, that the piffs security for his debt could not be considered to extend to what had no existence at the time - But it is argued

that if the Defendant abandons the lot, his improvements will be sold with the lot, and he will thus run the risk of losing them, or a part of them - But it should be considered that in this Case, these improvements are not sold to satisfy the Plaintiff's demand, ~~but to satisfy~~ ^{after satisfying} necessity, and because they cannot be separated from the soil - The whole produce of the sale to the full extent at least of those improvements will go to the Defendant - and on this account it is not necessary that the Plaintiff should give any kind of security to the Defendant for the reimbursement of that upon which he makes no claim, and from the apparent value of the property, neither the demand of the Plaintiff, nor the charges of a decret, can be admitted as a ground for ordering this security -

+ Path. Hyp. p. 440
It may appear singular that in a question of right between the parties, any discretionary power should

+ This may account in some measure for the various opinions ^{held} decisions given on this point, grounded on the more or less trouble ^{of} the case
" tout depend beaucoup de l'arbitrage du Juge,
" parceque, c'est plutot par un principe d'équité, que
" par les règles générales du Droit, qu'un acquereur
" evince a droit de se faire tenir compte des Améliorations
" de l'Immeuble qu'on lui enlève - C'est donc au
" Juge à bien examiner les circonstances pour ne pas
" priver l'acquireur des dépenses raisonnables, que le
" propriétaire en paie, ou du faire lui-même, et pour
" ne pas trop surcharger l'évitant"

N^o 1878.Martigny }
Choquet }

If donation on condition of paying a rent or pension
 creates between father & son carry land & rents, mens
 when that pension could be considered as the value
 of the land given -

See authorities in the case of De longueuil vs. Charon
 Feb^r Term 1822.

Campbell
n^r
Lefebvre

Action on note - Plus prescription offre
his oath, qu'il n'a droit rien au Denarois
Postier Ob. N° 718 - Ces prescriptions sont uniquement
fondées sur la présomption du paiement. -

Id N° 719. Le Débiteur à qui le serment est déféré,
est tenu de jurer que la somme qui lui est demandée
n'est pas due -

Pas due - must mean to say because the party has
paid, & not that he never owed, because prescriptions
~~carrying wth it~~ a presumption of paye the oath of
the party must extend to this fact -

Post. N° 718. - refers to 10^e art. of 1^e Tit. ordre 1673 -
Pourront néanmoins les marchands & ouvriers déposer
le serment à ceux auxquels la fourniture aura été
faite - les assigner, - et les faire interroger -

Post. wrote also on the Cout. d'Orléans - & the 265^e
art. of that Custom says - in fine - Néanmoins si celui
qui se prétend créancier, veut du paiement croire
sa partie par serment, elle sera tenue prêter le serment,
et où elle ne voudroit jurer avoir payé, en ce cas
sera tenue payer, nonobstant ladite prescription,
en affirmant par le serment -

Bonnie on the 10^e art. Code March. lt. 1^e says - D'ailleurs
comme la prescription en ce cas n'est autre chose
qu'une présomption de paiement - pour s'en
servir il est juste d'affirmer le paiement -

See what the commentator on the 126^e & 127^e
art. of our own Custom says -

Néanmoins, parceque cette fin de non recevoir
est fondée sur la présomption du paiement fait
par le Défendeur, cet usage s'est introduit
contre les termes express de la Coutume et de

2 Bouyon. 579

l'ordonn^e d'obliger le Défendeur à prêter le serment qu'il a payé, si non, de la condamnation au paiement de la somme demandée — la prescription n'étant pas introduite en faveur des personnes des mauvaises foies. D'où il s'ensuit, que tout Défendeur opposant la fin de non-recevoir doit alleguer le paiement par lui fait — et pour cet effet il ne doit pas refuser le serment &c.

Denoixart. V^e Prescription. N^o 101. Il vient d'être dit que malgré la fin de non-recevoir résultant de la Coutume, on oblige le Défendeur d'affirmer qu'il a payé — Nous ajouterons qu'il faut même que le Défendeur dès l'origine de la contestation (et sans se départir d'il vient de la fin de non-recevoir résultante de la Coutume) soit dans le cas de pouvoir opposer pour défense « qu'il a payé, qu'il ne doit rien, et qu'il offre de l'affirmer » —

citez cas q M. le Due de Bouillon —

But putting all these authorities out of the case what does our own Stat. Law say? "Shall, if thereunto required, make oath that such promissory note is bona fide discharged and paid". —

As to right of compensation set up by Defendant in his answer, see Poth. Obl. N^o 677 —

The Statute of Limitations proceeds upon the supposition that the debtor has paid, but after a lapse of time may have lost his voucher — and therefore where he acknowledges that the debt has not been paid, it takes the Case out of the Statute 5. C. L. v Sch. 76. & W. J. Bayley. —

Barsaloue
Orkney }
Gray opp.

Privilege of oporant on sale of house
for rebuilding a part thereof on question
of privilege between him & the baillair
du fond —

See Denys & Poulege N° 33. b 42 —

Domat liv. 3. tit. 1. li. 5. §. 9. —

2 Gr. Comr. on art 170. p. 1219. N° 20. 21

N° 20. says. En quatrième lieu, le maçon, et les autres ouvriers qui ont travaillé à la construction ou au rétablissement d'une maison ou d'autre ouvrage, ont un privilège sur la maison ou sur l'ouvrage sans qu'il soit besoin de stipulation

N° 21. En cinquième lieu, la loi Creditor, donne
privilegi à celui dont les deniers ont été employés
à la construction d'une maison — creditor qui ob-
restitutioem edificiorum crediderit, in pecuniam quam
crediderit, prorogatum exigendi habebit — et cela sans
stipulation, quoique celui qui a prêté pour
l'acquisition d'une maison ne l'ait pas autrement
que si il l'a stipulé — La raison de la différence
est, qu'il n'y a aucune nécessité qui oblige à
faire l'acquisition d'une maison, comme d'en
faire la réparation et le rétablissement —

2 Boujon Tit. 8.
des Etats. p. 733.
N° 155 —

Ce privilège a lieu en faveur des ouvriers, selon
moi, encore qu'il n'y ait aucun devis ni marché
par écrit, pourvu que les ouvrages soient constants
ou que s'ils sont déniés, ils puissent être vérifiés
et que l'ouvrier ait agi dans un sens compétent —
sa qualité, ainsi que la cause de sa créance —
est évidemment du titre, fondant dans sa
personne

personne un juste privilége —

Note - Telle est la jurisprudence du Chatellet - voyez Duplessis des Executions liv. 1. p. 618 - En effet, leur qualité et l'existence de leurs ouvrages qui ont augmenté le prix de la chose décrite, fondent un privilége, qui par la cause certaine qui le produit, est indépendant d'un devis, leur qualité et la nature de leurs créances les mettant, pour ainsi dire dans la classe du Vendeur qui a un privilége incontestable sur la chose par lui vendue, je n'y vois pas de différence —

Jugt. du 20 Avril 1818 - M. Neder & al. vs Hazan
et Bangs opp.

(174)

N^o 2
Bourdon
&
Sarrault }
&
E. Contre }

See statement made of case -

(175)



(176)

De Rouville
v.
Gaucher et
Bordalais -

The declaim states - That on 28. Mai. 1822.
the Plaintiff obtained Letters Patent from His
Majesty authorising him to make a new
Territ or the Seignories of Rouville and
Chambly, the said letters Patent addressed to the
Chief Justice & Judges of the s^e Court, requiring them
upon the demand and requisition of the Plaintiff, that
they should make known as well by public notice
and publication at the church door of the parish
or parishes within the limits of the said Seignories
during three successive Sundays, as by notices fixed
up in the common and ordinary places of public
resort within the said Seignories, that all vassals,
Censuairis, tenants, holders of long leases, holders
and possessors of lands or landed property, subject
to any rights of Justice, Domains, Cens. rents &c
or other seigneurial rights due to the Plaintiff as Sirs
of the said Seignories, should appear before such
notary or notaries as should be appointed by the
said Judges, and within the time to be by them
prescribed, in order to take fealty & hommage, and give
in writing aven & de nombrent, and a true and
faithful declaration of the names, butts & bounds
rents revenues and charges as will in lieu as return
of the property and estate they possess, to produce the
titles by virtue whereof they hold the same, clear them-
selves by oath as to the truth of all such aven & de nombrent
and declaration, and pay the arrears due to the s^e Seign^r
and for which purpose that the said tenants & proprietors
should be held and constrained by all legal course, and
in case of refusal, opposition or delay, that the said
parties be held to appear before the said Judges or others
competent

competent, in case the said plaintiff should maintain the said aven, denombrement & declarations not to be true, requiring the said Judges to cause the premises to be measured in the presence of the parties, or after due notice given, and to fix boundaries and limits where requisite - and that of the whole there should be made by the said Notary or Notaries, a register or papier Terrier, in which shall be entered and transcribed by him or them the declarations of all and every the Diefs, houses, lands, meadows, vines, and other inheritances belonging to the said Seignories of Roville and Chambly, for such ends and purposes as to rights and Justice shall appertain - By which Letters Patent it is also enjoined to all bailliffs of the said Court upon demand made, what for the due execution of the said letters patent, they should make all necessary commandments, citations & other necessary acts; and in order to ascertain the true amount of the said rights that Notaries, writers, Clerks, Prothonotaries & other public officers having in their possession any deeds of sale, transfer, exchange, donation, or other acts relating to the said Seignories, that they be particularly required to exhibit & produce the same before the said Judge in order to be seen, compared, and copies thereof collated on the originals be given, in the presence of the parties or after due notice -

That by sentence and order of the said Court, was date the 13th day of June last (1822) upon the petition of the Plaintiff by his attorney, requiring the execution and confirmation of the said letters patent, ordered the said letters patent to be enregistered in the Registers of the said Court, to be executed according to their form and tenor, and further ordered hereupon, that by

M^r

Mr Jean Bap^t. Tache, and his confrères, notaries, whom
 the Count appointed for this purpose, the said acts of fei
 hommage, aveux, denombrements, declarations, acknowledgements
 and all other acts for renewing the rights and titles to the
 lands in the Seigniories of Rouville & Chambly, should
 be taken and received, with injunction to all vassals,
 censitaires, tenants, holders of long leases & possessors
 of lands and landed estates in the said Seigniories, to
 appear before the said notaries in 15 days after the
 publication of the said letters and of the said sentence,
 at the place in the said Seigniories to be designated
 in the said publications, and there to bring, exhibit
 and communicate the titles of their lands & properties
 and then pass their acts of fealty & hommage, avena
denombrement, declarations and acknowledgements
 of all the property & estates which they possess in the
 said Seigniories as well in Tief as in roture charged
 with rights and revenues, and to declare the same by
 butts and bounds with their names, and the charges
 to which they are subject, on pain of forfeiture, and
 to be proceeded against them by Saisie, and moreover to comply
 with the tenor of the said letters, which should be —
 for this purpose published and fixed up at the diligence
 after the said plif during three Sundays successively, as
 well by publication after divine service in the morning
 at the parish churches of the places within the limits
 of the said Seigniories, enjoining all bailliffs that for
 the execution of the said letters they do all necessary acts &
exploits in this behalf — which said letters Patent were in
 consequence on the said 13th day of June last registered
 in the Registers of the said Count in conformity to the said
 sentence —

that

That in conformity to the said Letters Patent, and the said sentence of the said Court, the Plaintiff caused to be published and fixed up during three Sundays successively, the said letters patent and sentence, in the parishes of St. Hilaire, and St. Jean Baptiste west, on the 11th and 18th days of August last at the door of the church or parish chapel of St. Hilaire in the said Seigniory of Rouville, and on the same days at the neighbouring church vizt. the Church of St. Mathieu de Beloeil, where the parishioners of St. Hilaire attend divine service, when none is held in their own church, and there being no mass said on the said days at the said Church of St. Hilaire - on the 25th day of the said month of August at the church door of the parish of St. Hilaire where mass was that day performed - and on the 18th and 25th days of the said month of August and the first day of the present month of Septe at the door of the parish church of St. Jean Baptiste in the said Seigniory of Rouville, with commandment as above directed -

That the Defendant possesses for several years past a lot of land or concession en roture in the said Seigniory of Rouville in the parish of St. Jean Baptiste, west
(lot described)

That the s^r Defendant hath not hitherto complied with the said letters patent and sentence of Confirmation therof but hath hitherto neglected to bring, exhibit & communicate the titles of his lands and property before the said Mr Tache' qd his confidem notaris at the place designated, and to make and pass before them his acknowledgments and declarations of all the property and real estate which he possesses and holds in the said Seigniory of Rouville whereby he hath incurred the pains and penalties of the law -

Wherefore Plaintiff concludes - that Defendant be condemned to carry, exhibit and communicate the titles of the said lots

lots of land which he possesses in the said Seigniory
of Rouville, before the said Mr Tache & his confrere notaris
or such others as may be hereafter appointed for the
execution of the said letters Patent, in the Seigniorial
House of the pliff in the said Parish of St. Ibilain
and there to make and pass at his proper costs and
charges, his declarations and acknowledgments
of all the property and estate which he possesses in
the said Seigniory of Rouville and to furnish a copy
thereof to the said pliff, and this within 8 days from
the service of the order to be hereupon given - in
default whereof that the D^efende^t be thereunto held
and constrained, in regard and in this behalf the Pliff
reserves to himself the right to take conclusions -
and the pliff further conludes that the D^efende^t
be held and adjudged to pay to the Pliff all the rights
Lods & ventes, Ans & rentes and arrears thereof that
shall be ascertained to be due, either by the exhibition
of the titles of the s^o C^onde^r and his declarations
and acknowledgments, or upon enquest before this
Court, and in ~~damages~~ and intent to the Pliff
to the amount of £50 - the whole with fine off-

Plea - denies facts stated in declaration - that
action cannot be maintained -

1st That proclamations stated in Decls were never
made according to Law, & in particular the Letters
patent were never read & published at the door of the Parish
Church of St. Jean Bapt^e.

2^d That supposing pliff proceeding to be regular in
regard of the proclamations, the D^efende^t on several occasions
went to the Seigniorial house of Pliff, at a great distance
from his place of residence, and remained there the 10.th 11.th & 19.th

days

days of September last, in order to give in his acknowledgement and make his declaration of his titles and possessions which the Plaintiff is entitled to demand for the perfecting his Paper Terrier, which Mr Tache, the person appointed for this purpose did not think fit to receive, when thereunto required by the said Defendant on the 19th Sept^r when the Defendant offered to him a larger sum for doing so than by law he was entitled to demand, as appears by the protest made in this behalf as well as by Plaintiff as also D^r Tache -

3rd That the difficulties which then arose between the parties were occasioned by the pretention of the Plaintiff to have new titles different from those he was entitled to demand by law, which however had been demanded and obtained from several Censitaires of the s^r Seigniory, the Defendant having offered, as he now again offers to make the acknowledgement and declaration which by law he is bound to make of his titles and possessions and refusing to submit to the exorbitant charges to which he is not bound and against which he hath hitherto acquired prescription, having possessed by himself and his predecessors for them and even for thirty years without having complied therewith -

4th That Defendant prays out of the communication, exhibition and production which he now makes in this cause of the titles he holds of the lot of land described in the declaration, as well as of certain other parcels of land which he possesses in the said Seigniory, which titles are mentioned and described in his list of exhibits herewith filed and to which he refers - the Defendant at the same time praying out of the offer he now makes to make the declaration and acknowledgement which can be by law required of him in regard of his said possessions, under such delay and in such manner as this Court shall direct, it being well understood

understood that the whole shall be at the expense
of the plaintiff, as being the cause shew'd

5³ That moreover the plaintiff's conclusions are
irregular and vague on the score even of the communication
and acknowledgment demanded, the Plaintiff not
being entitled to demand ^{that} the said communication and
acknowledgment should be made before any other
person than Mr Tache, — and in this respect the
conclusions do not accord with the premises statut
in the declaration —

6⁴ That the Plaintiff has irregularly and wrongfully
joined ('cumule') an action for Lods & Rentes, with
an action for the exhibition of titles of the lands of
the Defendant possessed in the said Township, the
more so, as the Plaintiff has received the Lods & Rentes
which were due to him by the Defendant upon the deed
of purchase of the said lot of land mentioned in the
declaration, which cumulation of actions can be
only to create expenses in this Court, ruinous to the
parties —

7⁵ That Defendant owes no Cens & rents to the Plaintiff
being cleared and discharged of all arrears thereof as
appears by the Plaintiff except of the 8th day last, since
which time no Cens & rents have become due to the said
Plaintiff —

8⁶ That at all events this action is ill founded in
this Court for a demand of large sums of money
being due to Plaintiff for Lods & Rentes & Cens & rents, & for
exhibition of titles, when nothing is due to Plaintiff, & when
Plaintiff has had exp. of titles made to him at time Lods & rentes
were paid — wherefore on —

To

To this plea a general answer was put in denying all the facts, and the insufficiency thereof

The points raised by the plea may be reduced to the following -

1. That proclamations were not made, nor letters patent published as set forth in Declaration. -

2. A compliance by Diford^t with the requisitions of the letters Patent - his altered^t at the manor house of Puff on 10, 11, & 12^t days of Sept^r in order to make his declaration and acknowledgement - his offer to do so - and a refusal on the part of the Commissioners to receive his declaration - his tender of a larger sum of money to the Commissioner than he was entitled to demand - and Prolets^t on refusal to accept

3. A claim on part of Puff to have new titles from Diford different from those he had a right to claim - the Diford refusing to submit to the usual habeante compositions, and charges made by Puff - at which Diford^t had a good presumption -

4. Claims act of the exhibition & production of the title of the lands he possesses in the Puff Signory - consenting to make such declarations & acknowledgement in regard therof as this Court shall direct - but at the expense of the Puff

5. That conclusions of debt are inconsistent & irregular as Puff cannot demand that Diford^t should make his declaration & acknowledge before any other person than Mr Farke - who is the person legally appointed for this purpose.

6. Cancellation of actions, 1^o. For Lands & Estates & 2^o. for lost & y^r titles

7. Diford^t discharged from all arrears by receipt of 8^o Law^r last, since q^t time which has become due to Puff

8. Action ill founded - as it concludes to pay of money which is not due & for exp. of title, of which he has communication when Lands & Estates were paid -

The facts of the case as they appear before us, are, that the Letters Patent, the Ind^d. of Confirmation, and notes to the Censitaires of the Dist^t, were published & notified in the manner time & place stated in the declaration, by a person calling himself Madore Isidore Racicot, one of the bailiffs of this Court - in consequence of which many of the those Censitaires appeared & made their declarations - On the 10th ~~of~~^{the} Sept^r last the Dept^r in company with several other tenants to the number of 30 or 40 - appeared to make their declaration, but it was then too late in the day and they were directed to return next day - On the 11th they returned about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, but either apprehending difficulty, or imposition, they were accompanied by a notary public, and again both severally & in a body required the commissioners to receive their declarations and acknowledgments - One of them Deshantel gave in his papers - they were found defective, and returned to him - another of them Nadeau, gave in his, and it was found that in regard of one of his lands his papers were regular - on this his declaration and acknowledgment was made out, and was found to be correct and approved by him - but he refused to sign it - until he should be informed what he had to pay, and tendered of which was not accepted - This refusal appears to have originated by the information that some of the Censitaires had paid 12f^r - for their declaration which was considered as an over charge, and Nadeau conceiving he might be bound to pay the same thing in case he signed his declaration, refused

sign it - upon this it appears a protest which had been prepared was made in the name & behalf of all those persons, and this protest contains a pretty correct statement of the facts as far as it goes, it may right to refer to it
(Here take in protest) —

These Censitaires, of whom Dft^r is one, appeared again before the Commissioner on the 19th Sept^r and in it they again state their willingness & readiness to make their declarations and acknowledgments, which they say, could not before be done from the multiplicity of business then in hand at the manor Hause — They then state, that they had made out a statement and Inventory of all the deeds & titles, in order to facilitate the taking of the declarations & acknowledg^ts of each of them according to an annexed formulay, and that they are willing to execute new titles to the Seignior upon his paying the Costs thereof, they being ready & willing to pay ~~three~~^{& no more} lives for their acknowledgments for each lot of land they severally possess, which sum they offer to the said Commissioner — They acknowledge the obligation under which they are to make their said declarations & acknowledgments upon the Seignior complying with the law in force in this Province, that they hold all the deeds and titles of the parties according to the Inventory thereof, and now offer the same to the Commiss^r if he will take their declarations according to the above offer —

What was the answer of the Comm^r (see Protest.) —

It appears further in evidence, that the Dfnd^r owed no rents or revenues to the Plff, at the time of bringing his action and that at the time of paying his Lods & Ventes the Plff never had communication of the Defendant's Deed of purchase under which he holds the land in question. —

From this statement of the Case, the following questions are raised as an objection to the plff's right of action.

1^{re} That the letters patent and Ord^t directing their execution had not been duly and legally published & notified according to the requirements thereof, so as to compel the Defendant and the other censitaires of the Béff to take notice of them -

This objection seems to be founded on a little informality of the Certificate of publication, it being stated in the body thereof to have been made by one Madame Isidore Racicot, but is signed by Marie Isidore Racicot, this informality may affect the validity of this act as an authentic act, and if the merits of this action depended upon this act, we might consider it insufficient to maintain it - This leads us to enquire, what the end and object of publication of the letters patent and Ord^t - is to see if the alleged defect in the present instance be material -

^{# To appear and make his declaration before the Commissioner.}

Although the obligation ^{of} the Censitaire is not established by any article of the Custom, yet it is recognized as a necessary and indispensable right arising out of the nature of the feudal tenur and of that connection which must subsist between Seignior & Vassal - The Seignior had ~~an~~ ^{on} action at law ag^t ~~any~~ each of his tenants individually in order to compel them to recognize him as their Seignior and obtain from them the declaration & acknowledgement under which they held any part of his Estate - This

^{# mode of proceeding by action ag^t. every censitaire of a Seignior, often without meury,}

was considered injurious and expensive to both parties, and recourse was had to the more summary mode of proceeding by calling upon the tenants in a body by a general proclamation and notice at the places of most public resort within the limits of the Seignior, to appear and make their declarations - and to give authority & effect to

4 Hor. 657

Id. 681

^{# mode of proceeding by action ag^t. every censitaire of a Seignior, often without meury,}

4 Hor. 688. g. 10

this

of granting general
commissions to his
judges to call persons
before them for the
ends of justice & for
the particular objects
of a papal bull.

+ failed to appear
or if they —

1 From. 81 +

7. Itini 703.706.

Report v. Terrier

p. 93. —

This mode of proceeding ~~second~~ was by letters patent
were granted by the King, not merely as sovereign, but as
possessing the legislative authority. ^{This} made it impious
on the censitaires after publication & notice at the church
door, & other places, to appear & make their declarations before
the Commissioner who had been appointed for this purpose—
if they were obstinate and would not appear before this
commissioner, they were liable to different penalties, such
as fine, seizure of their lands and the like — if they had
good grounds of objection to make, these were brot before the
competent jurisdiction & there determined — Now what
was the object and intention of this notice & publication at
the church door? The authors say, it was to put the
censitaire in demeure — and to arrest the effect of prescription.
for until this demeure was ascertained, the Seignior could
not use any of the extraordinary remedies granted to him
under the lettres Royales, of fine or seizure of the lands —
and the Puff in this case proceeded in this extraordinary
manner, the validity of this demeure under the certificate
of publication & notice made by him, would have been
a primary question — but where the Seignior proceeds
by the usual and ordinary course of law, which he
could have taken even if no lettres de Terrier had been
granted to him, can the Defendant avail himself of the
want of notice by ^{any} regular certificate of the publication
thereof? He certainly might to a certain extent — he
might have ~~alleged~~, that had he been duly notified
of the letters patent obtained by the Puff — he would
have complied with the requirement of those letters without
the necessity of an action, and upon this to tender that
declaration and acknowledgment which he was bound
like the bona fide debtor, who tenders what he owes —
in that case it would have been matter of consideration how far
the censitaire should be harassed by such expensive litigation —

But in this, as in every other action, where want of notice, or of a previous demand, is not the ^{only} ground of defense relied upon, but where other matters are alleged to exonerate the Defendant from the action, the want of publication & notice in this case, like the want of a previous demand in any other, ceases to be a question ~~otherwise~~ material for the decision of the contest — ~~and we therefore think, that~~ ~~as the want of the certificate~~ But how is the fact in this case, the Defendant not only avers that the publication in question was made, but his whole defense rests upon the principle that he had done, and was still willing to do, all that the Plaintiff was entitled to demand under the said publication & notice of his having obtained the lettres de Térrier — This part of the plea cannot therefore be maintained —

On 2^d point — This seems to contain ^{an offer to} the substantial part of the defense to the action — 1. ~~and affirms~~ to comply with the requirements of the lettres de tenir — Defendant attended at the manor house of Plaintiff during 3 days, the 10th, 11th & 12th Sept. and a tender of money for payt. of the Commissioner fees on taking the Defendant's acknowledgment — The Defendant appears to have made common cause with 50 or 60 other persons who had assembled for the same purpose, whose object it was ^{Def't. of other tenants} to give in their declarations under certain restrictions, namely that the emoluments of the Commissioner should be previously ascertained, and on his refusal to state his claim a tender was made of 2/6 for the Defendant's acknowledgment for each lot of land he possessed — The whole of the Defendant's conduct seemed to be regulated upon this principle that he was willing to make his declaration but he would not submit to the unlimited or arbitrary charge of the Commissioner for his trouble — ^{had} ~~the~~

The Commissioner made any charge, or had no any fixed rule to guide us in saying what he ought to charge, we could then determine the question - but there being nothing settled on this subject, the allowance to the Commissioner must depend on a quantum meruit, which cannot be known until the labor is performed - of this the Commissioner seemed to be aware, and declined making any fixed charge - The Defendant was certainly wrong in declining to give in his declaration, when he found this to be the case - and it was equally wrong to suppose that he would be liable to pay whatever the Commissioner should ask, after signing his declaration - As to the unreasonable delay occasioned to the Defendant ^{by refusing to wait} ~~in admitting~~ him to make his declaration, & by obliging him to wait on the 10th 11th & 19th Sept: had this arisen from any fault of the Plaintiff or his Commissioner or by undue influence given to others, it might afford cause of complaint - but this delay was in a great measure occasioned by the Defendant himself, who chose to associate himself with a number of others and to act in a body, and they had a point to carry, they were assisted with the advice and ministry of notaries - they had statements of their titles to draw up, and protests to make - and independently of the impossibility of so many persons making their declaration in a day, or even several days, it was the duty of the Commissioner to act with prudence and circumspection, when he saw a disposition to cast off any oversight on his part - The Defendant had a duty to perform towards his Superior and nothing but the discharge of it can exonerate him - and although he might chuse to perform this duty in person, yet, if his time was of so great value to him, he had the means of substituting another to do it for him -

As to the 3^d Point - there is no proof before the Court

as to the 4th point - Affairs to make such exhibition of titles
as the Count shall direct -

5th Point - Declaration - demands that defendant should make
his declaration before any other person ~~not~~ than Tache
- This not irregular as another might be appointed in
the place of Tache. -

6th point - Cumulation of actions - For Lods & Rentes - & for
exhibition of titles. -

7th - owes no arrears - The demand for arrears of
Lods & Rentes & other Seignorial dues being
merely a conclusion consequent upon the
declaration & exhibition of titles, the
argument produced by defendant will of
course discharge this part of the demand -

8 - Action is ill founded, as it concludes for the
payt. of money not due - and for the
exhibition of titles of which Puff had
communication when Lods & Rentes were paid

But this exhibition of titles being made only in
regard of that particular title on which the Lods
& Rentes were paid, does not satisfy the demand
of the Puff, nor the obligation of the Defendant which
extends to all the titles in the Defendant's possession
up to the original bail à sens, so as to regulate
the respective rights of the parties under the
bail à sens, & besides the exhibition of titles
for the payt. of the Lods & Rentes, did not preclude
the right of the Seignior to demand a new exhibition
in order to perfect his papier Tresser. -

Lacroix. — } action en retrait Conventionnel
Turgeon. — }

Declar states that by Deed of Concession of 28 Mai 1761, Susanne Piot de la Langloisserie, seignior of Miller Isles, that is to say of that part of the Seignory of Blainville, of which the platt is now the proprietor and possessor, granted a lot of land to one Pierre Paschal, upon certain terms and conditions therein expressed, and among others, upon the following reservation. " et en cas de vente de tout ou partie de la dite Concession, se reserve ladite Dame Seigneur le droit de le reuter par preference, en remboursant le Detenteur du prix principal de son acquisition et loy aux courts."

That on 16^e April 1765. — André' Colin at Saliberté as Tutor to the minor children of Pierre Paschal then deceased, and Marie Josette Colin his widow by & with the consent & authority of Paul Desjardins her then husband, sold the said lot of land to one Louis Urbain

That by act of 21 Aug^t 1768 the said Louis Urbain his wife sold the said lot of land to one Jean Louis Delage. —

That by deed of Cession of 28 Decr 1789, the said Jean Louis Delage & his wife sold the said lot of land to Jos. Hubert Lacroix. —

That by deed of 14 June 1793, the said Joseph Hubert Lacroix sold the said lot of land to one Frank Lapierre. —

That by deed of Donation of 5 Janv 1807, the ^{widow} ~~successor~~ of the late François Lapierre, conveyed the said lot of land to Paul Filatreau, Fran^r. Lapierre, Ant^r. Maisonneuve the minor children of the late Ant^r. Lapierre, and to Jos. Turgeon the Dapt^r —

That by Deed of 9th June 1814, the said Antoine Maisonneuve, sold their right in said lot of land to Jos. Turgeon, the Df^t

That by deed of 31 Aug^t 1815, the said Paul Filiault, sonther Donee of the widow of the said late Frans. Lapierre, made over their respective rights in the said lot of land to the said Jos. Turgeon

That the plff as proprietor of that part of the Seigniory of Blainville in which the said lot of land is situated, and holding the rights of the said Susanne Riot, is entitled to exercise the said right of retrait Conventionnel as stipulated in the said deed of Concession, and thereupon concludes, that the Plaintiff be declared by the Court to be entitled to exercise the said retrait Conventionnel on the offer he now makes to pay and reimburse to the s^r Df^t within such delay as the Court shall please to appoint, the price and sum of money which in the said Df^t has paid, or is bound to pay for the said lot of land with all the costs and charges attendant on the perfecting of the said purchase, the amount of which sum of money to be ascertained by authentic acquittances and that thereupon the Df^t be condemned to abandon and deliver up to the plff the said lot of land so purchased and acquired by the said Df^t with all the deeds, titles, rights thereunto belonging also to make and execute a good and sufficient deed of transfer and conveyance thereof before notaries to the said plaintiff, and grant an acquittance and discharge to the said Plff of the monies to be paid

paid and remunerated by him to the said Defendant and in case the said Defendant shall refuse to accept the sum of money so to be tendered to him by the said Plaintiff, that the said Plaintiff be authorized to deposit in the hands of the Prothonotary of this Court such sum of money as this Court shall be pleased to appoint for the price, costs & charges upon the purchase of the said lot of land so made by the said Defendant, there to remain until the plaintiff's demand aforesaid shall have been fully supplied with by the said Defendant and finally that on default of the said Defendant complying therewith the Judge of this Court be held and considered a good and sufficient title to the said Plaintiff of the aforesaid lot of land and that Defendant be condemned in Costs.—

Plea.— 1st of Pecuniary exception — That the action cannot be maintained, even if the facts stated in the Declaration were true, yet the pretended right of retrait of the Plaintiff claims if ever it existed has become prescribed in law even according to the facts stated in the 1st Declaration. That the droit de retrait claimed by the Plaintiff, not being a right established by the laws of the land but a mere faculté de retrait or réservé, is liable to be prescribed in law, and the lapse of time which has occurred since the 28th May 1761 until the bringing of the present action is more than sufficient to prescribe the right claimed by the present action — which prescription the Defendant now hereby invokes ag^t the said Plaintiff, which is only a personal right and prescribed in thirty years —

That the Plaintiff cannot maintain his present action, inasmuch as the Plaintiff himself is bound in law to warrant and defend the said Defendant from and against all troubles and disturbances whatsoever in the possession and enjoyment of the said lot of land, inasmuch as the Plaintiff is the ^{son} heir at law of the late Jos. Hubert Lacroix, Esq. his father and as such

Choldey

holds and retains the Seignory of Blainville - and
 that the said plaintiff cannot therefore exercise the
 said right of retrait conventionnel, inasmuch as the
 said Jos. H. Lacroix in his life time, by act passed
 the 14 June 1793, before Chatillier & his conform Notary
 did sell and convey the said lot of land, with promise
 of warranty ag^t all troubles, over to one Francois
 Lapierre, without making any mention therein
 of the right of retrait now claimed by the Plaintiff,
 which is an unusual & extraordinary right, and not
 by law attached to the said Seignory of Blainville,
 in the said Jos. H. Lacroix would be bound to
 cause the purchaser of the said lot of land to enjoy
 the same quietly, without let or hindrance of any
 kind, in conformity to the said deed of sale thereto
 made by him, - the Plaintiff therefore as heir of the
 said Jos. H. Lacroix is bound in law to the same
 warranty, and the said defendant being in the right
 of the said Lapierre to whom the said Jos. H. Lacroix
 sold the said lot of ground, is entitled to the same
 warranty from the said Jos. H. Lacroix, as he the said
 Lapierre would have been -

2^e au fond - Facts not true as alleged. -
that, Plaintiff & those in whose rights he claims having
 consented to the sale and alienation of the lot of
 land in question, without claiming the right of
 reserve in question, and by having given Sausine to
 the purchasers of the said lot, they cannot maintain
 the present action -

Reply to exception - That Puff's action is well founded and Puff is entitled to the retrait Conventionnel demanded

That the present action for a retrait Conventionnel is not liable to the 30 years prescription, nor do the facts alleged by the Defendant in his plea entitle him to plead or set up a prescription of 30 years as the claim arises out of the said Puff - That the 30 years prescription if it could be pleaded, can take effect only from the day on which the Defendant exhibited ~~to~~ the Puff, the titles of his purchase of the said lots of land - and further that the right of retrait Conventionnel mentioned in the declaration is not the same as the droit de retrait or Nemine, and liable to 30 years prescription.

That the droit de retrait Comt^t is not liable to the 30 years prescription, inasmuch as at every new purchase of the property, the right of retrait Comt^t becomes renewed in favor of the Creditor of that right, as it has in favor of the Puff in this Case under the Defendant's titles.

That the Puff is not bound in law to warrant the Defendant as the right of retrait Comt^t claimed by the present action, because the said late Jos. H. Lacroix by the sale he made to Frank Lapierre of the lot of land in question, not being then proprietor or Seignior of that part of the said Seigniory of Blainville in qd the said lot of land was situated, and not having sold or alienated the said lot of land as Seignior, did not therefore sell or alienate the same as free and clear of the said right of retrait Conventionnel, but on the contrary alienated & sold the said lot of land subject to all the rights reserved, as made and contained in the deed of Concession, and therefore as the said Jos. H. Lacroix could not in law be held as the Garant of the said

said Defendant neither can the plaintiff as the heir at law
of the said Joz. H. Lacroix, be bound to warrant the said
Defendant.

The other parts of reply containing a general answer
and denegation of law & facts alledged by Oppo.

Dec.^m des Fiefs
par Renaudou
re Droits Seign.

N^o 214-15. 17.

Les droits Seigneuriaux utiles, se divisent en droits
Seigneuriaux Ordinaires, et Droits Seigneuriaux
extraordinaires, ou exorbitants. —

Les droits Seigneuriaux ordinaires sont ceux qui
sont réglés par les Coutumes des lieux, et pour lesquels
il ne faut autres titres que la Coutume dans l'étendue
de laquelle sont situées les Seigneuries, comme sont,
par exemple, les Rachats, les Reliefs, les Quarts,
les Lots & Ventes. —

Les Droits Seigneuriaux extraordinaires, sont
ceux qui ne sont pas accordés aux Seigneurs par les
Coutumes, mais qui sont fondés sur des titres —
particuliers — tels sont les droits de Corvées, de
Foyers & marchés, les peages, et une grande quantité
d'autres, qui ne sont pas de droit commun, et que
par cette raison on appelle droits exorbitants. —

219

Il n'en est pas de même à beaucoup près des
droits Seigneuriaux exorbitants — il faut pour
les établir des ~~bons~~ titres en bonne règle, et il faut que
la possession soit absolument conforme au titre,
sinon, elle y est restreinte. —

A distinction has been taken between the retrait conventionnel, in this case, and the droit de renier or faculté de rachat.

There seems to be no material ground of distinction between these, as to the rights accruing to the parties under this kind of retrait or droit de renier. The appearance of a distinction seems to be taken by Mr Pothier in his preliminary article upon this kind of retrait, when he says, "par droit de retrait conv^e nous n'entendons pas ici le droit de renier — nous entendons ici par le nom de retrait conventionnel le droit qui naît d'une Convention apposée lors de l'alienation qui a été faite de l'héritage, par laquelle celui qui l'a aliené a stipulé que lui & ses successeurs auroient le droit, toutes les fois que l'héritage sroit vendu, soit par l'acquéreur, soit par ses successeurs, d'avoir la préférence sur les acheteurs et de prendre leur marché."

But by this observation Mr Pothier does not mean to point out any other distinction, than the one he thus expresses, namely the condition upon which the right of rachat, ~~ou renier~~ was exercised, distinguishing this respect from the droit de renier, where the right can be exercised by ^{first} the purchaser. The true characteristic which ~~forms the~~ distinguishes all this kind of droit de rachat, consists in this, that it is founded in the special contract and agreement between the parties, and liable to such terms, conditions and modifications as they shall see fit to appoint — different in this respect from the retrait lignage & rachat Feodal which ~~are~~ exist by the mere effect & operation of law.

4. Henrys 313. Plaut. 19

Brittonnus v^e
Retrait.

1. Gr. Com^u p. 435,
art. 20. cte 1.

Henrys. Brittonnus & others, describe the
Retrait Conventionnel in this manner - " Le
Retrait Conventionnel, s'appelle, faculté de rachat
ou de remise - c'est le droit que le vendeur a en
vertu de la stipulation faite par le contrat de
vente de rentrer dans l'héritage par lui vendu
en rendant le prix. -

But what do all these words, retrait, remise
faculté de rachat, droit de reulation, mean -
they apply only to the different modifications, terms
and conditions upon which, a person alienating
his property, may again take it back ~~again~~,
and we find in the Rips^u v^r Retrait - one
general definition which is made to apply to
~~the whole~~ every species of redemption of property
whether by contract or by custom -

It says - " Le Retrait en general, est une faculté
introduite par la bienséance, la Convention, ou
la Coutume de la situation, lorsqu'il s'agit de
fond, accordée à une ou plusieurs personnes
successivement, de se faire subroger à la place
de l'acheteur de la chose sujette à Retrait, en
remboursant à l'acheteur dans le temps fixé, le
prix principal, les frais, et loyaux couts légitim.
faits à l'occasion de l'achat, et à la charge
de requérir cette subrogation dans le temps fixé
par la Coutume ou par la Convention -

Cette définition embrasse toutes les espèces de
retrait + en all 21 in number +

But

But it is contended that the prescription pleaded by the Defendant will not apply, first, because no prescription can avail agt it, as it ^{is} a right attached to the soil, and because the Defendant by his deed acknowledges to hold it subject to all ^{the} conditions of the original grant or deed of Concession — and 2^d because the prescription of the 30 years will not apply or run from the deed of Concession, but only from the time that the Plaintiff or the person whom right he holds could have exercised the right of retrait.

As to the first objection — the right here ^{stated} altho' it regards the soil as the object of it, yet being a right arising out of the convention of the parties and not by operation of law, prescription will take effect agt it, the maxim being, "que tout ce qui tombe en Convention, tombe en prescription"

Renaudot. Difs. Fev.
Tit. Bannalites. p. 209.

This is not a Seigniorial right, and no purchaser was obliged to take notice of it, unless by ^{personally} he could bound himself, unless he had purchased subject to this condition by express stipulation, and none of the deeds of sale subsequent to the deed of concession, appear to contain any stipulation to this effect — This retrait, being in the Custom of Paris a droit extraordinaire, is also subject to be devolved by the decret — And although the prescription pleaded by the Defendant cannot be ^{revised} referred to date from the date of the deed of Concession (28 May 1761) — yet it will run from the date of the sale made by the representative of Pierre Paschal the original grantee to Louis Urbain, that is, from 16th April 1765, when the right of retrait became

became open - soon which time the 30 years
prescription will have been acquired - That
Louis Urbain & the subsequent purchasers of
the land, by paying the taxes & rents & obtaining
possession on their respective titles, cannot be
considered to have acknowledged a right which
their deeds ^{do} not mention, and the present deft
is entitled to avail himself of the prescription
which has commenced or been acquired during
the possession of the prior purchasers, because
the prescription of this right when once acquired
cannot be again revived, but the land becomes
forever after exonerated therefrom - And in
this respect a distinction is made between this
and the other kinds of retrait established by
law, which although a particular proprietor
may acquire prescription of them, yet they
revive at every new tenant — See Poth.
Tr. Retrait N° 611, 12, 13. —

As to the Guarantee set up by the defendant
it is also a good plea to the present ^{action} the
Plff as heir of Jos. H. Lavoix cannot maintain
it, — Jos. Lavoix by selling the land to Lapierre
without stipulating the right conventional, became
bound to the warranty in question — when he afterwards
became signor of the dist. of Blainville where the said
lot of land was situated, ~~altho'~~ he became vested with
the right of retrait, then was then in his person a
junction

N. Demarre v.
confusion § 3. art. 3.

of the two rights either & ps assue or as it is called a
confusion - or when the two ~~capacities~~^{capacities} of Creditor &
Debtor unite - Lorsque le même homme se trouve à la
fois Créditeur et garant du Crediteur - ce qui equivaut
à être principal Debiteur - Here also we find the
same distinction apply between the the Retrait Seigneur
or Feodal, and the Conventional

Poth. Retraits N° 571 - Le retrait feodal étant établi
par les Coutumes, de même que le lignage, et le
vendeur n'en étant pas garant, le Seigneur est
admis au retrait feodal, quoiqu'il soit devenu
l'héritier du vendeur, ou Caution du Vendeur -

Il n'en est pas de même du Retrait Conventionnel;
le vendeur est obligé de garantir l'acheteur, de même
que de toutes les autres exactions, s'il n'a pas déclaré
par le Contrat que l'héritage étoit sujet à ce retrait.
Il suit de là, que lorsque la vente a été faite sans
cette déclaration, celui à qui le droit de retrait
conventionnel appartient, n'est pas renouvelé à -
l'exercer, s'il est héritier pur & simple du Vendeur,
ou s'il est Caution de la vente, ou héritier d'une
Caution -

V^o935

Mr. Stewart
 v.
 L. M. Lean
 Grece - Opp^t

On opposition of John Wm Grece -

The claim of Oppost. is founded on a deed of Conveyance of the lots claimed from John Lynd, as Atts of Defd by deed executed before Voyer & Lebeau, Notys or Quebec the 16th Sept^r 1803 - It appears also by the evidence adduced that the oppost - by himself & his Agents have been in possessⁿ since that time or soon after - There are some copies of bills of exchange and letters produced by the Oppost - but they are not proved nor admitted -

The oppost. it is however appears defective in this, that there is nothing to show that John Lynd was the Attorney, or had authority to sell the Estate in question - And there is besides a clause in the Dred of Conveyance, which stipulates that Lynd was to within 18 months from the date of the deed, procure from the Defendant a ratification and confirmation of said sale of conveyance so made to Oppost -

There is no replication to answer to Morgan's Oppo-

^t made by Lynd
 to the oppost

N-959

Dumont & als
v.
Forgeron - }
Garants -

Action hypothe. agy Defendant for Lods &
Ventes, & for fine for non exhibition of
titles to Phillip as Successor or on don. of 10th Oct. 1817
by Ant. Charon to J.B. Charon his son -

Plea by J.B. Charon, arriu Garant. — That he
is not bound to make any exhibition of title to Phillip the
title in question being a deed of donation from father to
son, which does not carry Lods & Ventes. — That
Defendant as possessr. of land cannot be condemned the fine for the
personal neglect of him Charon, until he should have been
previously adjudged to pay the same. — That the said
Deed of Donation, contained a family arrangement & not
subject to the payment of Lods & Ventes. —

By the deed of Donation of 1^{er} Oct. 1817,
Antoine Charon & wife, give a certain lot of land
& moveables to Jean B. Charon their son in consideration
of his paying them a certain rente & pension viagere —
and further — " avec obligation en outre de la part du
donataire, ainsi qu'il s'y oblige, de faire rapport à
ses dits pere et mere, donateurs d'une somme de cinq
mille livres de vingt coupes en l'espace de dix ans de
ce jour sans intérêts, par paiement de cinq cent francs
chaque année à compter du ce jour. "

On the 15th Janv. 1822 the parties appear before the
Notary, and make the followg declaration — " Lesquels
(Donateurs) vu le rapport d'une somme de cinq mille
livres auquel ils avoient assujettis J.B. Charon dit
Cabane, disent et declarerent par les presentes, qu'ils ne
pretendoient rien en ladie somme de 5000^{fr.} et qu'elle étoit
designée pour être partagée entre leurs Enfans pour observer
une égalité entre eux & led. donataire, laquelle dite somme

"leur

" leur ayant été bien et durement payée par ledit Jean
 " Baptiste Chanon, disent et déclarent en avoir fait le
 " partage de leur vivant entre leurs dits Enfans — n'ayant
 " pu leur partager la susdicta somme, vu que la partie
 " portion que chacun d'eux avoit eu en icelle, n'avoit
 " pu se diviser, et aurait cause du trouble dans leur
 " famille —

If we consider the favorable ~~point of view~~^{light} in which family arrangements are viewed by the law, it will induce us to believe that Lods & Ventes ought not to be allowed on the Donation in question — And although in case of a sale between father & son Lods & Ventes are due, yet this is allowed upon the principle that the Contract was made with the same view and intention as if it had taken place between strangers — The Plffs contend that the contract here in so far as regards the payt. of the 5000^{fr.} must be considered as a sale, as a sum of money paid in order to complete the value of the land conveyed to the Defend^r — The intention of the parties must determine the nature of the Contract, for if this was not a sale, there can be no Lods & Ventes — To judge of this intention we must consider the words used, they are peculiar, and do not convey to the mind in a transaction of this kind between father & son the idea of a sale as between strangers — The Defd^r "s'oblige de faire rapport à ses pere & mere" These words are peculiarly applicable to rights of inheritance and succession, and contemplate a division among children or co heirs — and if ~~it had been said~~ in this

+ it had been said

deed of donation, instead of the words which afterward follow, that this rappoport was to be made, in order to observe l'égalité entre leurs enfans to enable the donors, to enable them "pour faire le partage entre leurs enfans, et pour observer une égalité entre eux" — I believe the Plaintiffs would not have considered themselves entitled to any loss & expenses upon such a stipulation — Now the Parties have by a subsequent act, said, that this was their intention, and that it has been carried into effect, by the payment and application of the money in this way — To this it is objected, that the Parties cannot by any such subsequent act, vary the nature of their Contract, nor deprive the Plaintiffs of rights they might have acquired under the Deed of Donation, — This principle is right, and if it applied here, the transaction would be of no avail in this respect — had this for instance appeared on the face of it to be a deed of sale, or any other transaction where money alone was the consideration, it would not be allowed to the Parties at a future period to explain away their original intentions — but in this case, the words used by the parties are susceptible of that interpretation which has been put upon ^{them}, as the legal and just import of such terms, and it would be extremely hard if by the occasional accidental omission of this explanation in the deed itself, whether by the inattention of the officer drawing the deed or otherwise, ^{No party} should be injured, — ~~where~~ this, it is the duty of the Court to prevent when it can be done consistently with right — A case has been cited, in $\frac{1}{2}$ it is said this question has been determined at the P. C. — the case of Martigny v. Beauchamps — Oct. 1820 — but there is a striking difference in the cases — In

The Case of Beauchamps, the father by the marriage
 Contract of his Son, the Defd - transferred & conveyed
 to him a certain lot of land, of he estimated at
 5000^4 - part of which vizt. 1500, was given as
 a donation en avancement d'honneur, & for which
 the Defd was to account and faire rapport
 to the future successions of his father & another
 the remaining sum of 3500^4 the Defd - became
 bound to pay to his father - and upon this
 latter sum the Court was of opinion that Lord
 Wente were due to the Signer - When the
 intention of the parties was evident, this was
 a sale made of a property to the son for 5000,
and the stipulation that a part of this sum
 1500^4 - was 'en avancement d'honneur & sujet a rapport'
 made it evident that the remaining sum was
 to be paid as the value and consideration of the
 land, was not en avancement d'honneur ni sujet
a rapport - Now in this case the sum to be
 paid to the Donors, is a subject of rapport
 which can be understood only to apply to that
 kind of family arrangement over which
 the Signor has no control -

Authorities -

- last - Tonmarie. Lord & Wente - part 3. ch. 17. p. 30. № 499 -
- Repⁿ de l'In. v^e Lord & Wente, p. 616. §. 8. -
- Herre. Mat. Feod. & Censuiles - 2. Vol. p. 84. -
- Boulain. du Droit Lige. p. 145. -
- Tonmarie. (above) -

and necessary, and all we could do was
to continue our task in the most careful manner.
Sunday, July 26th. Spent the day in
resting and writing up our notes and
memories, and writing up the account of our
journey.

Wednesday, July 27th. Started early this morning
and reached the village of Ampani at 10 a.m.
The road led through a series of hills, and the
country was very dry and yellowish brown. The
temperature was very hot and uncomfortable.
Arrived at Ampani about 1 p.m. There were no signs
of life or habitation, and we passed the afternoon
in the shade of a large tree, resting and writing up
our notes.

Thursday, July 28th. Started early this morning
and reached the village of Ampani at 10 a.m.
The road led through a series of hills, and the
country was very dry and yellowish brown. The
temperature was very hot and uncomfortable.
Arrived at Ampani about 1 p.m. There were no signs
of life or habitation, and we passed the afternoon
in the shade of a large tree, resting and writing up
our notes.

Duplessis }
 Cardinal & }
 al' —

Action en délivrance de legs, founded on
 a will made by the late P^r Cardinal,
 grandfather of plaintiff. Simon Aug^r Cardinal
 Jos. Robreau Duplessis & Marie Cath. Cardinal his
 wife, and Louis Duchantal & Marie ann^r Cardinal
 his wife —

Plea of Simon Aug^r Cardinal — That the last
 will and testament of the late P^r Cardinal, upon
 wh^t the action is founded, is null & void in law, &
 not made according to legal form. —

That it does not appear that the said testament
 was ever read, le & lu, in the presence of the Wit^s
 said to have been present at the passing of the said
 testament. —

Answer to said except^r — That the will is good and
 sufficient and made according to legal form —

Plea of Per. Except^r of Louis Duchantal & wife —

That the matters and things stated & set forth
 in the plff's declaration are not sufficient in law
 to entitle him to maintain his action. —

1. Because the last will in question is wholly
 irregular, insufficient, informal & of no effect in law. —

2. Because the said last will & Testament is not
 made according to the forms prescribed in law, and
 the usages and customs of the Province —

3. Because it does not appear and is not expressed
 that the persons who were before in the presence of
 whom the said last will & testament was executed,
 were good, fit, and sufficient witnesses & of full
 age, as required by law

4th Because the said witnesses are not sufficiently designated, nor described with sufficient accuracy and certainty, nor that they were of full age. —

5th Because the said last will & Testament was not, nor doth it appear, that the same was twice read over to the Testator, in the presence of the witnesses, before & in the presence of whom the said last will & Testament purports to have been made and executed. —

And for further plea denying all the facts stated in the declaration —

Answer to said Excepⁿ is general & contains that same is ill founded & not applicable to the demand stated in the declaration —

The clause in the will stating the manner in which & before whom it had been executed was in the following words —

" Ce fut ainsi fait, dicté, et nommé, par ledt Sr Testateur au dit Notaire, présence du Sieur Bernard Lemire S^r Germain, et Sr Jacques Delaunay,
 " témoins pour ce Béguis, et à lui dit testateur par
 " ledit Notaire, lu & relu; qui a dit le tout bien
 " entendre et y a persisté, révoquant tous autres testaments
 " ou Codiciles qu'il pourroit ci-devant avoir fait, —
 " s'arrêtant aux présentes dis positions qu'il déclare être
 " ses vraies intentions et Ordonnances de dernière volonté.
 " Fait & passé au dit Montréal au Coteau S^r Louis en la
 " maison du dit Sr Pierre Cardinal, Testateur, l'an 1816,
 " le 22^e Jour de Juin après midi, et à ledit Sr Testateur signé
 " avec nous Notaire et témoins, lecture faite & refaite." —

The objections taken to the validity of this will are three —

1. That it is not said that the persons called to assist as witnesses, were fit and competent witnesses as by law required. —
- 2^e That these ^{s^r} witnesses are not designated or described in such manner, as the law requires —
- 3^e That it does not appear that the will was read a second time, lu & relu, in the presence of the witnesses & notary, at time same was executed. —

The 289^{te} art. of the Custom on these points states —

" ceux témoins idoines, suffisants, mâles, et âgés de
 " 20 ans accomplis, et non légitimes — Et qu'il
 " ait été dicté et nommé par le Testateur aux dits
 " Notaires, Curé ou Vicaire général, et depuis à lui
 " relé en la présence d'ceux notaires, Curé, ou Vicaire
 " général et témoins, et qu'il soit fait mention audit
 " testament, qu'il a été ainsi dicté, nommé, & relé." —

Now altho' this law requires certain capacity in the witnesses, yet it is not required that it should be expressed in the will, that they possess such capacity nor that they should be designated in any particular manner — we find no decision upon this article of the Custom to this effect, nor that a will was set aside from want of such sufficient description of the witnesses — we can readily enter into the reason why such a description would be proper, not only as facilitating ~~to~~ a knowledge of the residence, the character, and competency of the witness, but as giving a stronger degree of authenticity to

to the will itself — The mere defect of description of the witnesses cannot annul the act, it would require positive allegation of them as coming within prohibition of the law, to effect this nullity, — The arrest cited from Pothier, Dom. Inst. p. 301 — says "un testament a été confirmé quoique la qualité des témoins n'ait été exprimé par ces termes — principaux habitants de ce village" — but we are not to infer from this that if even then words of description had been wanting, that the will would have been set aside — The first and second objections therefore cannot be considered as sufficient to annul the will, — The attempt by the Plaintiff to make up this want of description of the witnesses by verbal testimony, is wholly inadmissible, as the validity of an authentic act in point of form cannot ~~not~~ be supplied by any external ^{evidence} fact, the testimony therefore of the witnesses — and must be rejected —

The other objection, that the will was not read over a second time to the testator in the presence of the witnesses, appears to be more material, because founded on the letter of the law, and ~~therefore to~~ ^{this} ~~shows that thereby they~~ was wanting ~~considered as constitutive~~ an essential requisite for the validity of the will, — The will before us must be considered as a Testament Solemnel, and as such must be clothed with all the ^{forms the} law requires — If it cannot be considered in this light, it cannot be considered as a will at all, for the evidence of its execution comes before us as being such Testament Solemnel only —

The presence of the witness with the notary seems to be required, not merely when this part of the ceremony of reading the will is gone through, but during the whole time of reducing it into writing, if we were to limit the presence of the witness merely to the latter part of the article - "et deponit a lui relire en presence d'icuns Notaires & Témoin" - it would imply, that this was the only essential part where their presence was necessary, which is not the case - but the objection here taken is, that altho' it appears that the witness were present at one time, it is not said that they were present at the particular time specified in the article as essentially necessary "et deponit relire en presence des témoins" - But the allegation that the witness were present as stated in the part of the sentence must apply to the whole of it, their signature with that of the notary confirming this fact - and it would have required an allegation on the part of the Defende that the witness were not present when the will was read, and an inscr^m en face to be permitted to prove it - That the will should be dictated by the Testator - that it should be read over to him - and that the witness should be present - are essentials for the validity of the Testament Solemnis - but the particular arrangement of this statement, whether at the beginning or end of a will, does not seem so material, as to occasion the nullity of it ^{altho'} not in the order stated in the article - this we find has been so determined by the Courts on different occasions.

See on Glou. 5^e n° 25. when this question is put,
 " Si ces solemnités requises pour la validité des testaments
 & savoir, qu'il a été dicté et nommé par le Testateur aux
 notaires, et à lui relé en présence des notaires, peuvent
 être mises ailleurs qu'à la fin du testament ? —

Il semble que non — parce qu'on ne peut pas écrire
 dans la vérité que ces formalités ont été observées, —
 auparavant que le testament ait été achevé, puisqu'il
 n'est pas vrai auparavant qu'ils y aient été gardées.
 Néanmoins les arrêts ont jugez le contraire à ces thres.

La raison est, que le testament est un individu qui
 ne compose qu'un même acte, et dont par conséquent
 la perfection doit être accomplie dans un même sens.

Ainsi il n'importe pas en quel endroit du Testament
 il soit fait mention qu'il a été dicté, nommé & relé
 parce que cette clause, en quelque lieu qu'elle soit mise
 à son rapport à l'acte, lequel n'est achevé que par
 les signatures des testateurs et des témoins, et qui font
 foi de tout ce qui y est contenu, — de sorte qu'il suffit,
 que les formalités soient observées auparavant les
 signatures, et il importe peu, si c'est au commencement
 ou à la fin, pourvu que les solemnités y aient été
 gardées. —

See also what is said on same glou. N° 29. in
 regard of the Custom of Amiens. —

La Coutume d'Amiens requiert que le testament
 soit relé en présence des témoins et sans suggestion
 d'aucunes personnes — Cette question s'est présentée en
 l'Audience de la Grande Chambre, le mardi 16 Janvier
 1646. si cette clause, relé, est suffisante — ces mots, "en
 "la présence des dits témoins", ayant été omis ? —

Par l'arrêt, le testament a été déclaré bon & valable.

La raison de douter est, que la Coutume d'Amiens
 requiert par forme essentielle dans les testaments
 fait

faits en présence de témoins, qu'ils soient dictés et nommés en leur présence, et depuis aussi relayés en leur présence, il est nécessaire qu'il en soit fait mention et cette clause ne peut point être supplée par équivalence, de même que les termes, "sans suggestion", suivant les arrêts remarqués ci-dessus. —

La raison de la décision est, que la clause de "dicté, nommé, et relayé sans suggestion d'aucunes personnes" sont essentielles dans la Coutume d'Amiens mais que ces termes, en présence des témoins, ne sont pas essentiels, vu qu'ils ne sont requis que pour la solemnité extrinsique du Testament — il suffit qu'il paraisse par l'acte et par la signature des témoins, qu'ils ont été présents au testament, sans qu'il soit requis de mettre que la lecture du testament a été faite en leur présence — ainsi quoique la Coutume de Paris post en l'art. 289. — "et depuis à lui relé en la présence d'icelx notaires, curé ou vicaire général & témoins", on n'a jamais requis, qu'il fut fait mention que le testament a été lu en la présence des témoins —

M. Auzanet, dit, que la lecture du testament doit être faite au Testateur, et que cela est très important, afin qu'il connoisse si son intention a été bien reçue ille par celui qui a écrit sa volonté, mais que les autres formalités de dicté, nommé et relayé, passent à présent en style ordinaire, et ne servent qu'à tendre des pieges à des Curés et Notaires ignorants, et à autoriser des surprises et des suggestions — que pour cet effet en abrogeant ces formalités, qui sont entièrement inutiles, il seroit à propos d'ordonner d'autres formalités plus solides, comme la signature du testament à chaque page, pour éviter le changement des feuilles. —

See also what Riccard says on the same subject

and nearly in the same terms; Vol. p. 340. no 1330. In
These authorities are referred to by the Court not upon
the principle that the words retraen primum des testium
are to be regarded as useless and may be rejected as
such, but to shew in what estimation they were held
even Centuries ago, and to warrant us in adopting
any favorable construction of the terms used in the
will as conforming with the requirements of the
289⁴ art. of the Custom — We know that the opinions
of Courts have changed with the times, and we also
know how strongly the opinions of the Courts influence
upon the Legislature in France, so as frequently to
be the ground work of new Enactments & Regulations,
upon the Jurisprudence of that Country — the ordn.
of 1735 — made for regulating the form of making
wills is a strong proof of this fact — as it has —
adopted the prevailing opinions of the Courts on
this subject, and rejected much of the superfluous
forms which were considered more as snare to —
entrap the ignorant practitioner, than as guards
to protect the real intentions of a Testator —

N^o 2095.
Dom. Rép
r
McCord & Gal

On application to remove P. Verbal of
Gr. Voies, dated 30 Jan^y. 1821, establishing
a bridge and front road along the River
Richelieu from the pointe à la Mule to St. Johns
in the parish of St. Sulpice, Barony of Longueuil.—

Reasons for quashing P. V. and annulling
Judge's homologating the same. —

1^{re} That Court of Quarter Sessions was not competent
to hear & determine the matter &c in s^e P. Verbal, as
on 26th April 1822, the day the same was confirmed
Chas. Wm. Grant, one of the Justices who sat in Judge
thereon was an interested party, being one of the prop^{rs}
of said comprehended in the description of "Tous
les propriétaires depuis les terres n° 41, 42 & 43, en
haut de l'Isle d'Apalme inclusivement jusqu'à la
terre de Boudreau", and therefore the said Chas
Wm. Grant could not sit in Judge on the said
P. Verbal, and therefore Judge null and void

2^o That the said P. Verbal was not made by
the Hon. Louis René Chaussegros Chevalier du Grand
Voyer of the District — and therefore the said Justices
had no power to proceed thereon — The said P. V.—
not having been made conformably to Law, in
this 1st Bœun on 20 Jan^y 1821, the said Gr. Voyer
did not and could not visit the premises in question
the same being then entirely covered with snow
and could not be seen or viewed — 2nd Because
on the said 20th Jan^y 1821, the Gr. V. in drawing up
the said P. V. fixed and appointed no day for the
homologation

Homologation of the said P. V. - and could not then intend to fix the 22^o April 1822 for such day - nor could the said Gr. V. legally fix so distant a day for the homologation of the said P. V. - 3^o Because the said Gr. V. by his said P. V. obliges Ternin & several others complainants to make above 30 acres of the front road of our L^o. H^o. Gaurin one of the intervenis in the said P. V. - and 4^o Because the homologation of the said P. V. was not fixed, demanded nor prosecuted according to law. -

3^o Because the said pretended P. V. after having been deposited in the Office of the Clerk of the Peace for the homologation thereof, and before the said 26^o day of April 1822, was changed and altered, without the Consent of the said Court of Dr. Sessions, the said complainants stating and alledging, that when the said P. V. was deposited in the said office on 12 Ap^o. 1822 the words - "les terres N° 41. 42 & 43, en haut de", having been afterwards added to the said P. V. -

5. Term Reps. 338. King v. Liston. -

Held - that the Court cannot take notice of any fact which does not appear upon the face of the Conviction itself, on the validity of which they are called upon to decide - It must either stand or fall upon its own merits, and the Court cannot take in aid any extraneous information, to support or quash it. -

N° 2125.-

Durocher val
v
Beaubien &
&
Boutillier
Intervs

On question whether a minor, aged 20 years can by will bequeath any thing of her property to her Tutor & to his relations

Art 293^e. art. Courtraine, says, Pour tester des meubles, acquests & conquets immobiliers, il faut avoir accompli l'âge de 20 ans — Et pour tester du quint des propres, faut avoir accompli l'âge de 25 ans. —

292. art. Toutes personnes, saines d'esprit, agées, et usant de leur droits, peuvent disposer par testament et ordonnance de dernière volonté, au profit de personne capable, de tous leurs biens meubles, acquests et conquets immobiliers, et de la cinquième partie de tous leurs propres héritages, et non plus avant, encore que ce fut pour cause pitoyable. —

296.^e. art. Les mineurs et autres personnes, étant en puissance d'autrui, ne peuvent donner, ou lister directement ou indirectement, au profit de leurs Tuteurs, Curateurs, pédagogues, ou autres administrateurs, ou aux enfants des dits administrateurs, pendant le temps de leur administration, et jusqu'à ce qu'ils ayent rendu Compte : peuvent toutefois disposer au profit de leur père, mère, ayant ou aîné, ou autre ascendant, en sorte qu'ils soient de la qualité susdite, pourvu que lors du Testament et décès du Testateur, les dits père, mère ou autres ascendants ne soient remariés

The British Stat. 14. Geo. 3. ch. 83. Sec. 10 —

Provided also, that it shall and may be lawful to and for every person, that is owner of any lands goods or credits in the said Province, and that has a right to alienate the said lands, goods or credits, in his or her lifetime by deed of Sale, gift or otherwise, to devise or bequeath the same at his or her death, by his or her last will & testament; any law, usage, or custom, heretofore or now prevailing in the Province to the contrary hereof in anywise notwithstanding — Such will being executed either according to the laws of Canada, or according to the forms prescribed by the Laws of England —

By Prov. Stat. 41 Geo. 3. ch. 4 - entitled — "An act to explain and amend the law respecting last Wills and testaments" — It is enacted —

That it shall and may be lawful for all and every person ~~and~~ persons, of sound intellect, and of age, having the legal exercise of their rights, to devise or bequeath by last will and testament, whether the same be made by a husband or wife in favor of each other, or in favor of one or more of their children, as they shall see meet, or in favor of any other person or persons whatsoever, all and every his ~~and~~ her lands, goods or credits, whatever be the tenure of such lands, and whether they be proper, acquets, or conquets, without reserve, restriction, or limitation whatsoever, any law, usage or custom to the contrary hereof in anywise notwithstanding —

according to the 276^o. art. of the Custom, it is expressly prohibited to the minor to give by deed of gift, or by will to his Tutor, Curator &c — and if this were the only law to be considered, the question must readily be determined — but it has been contended, that under the Prov. Stat. L. 1. Geo. 3, all impediments under the 276^o. have been removed, and that the minor is entitled under this Stat. to make a will in favor of his tutor — that the words in that Stat. "being of age", imply, the age at which a person can make a will, and not the age of majority — and as the age at which a minor could make a will of his moveables was under the 293^o, being 20 years, we can claim the benefit of the Prov. Statute —

To better understand this, we must examine what the import of the word "ages" is, as used by the Custom, which will assist us in finding out the intention of the legislature in the St. of L 1 Geo 3. when the same word, or words of some import, are used, as being consistent with the legal interpretation to be put upon this latter act — Now it is evident, when the Custom, makes use of the word, "ages" — ~~with~~ ^{and hence} connected unconnected with any particular age, it means and intends, the age of majority — for —

Let us first look at the 292^o. art. before us — in reading it, every one must be satisfied that it means the age of majority — because none but majors, under that Custom, have the power of alienation of the property described in this article — Let us next read the 293^o. article, when a power of alienation is given to a person under age — it here appears in express terms

20 years -

terms the age, and the extent of the authority given
the alienation of meubles, meubles, & congrets immobiliers, and
the latter part of the article might have been omitted as
superabundant, ~~because~~ and as sufficiently provided for by
the 29^e art.

In other articles where the Custom is ~~concerning~~ a legal
capacity to persons under age to do certain acts, it does not
fail to express the age and the extent of the authority - look
at the 32^e art. Tout homme tenant Fief est tenu &
reputé âgé à 20 ans, et la fille à 15 ans — quant
à la foi & hommage, & charge du Fief —

See the 113^e art. where the word "âgés", is used alone
as descriptive of a particular kind of persons,

"Si aucun a joui et possédé héritage ou rente à juste
titre et de bonne foi, tant par lui que ses prédecesseurs,
dont il a le droit et cause, franchement sans inquietation
par dix ans entre présens, vingt ans entre absens - âgés,
et non privilégiés, il acquiert prescription du d^r. héritage
ou rente" — Here it is evident that the word âgés
means persons able to prosecute their rights — able to alienate
them — or to lose them by non-use — and all the Com-
mentators agree to say, that the word so used, means
persons of the age of majority —

See also. The 120^e art. — 123^e d^r 124^e — & others where
word is used in same manner & sense —

What do the Commentators say on the same subject —
Fer. Dic. N^o âge — Nos Coutumes se servent de ce terme
pour signifier un majeur de 25 ans — and refers to 113 art.
above cited —

Repⁿ N^o "Age" In speaking of the terms, in the Coutume
d'Artois - "est reputé âgé" says, les Coutumes qui s'expriment
de la sorte, ne veulent pas dire que les enfans parviennent à
l'âge dont elles parlent, sont pour cela majeurs, mais
seulement qu'ils sont reputés tels — ainsi la majorité qu'elles
indiquent n'est proprement qu'une emancipation. —

Fer. 4^e ap.

Il en seroit autrement si le mot "âge", étoit employé seul, et sans aucun terme qui caractérise une fiction, car alors, il devrait par la loi et abstraictement à la signification particulière que pourroient lui donner les paroles dont il seroit précédées ou suivies, designer la majorité parfaite, l'âge de 25 ans.

see also the remarks of Maillart on 72. art. of same Custom - on words "ages & non privilégiés" - which are applicable here -

The Custom of Paris therefore appearing to point out, where it means to vest any power or authority in the minor, that it is done by express terms, and not by implication, and in the case before us it appears to vest ~~the right of willing~~ in the minor the right of disposing by last will and testament of certain portion of his property and estate, ~~but prohibiting~~ this disposition in favor of a Tutor - it comes then to be considered, how far the British and Provincial Statutes have removed this incapacity arising from the relative situations of minor and Tutor -

The British Statute of the 14th Geo. 3. ch. 83 cannot be considered as extending the power of the minor in regard of disposing of his property by will - it says, that the owner of any lands, goods, or credits who has a right to alienate the same in his lifetime by deed of sale, gift, or otherwise, may devise or bequeath the same by his last will & testament - Then the power to devise or bequeath his will was made coextensive w^t the power to sell or give by deed - but what could the minor sell or give by deed?

nothing -

wishing, unless when married or emancipated, he could give his moveable property by deed — being of the age of 20 years — But the minor could dispose of more than this by will under the 293^o art. of the custom before the British statute, which does not extend to him or benefit him in this respect —

Let us next consider the Provincial Stat. — It is certainly more general in its expressions and in its effect, but it does not appear to come in aid of the minor, but on the contrary to exclude him in express terms — all persons of sound intellect, and of age, having the legal exercise of their rights, have the most ample powers given to them to ~~give~~^{leave} and bequeath by will, but persons under age, although entitled to give by will, cannot by any construction, be considered as coming within this ^{description} ~~statute~~, unless we could suppose a few words to be added after the word, "âgé", so as to make the clause run thus, and of age of 20 years, as stated in the 293^o art. of the Custom, for without this, the words, "and of age", are the words contained in the 292^o art. ~~of personnes âgées~~, and must be interpreted in the same manner ~~that is, le mot, âgé, étant employé seul et sans aucun terme~~ and according to this interpretation, âgées, c'est à dire majeurs — Car âge nis absolument, (as is the case here) est entendu de la majorité, et en droit, le mot, âgé, est entendu du âge de 25 ans. —

and according to
the general
meaning and
import of similar
words used in
other articles of
the Custom

N^o. 217

Armour }
 Wm Hunter &
 Thos Hunter }

Action of Debt on Obligation -

Decls. states, that on 16th Sept^r 1820 the
 Defend^ts made their certain Obligation
 before Doucet & another, public Note & acknowledged
 themselves to owe & be indebted to the persons carrying
 on the Banking business at Montreal under the
 name and style of the president-Brokers and
 Company of the Bank of Canada, the said Plff
 acting for and on behalf of the said Association
 and present & accepting for them, in a sum of
 £1179, 13 - for value rec^d from the said Association
 which said sum with interest the D^t Defend^t jointly
 and severally did bind & oblig^d themselves to pay
 to the plff or to his successor in office, by payment
 of £200 by & am. to be paid in quarterly pay^ts
 of £50 - out of the rents of the D^t Defend^t house in
 Montreal, with the express condition that if the
 Defend^t should fail in making the said quarterly
 payments as the same became due, or such failure
 the entire principal sum above stated & then unpaid
 should become payable & demand - that on the
 first Feby. 1822, the sum of £100 for two quarterly
 pay^ts of the aforesaid principal sum of money became
 and is still due, whereby plff are entitled to
 demands, the whole of the aforesaid principal sum
 of money & interest - & continues to pay^t of £1200-

The Defend^t plead severally, and state -

for Plea of Preemptory exception. -

- 1st. That the obligation in question was made without any legal cause or consideration stated or set forth in the declaration & is therefore null and void in law.
- 2^d. That at the time of making the said Obligation there was not due or owing, nor hath there since become due or owing any debt or sum of money whatever by the said ~~Duty~~ to the said Plaintiff.
3. That by making of the said Obligation no debt became due or owing by the ~~Duty~~ to the Plaintiff.
- 4th. That the debt does not set forth a legal cause of action & is insufficient & irregular.

2^d Plea - Nel. debto

3^o Plea - matters stated in declr are insufficient in law to entitle Plaintiff to maintain his action.

4^o Plea - The association of the Bank of Canada is illegal, & Plaintiff cannot maintain his action.

Replication, contains a general answer to the Plea

It has been settled as a principle of law, that both off. No 58, stipulations made between two persons in favor of a third are legal and binding as between the parties stipulating, and that he who has the legal interest may enforce the contract in favor of him who has the beneficial interest - This has been settled in some of the Bank Cases, even upon blank indorsements on promissory notes, under which the Cashier of the Bank has been admitted to bring the action, for monies advanced theron by the Bank.

59. -

although there appeared no special contract to support the action - The case before us seems to be stronger, on account of the special contract to pay to the Plff, who alone is entitled to bring the action - For the present Directors and Company of the Bank of Canada had no legal existence, either to ^{make a} contract, or to enforce the performance of ~~it~~ - and if they had yet they are no parties to this obligation, & have only their equitable remedy agt the Plff in what he may have received to their use -

The law of England appears to be the same in this respect. in the Case of Offy. v. Ward. 1st Levintz Rep. 235 - Held, that an obligation made to A. for the use of B. B can neither sue, nor release it - A case strongly analogous to the present is 12 East Rep. 400 in Theophilus Mibcufsdal. v. Bruin - where a bond given to Trustees to secure the faithful services of a Clerk to the Globe Insurance Co who were no corporation, may be put in suit by the Trustees - and it was there held that the intervention of the Trustees removed all legal and technical difficulties to such a contract made with or suit instituted by the Company themselves as a natural body -

There has been a case adjudged in this Court when

where the same principles came in question
Bun of Mr David Mc Gillivray & Co vs Leger et
Parisiens Feb. Term. 1819 - where a contract was
entered into ^{between} ~~by~~ the Plffs & ~~Defendt~~ as agents of the
et W. Co with Defendt that he should perform
certain services as a Canal-Man for that Co
and upon failure the Defendt was held liable
in damages to the Plffs. —

N 125

Davis

Ermatinger }

On action ag^t the Defendant as Sheriff
for the value of certain effects by him
taken and seized under a writ of Seizure - arrest
sued out at the suit of one Joseph ag^t the Plaintiff
and which seizure was afterwards discontinued
and withdrawn by the Plaintiff in that Cause, and
when the Seizure was taken off it was found
that the Goods in question were missing -
The bailiff who made the Seizure under the
Sheriff's warrant, appointed one Burt, another
bailiff, to be the Gardien of the effects seized - the
Sheriff now adduces this Burt as a witness on
his behalf and at same time filed a release to
him of all actions in regard of the present demand
Due - If the Gardien under such circumstances
can be a witness for the Sheriff -

Nov 1594

In Lemiers
Lab^r Thayer
Agdum oppo

An opposition a fin de conserva-

On 21 Oct 1822. the plff obt^s Judg^t. at
the Dpnd^r for £60.3.7. in wages as a
Seaman on board a certain Schooner, hly
belonging to Dppd.

This vessel had been attacked
and seized by virtue of a writ of Saissie arrt prior
to Judg^t and of^t was adjudged to hold good thereon
in the pay^t and satisfaction of the plff claim

After the Saissie arrt had been made and prior
to Judg^t being rendered the Plff gave his consent
in writing, dated 6th May 1822, by which he gave
permission to the Dpnd^r who had been named
guardian under the Saissie arrt, to make use of
this vessel, he the Plff reserving his recourse ag^t
the said Dpnd^r as such guardian for the said
Jdg^t in case the said Schooner should not be delivered
up in time. — In consequence of this permission
the Dpnd^r made a voyage to the West Indies
with the vessel in summer '22, in q^t — voyage the
vessel was materially damaged and obliged to go into
port at St George in the Island of Grenada in order
to repair, where being in want of money to defray the
payment of Seamen's wages, provisions and other
necessary disbursements, the master disposed of a
part of the cargo to the amount of £374.5. which
belonged to the Opposants — The vessel having
returned

returned into port and having been sold under
a writ of Execution by the Sheriff, the Oppo's
claim a privilege on the proceeds to be reimbursed
the monies oft had been so expended out of their
Cargo on board, for the repairs — The Plaintiff on
the other hand contends that he has a prior
right to be paid before the Oppo's —

Abbot on Shipp's
p. 430 —

In proceeding against the ship in specie
if the value thereof be insufficient to discharge
all the claims upon it, the Seaman's claim for
his wages, is preferred before all other charges for
the same reason, that the last bottoming bond
is preferred to those of an earlier debt — the
labor of the Seaman having brought the ship
to the destined port, has furnished to all other
persons the means of asserting their claims upon
it, which otherwise they could not have done

1 Holt on Ship p. 443. — The wages of mariners take precedence of
bottoming bonds, the Sailor being entitled of all
1 Dadson. 40 other persons to the proceeds as a security for wages —

1 Bush & Ald. p 575 The Master of a ship has not a lien on
the ship or freight for his wages, or for his
disbursements on account of the ship during the
voyage, or for the premiums paid by him abroad
for the purpose of procuring the cargo —
see Hussey v. Christie & al. q. East. 426.

To Mr Scott -

1. Dodson's Reps.
204. - case of the
Rhadamanthe

In this species of Security (Hypothecation bonds) which is entered into under the pressure of necessity, the order of payment is very properly reversed, since without the subsidiary aid of a later bond, the property would be totally lost, both to the owners and former bond holders -

1 Dodson. 278

The Alexander

It is unnecessary for me to state, that bonds of hypothecation, are of a very high and privileged nature - they were invented for the purpose of procuring the necessary supplies for ships which may happen to be in distress in foreign ports, where the master and the owners are without credit, and where, unless assistance could be secured by means of such an instrument, the vessels and their cargoes must be left to perish - It is important therefore to the interests of commerce that bonds of this kind should be upheld with a very strong hand, and accordingly they have at all times been so upheld by this Court, when they appear to have been entered into bona fide, & without any suspicion of fraud. -

2. Emerigon.
p. 509. 570 -

Les loyers des Matelots employés au dernier voyage seront payés par préférence à tous Créditeurs - see authorities citées -

Si le Capitaine a besoin d'argent pour l'expédition du navire, qu'il ne trouve personne qui ~~se~~ veuille lui en prêter, et que les marchands n'en aient point, il doit vendre des marchandises jusqu'à la concurrence de la somme nécessaire, et ceux dont les marchandises auront été vendues pour ce sujet seront préférés à tous les autres, excepté aux Marins pour leurs Salaires -

Id. p. 571.

L'ordonnance de Wisbey dit. art. 45 — que le marchand auquel appartiennent les marchandises (vendues pour besoins du vaisseau) ou le manieur qui aura prêté, auront spéciale hypothèque à la suite sur le navire —

Valin. t. 14.

art. 16. p. 362.

Les loyers des matelots, employés au dernier voyage, seront payés par préférence à tous créanciers; and on note. p. 363 — he says — Apres les loyers des gens de l'equipage viennent les créanciers opposans pour deniers prêtés à la grosse ou autrement pendant le voyage pour les nécessités du navire — de même ceux dont les marchandises ont été vendues pour même cause, qu'ils y aient consenti ou non —

Il sembleroit que des créanciers de cette nature sans le secours desquels le navire n'aurroit pas achevé son voyage, devroient concourir avec les gens de l'equipage; cependant il est vrai de dire qu'en quelque endroit que le navire eut été retenu, ne pouvant plus continuer son voyage les matelots auoient trouvé le moyen de se faire payer de leurs gages sur le navire — ainsi la préférence que cet article leur donne est juste à tous égards, d'autant plutôt qu'ils contribuent plus efficacement encore par leur travail au retour du navire que tous créanciers fournissoient prêteurs —

See also what is said in regard of the privilege of the seller & others having a preference on a vessel before she goes to sea, but which they cannot claim afterwards —

St.
Inv. 1. Tit. 14
art. 17. —


Si le navire vendu, n'a point encore fait de voyage, le vendeur, les charpentiers, calfauteurs et autres ouvriers employés à la construction, ensemble les créanciers pour les bois, cordages, et autres choses fournies pour le batiment, seront payés par préférence à tous créanciers, et par concurrence entre eux —

aut

Inv. 2. Tit. 10. art. 2 — Seront néanmoins tous vaisseaux, affectés aux dettes du Vendeur, jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient fait un voyage en mer sous le nom et aux risques du nouvel acquereur — si ce n'est qu'ils aient été vendus par décret

B.

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


V. 21. W

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


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
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
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See Letters. T. V. V. W. - after C

